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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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SOCIALISTS' BLECHA ANALYZES VOTING TRENDS, SOCIAL STRATA

Vienna NEUE AZ in German 6 Feb 87 p 5

[Article by Herbert Lackner: "'Sociological Dilemma' Is Causing Concern to SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party]--Psephologist Blecha's Analysis Before the Renewal Debate;" first paragraph is NEUE AZ introduction]

[Text] The German Social Democrats, who are losing primarily young voters to the Greens, are not the only ones to be interested at present in the science of electoral sociology; last Wednesday the SPOe Presidium devoted an entire day to discussing short-term and long-term social changes which call for new strategies. Karl Blecha, deputy party chairman and psephologist, outlines for NEUE AZ/TAGBLATT his analysis of the SPOe's "sociological dilemma."

Fundamentally, in Blecha's view, the SPOe is threatened by two dangers--"a return to conservatism, which of course is directed against us, and a protest against this return, which in the form of 'postmaterialism' (that is, the Green movements-Ed) is likewise directed against us."

The dilemma can, however, also be defined on a different level. Blecha states: "On one hand, we are the chancellor's party, which automatically entails identification with the system, and, on the other hand, a socialist party by definition must of course also address those among the population who are critical of the system."

Finally, there is a third way of approaching this dilemma: "We have done everything in our power to improve the material living conditions of people, and now there are two effects that are causing great problems for us. On one hand, the voter adapts his demands of the state to his new higher standard of living--demands which the state is, however, unable to fulfill. On the other hand, he is disgruntled because, though he has everything his grandfather fought for, he is nevertheless not happy. For this, he blames the politicians and of course also the SPOe."

And--as if three dilemmas weren't enough--yet another comprehensive sociological problem is added, Blecha says. Since, after 17 years of Socialist-dominated governments, "class society has leveled off at least somewhat," people no longer think in terms of these (class) categories but, because of the educational reform, in terms of similar social concepts.

And, according to Blecha's provocative theory, this is where the greatest problem of all lies: Because supporters of the SPOe have far less homogeneous social concepts than, say, conservatives, the party faces great communication problems. The SPOe sociologist tries to prove this by applying to Austrian conditions a model developed by the German opinion poll institute INFAS [Institute for Applied Social Science]. Accordingly the electorate is divided into seven [as published] parts:

--Some 10 percent are young people oriented toward the future and career progress, hardly religious, and not tormented by a fear of technology, but displaying only limited political commitment. According to Belcha, the SPOe enjoys an absolute majority among them.

--Some 5 percent are postmaterialists-Alternatives who reject the typically conservative "duty and acceptance values" and follow a new system of "development values," being leisure oriented, fighting for self-determination and equal rights, but tending to refrain from voting or voting for the Greens.

--Some 10 percent are middle-aged liberals, career oriented, quality conscious, but also with a claim for self-development. According to Belcha, the SPOe enjoys a bare majority in this category.

--Some 15 percent are politically rather passive workers who do not earn a lot of money. This group is indifferent toward technology, not religious, and easy to enlist in the fight against alleged privileges. Though the SPOe still enjoys a majority among these people, there is an increasing trend among them toward not voting or toward switching to a conservative party.

--Some 10 percent are more socially oriented workers. They are open to new things, greatly interested in the preservation of the social state, and active in labor unions. Though they constitute the traditional core of SPOe voters, their stance has been shaken somewhat at present.

--Some 25 percent are adaptable performance-oriented "normal citizens" who regard the family as a stronghold which must have hierarchies just as there are hierarchies in the working world. They are status conscious, in favor of the welfare state, but see a lot of "parasites" in that state. In this group the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] enjoys a clear majority.

--Some 10 percent are classical conservatives, urban citizens who are very well educated and greatly interested in politics. Among these, the OeVP enjoys an unequivocal majority.

--Some 15 percent are elderly people--the "war generation," which is spread over all camps but very recently has shown that it can be appealed to by politicians of Haider's ilk.

Blecha states: "Despite the fact that such an analysis is only approximate, it is evident that the corps of SPOe supporters is far less homogeneous. We have to address all of them, though."

And the way out of this manifold dilemma? First of all, says the SPOe deputy chairman, it is necessary to point out the limits of the state. "We have to make it clear that the state cannot pay for everything, such as protection of the environment or garbage removal for instance." But there is also a need to make clear "that the Socialists are the advocate of the weak." And in that respect there is a need for a "revolution of souls," with the Socialists' fundamental values, such as liberty, equality, justice, and solidarity, being turned into universal fundamental values. Only then will it be possible also to succeed in elections, "for then one is elected because one accords with these fundamental values and is in fact the advocate of the weak--because then one is also elected by the kind of person who does not get such a lot out of it, being well off anyway." For that purpose, says Blecha, rational programs are not enough; what is needed in addition is emotion. And his vision is a vision of more creative work, greater participation, greater justice.

These questions are to be subjected to broad debate at a big congress on the future this June.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

DIFFICULTIES FORESEEN IN CREATING 'RED' COALITION AFTER VOTE

Risks Seen For SDP

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 8 Mar 87 pp 8-9

[Op Ed Article by Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittelkow: "Red Cabinet"; first paragraph is AKTUEL introduction]

[Text] The idea of voting for the Socialist People's Party [SF] does not seem so strange as far as at least 42 percent of the Danish people are concerned. On the basis of a new political opinion poll the authors of the debate book, "Red Majority," write about the possibility of an SDP-SF government.

In February the Institute for Opinion Analysis conducted a political survey. As usual people were asked which party they would vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow. The answers to this question were not surprising; they resembled what we have seen in other opinion polls.

But the institute then asked another question: which party would you vote for if you were unable to vote for your first choice? The answers to this question were really interesting.

One figure in particular must have given every Social Democrat a jolt: 26 (twenty-six) percent of the respondents said SF was their leading candidate for "second-choice party"--a higher figure than any other party received. (Source: KOOPERATIONEN and the Institute for Opinion Analysis) If we add this 26 percent to the 16 percent who named SF as their "first choice" in the survey, the result is that voting for SF does not seem like such a strange idea to at least 42 percent of the Danish population!

Figures like this should lead the Social Democrats to finally give up two illusions:

First, the illusion that the SF advance has reached its absolute limit with the 16-18 percent level the party currently has in the polls. SF can make further gains and this can occur at the expense of the Social Democrats unless they seize the opportunity.

Second, the illusion that the present SF success is just a ripple on the political surface and does not involve deep-rooted attitudes.

In actual fact SF has been borne along by new attitudes among the Danish people, especially members of the younger generations. And these attitudes are here to stay.

The new attitudes made their first breakthrough during the youth rebellion in 1968. At that time they were still being presented in a very narrow, academic and romantic revolutionary version. Since then they have become somewhat more popular in nature through the grass-roots movements. And some of the new attitudes have gradually won quite a broad foothold among the general population.

The new elements involve both political substance and political style.

People started to emphasize matters that politicians had not paid much attention to in the past. The environment and energy, discrimination against women and women's consciousness were some of the more central issues.

People also started to look at politics in a new way. They no longer voted entirely automatically for a particular party on the basis of their social background and tradition. People wanted to make decisions to a larger extent on the basis of the ideas and attitudes the parties had to offer with respect to the burning issues of the day--social redress, the environment or arms reduction, for example.

At the same time people turned away from centralism and trusteeship and demanded personal influence over what was going on.

The Social Democratic labor movement was not very well-equipped to meet the new demands when they broke out. On the contrary, it reacted to them sluggishly and unwillingly. On the other hand the new currents did not show much understanding or respect for the results the Social Democratic labor movement had achieved.

Therefore the encounter was not a particularly happy one initially. The result was that the new currents moved to the left of the Social Democratic Party. Here they were stuck in a protest role, far removed from political responsibility and practical politics. This was detrimental to both sides.

Gradually, as the new attitudes spread through the general population, the effect could be noticed in the distribution of votes between the Social Democratic Party and SF. Little by little the Social Democrats began to react and undertake the renewal that was needed. This has had an impact on the party's environmental, energy and security policies and on its attitude toward democracy, among other things.

But apparently this has not been enough. At any rate the party has not regained the ground it has lost. If we examine the present situation we may be able to find part of the explanation.

As we approach the next election there is only one possible alternative to a continued nonsocialist government: a red majority made up of the Social Democrats and SF.

But in spite of this the Social Democrats have refused to hold a joint discussion with SF concerning what can and should be done after the election. Instead we have seen only scattered polemics that look like nothing more than the traditional tactical maneuvers between two parties trying to capture votes from each other.

As far as that goes it is quite understandable why the Social Democrats remain skeptical about the prospect of a red majority. There are still big problems in relation to the Socialist People's Party when it comes to economic policy, defense and security policy, attitudes toward EC, etc. So big that it is very doubtful that a red majority could stay the course after the election.

But it does little good to refuse to face the facts. Regardless of their skepticism the Social Democrats would be wise to enter into joint discussions with SF much more openly and actively. By rejecting joint talks they have simply confirmed the picture of the Social Democratic Party that made the new currents in Danish politics go to the left of the party.

The Social Democrats risk presenting the picture of a party that thinks of nothing but votes and power. A party that is arrogant toward those who would like to cooperate with it. A party that is unclear in its statements about what it wants politically. And a party that is on the defensive in the debate over political ideas in comparison to the Socialist People's Party which keeps doing the best it can.

At the same time they have not calmed anyone down by keeping their distance from SF in this way. Every voter in Denmark today is quite aware that the only way the Social Democrats can regain government power in the foreseeable future is by depending on the support of the Socialist People's Party.

Of course there is a risk that the talks with the Socialist People's Party will break down. But there is a far greater risk that a red majority will break down after the election because of inadequate preparation. One could say the same thing about the risk that the Social Democratic Party will stand as the villain among the growing number of voters who are in sympathy with the new attitudes in Danish politics.

Jorgensen Rejects SF Goals

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 13-19 Mar 87 pp 1-2

[Interview with Social Democratic Party chairman Anker Jorgensen by Solveig Rodsgaard: "Jorgensen Wants Election Campaign Now"; date and place not given; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE AFTEN introduction]

[Excerpts] Social Democratic Party chairman Anker Jorgensen is hoping to win the support of 35 percent of the voters so that he can become prime minister after the next Folketing election. With a straight Social Democratic cabinet, for he is doubtful about SF's government capability. Anker Jorgensen does not want to devalue the krone; instead the economic situation should be improved by means of savings with a social purpose.

The Social Democrats are dismissing in advance any possibility of using the exchange rate of the krone as a tool for improving Danish competitiveness. So said SDP chairman Anker Jorgensen, who assured us that under no circumstances would a government led by him succumb to the temptation to carry out a devaluation. Not even a small one.

"I definitely reject the idea of touching the exchange rate of the krone and there is complete agreement on that in the Social Democratic Party. We will not do it," said Anker Jorgensen.

Instead the Social Democrats want to stress savings as an economic adjustment mechanism.

"We do not want to make savings a way of avoiding taxes. What we have in mind is savings with a social purpose, such as retirement savings accounts," Anker Jorgensen said.

It is his opinion that optimism in Denmark has now been replaced by broad pessimism and he wants a speedy Folketing election. Anker Jorgensen believes that from a purely tactical viewpoint the government would benefit from a speedy election because the economic realities cannot remain hidden behind "Poul Schluter's optimism for more than a few weeks or months."

Anker Jorgensen rejects the SF idea of sharp tax increases in order to finance social reforms. And the SF idea of handing the workers a 35-hour work week is described as completely meaningless, irresponsible and unacceptable. All in all it does not look at this time as if an SDP-SF alliance is viable unless SF changes its position in a number of areas. Anker Jorgensen also insists that an indispensable condition for a government led by the Social Democrats is that the party wins more support in the election. The goal is 35 percent of the votes compared to the 31.6 percent the Social Democrats won in the January 1984 election. But in opinion polls conducted since that time the party has not risen much higher than the 31.6 percent level. The latest Gallup poll published in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE gave the Social Democrats a support level of only 29.4 percent.

Tax Reform

Anker Jorgensen also rejects a reappraisal of the compromises the Social Democrats have entered into with the nonsocialist government over the years. This includes the tax reform compromise.

"Naturally the tax reform agreement cannot remain unchallenged forever. But the agreement must remain in effect for a relatively long period of time. I cannot set a precise number of years, but no changes can be made in the substance of the tax reform for the first couple of years. One must bear in mind that the tax reform is the result of a balanced solution in which the individual parties to the compromise had to make concessions on a number of points," Anker Jorgensen said.

SF, Money and 35-Hour Week

[Question] SF chairman Gert Petersen believes that as a public employer a red majority could hand the wage earners a 35-hour work week during the midterm negotiations 2 years from now.

[Answer] It is possible that a promise of this kind could be carried out in certain circumstances. But I regard it as completely meaningless. One cannot first tell the labor market groups that they must negotiate a settlement and then say afterwards that there are a few things missing here and there and that they will be taken care of when we have a red majority.

SDP Government

[Question] Svend Auken has indicated that a straight Social Democratic minority government after the election is the most likely outcome. Have you also dropped SF as a potential government partner?

[Answer] We cannot drop anyone. But there are many indications that when it comes to the point the mood in SF will make it impossible to establish a true government cooperation. Of course things may look different when the election results are in. And if SF is fully prepared to follow our views at that time, the possibility of a cooperation should be evaluated. But I must confess that I am skeptical.

[Question] Do you feel things are moving in SF when it comes to the party's position on defense?

[Answer] Yes there is a lot of movement in SF. But it is unclear what the conclusion will be. One day Gert Petersen says that SF could easily live with a zero solution for defense. The next day he is contradicted by the SF executive committee, whose members do not believe he can entertain views like that. I think it would be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at defense policy solutions with SF. I don't know if we can do so in 5 or 7 years. But just now it looks as if SF is not ready at all.

[Question] In other words, you are saying indirectly that there is no question of a government cooperation?

[Answer] We don't know how sensible SF might become with the speed of light. But the Social Democratic position is quite clear: no cuts in defense. Although I think our defense system has a reasonable size, defense expenditures are not enormous. We have a defense system that is--if you will pardon the expression--defensible. But on the other hand there is no justification for cutting back. We are a responsible party and we maintain a political attitude toward defense. It is our intention to arrive at a defense agreement with the parties with whom we have entered into defense agreements in the past. But we have clear conditions. We will not accept increases in defense spending except for price and wage increases or other demonstrable increments. The government has said that between 800 million and 1 billion kroner should go to real growth in the defense sector. We definitely reject that. I think the Liberals and the Conservatives should use the defense issue in the election campaign, they can have a competition over who is the biggest defense supporter.

Gains Necessary

[Question] Do you still think the Social Democrats must show election gains before you can start negotiating with SF?

[Answer] It is quite necessary for the Social Democrats to win more support. We will work and fight for that and I hope we can win the kind of support we received in the municipal elections in November 1985. People predicted then that we would not make any progress, but we did anyway. To be quite honest, my goal is to get around 35 percent of the votes. But aside from that it is a fact that unless we get more support there will be no red majority. The only time the polls show a red majority is when the Social Democrats move ahead.

[Question] Can you imagine the Socialist People's Party winning so many votes that there would be a red majority on the basis of SF gains?

[Answer] No, I can't. That would involve an even greater risk that we would be unable to implement sensible economic solutions. The Social Democrats would not go along with that.

Where Are the Voters?

[Question] It is a matter of fact that 4 1/2 years of nonsocialist rule have not produced more voter support for the Social Democrats than they had in the election in January 1984. Why is that?

[Answer] There are probably several reasons. There is still a tendency to shift to the right, not just in Denmark but across Europe as well. There are also shifts on the far left whether we are talking about green movements or socialist parties of one kind or another. Thus there is a

tendency toward a massive shift to the right in a broad segment of the population and at the same time there is a tendency among those who have been moderate socialists in the past to become somewhat more aggressive. That may be understandable when we look at developments in the environmental area, for example. These former moderate socialists are very consistent in their demands, which we support, incidentally. But they are not inclined to vote for the Social Democratic Party, which they identify as the party that let things slide in the past. Even though the Danish Social Democrats were the party and the government leaders who established the first Environmental Affairs Ministry in the world. Many people have forgotten that.

The right-hand side of Folketing has not been strengthened numerically. When the Conservative forces grow stronger it is at the expense of the other nonsocialist parties. And the parties to the left of center have become stronger overall. But the picture is very mixed. Of course it is unsatisfactory for the Social Democrats that we have not made progress. But there is nothing else to do but keep plodding along. We must continue to talk about the economic realities, even though we are well aware that some people will not vote for us because of it. We must face the economic realities squarely.

Criticism in AKTUEL

[Question] Last week AKTUEL wrote in an editorial that not even the "prospect of economic chaos would induce the large middle group of voters to want Anker Jorgensen back as prime minister." A few days later another editorial said that "the Social Democratic Party has still not restored its authority sufficiently." Do you agree with that view?

[Answer] If by authority one means that we have not regained voter support as measured in the opinion polls, then all I can say is that we hope this will happen in the election. I have just given an explanation of why things are going slowly. But I believe and expect that we will regain our strength. We really believe that in an election campaign--and also before that--it will be possible for us to make people see the truth about economic policy and such things as environmental policy, for example.

[Question] Doesn't it make an impression on you when AKTUEL writes that kind of thing?

[Answer] There are many things that make an impression on me. Many editorials make an impression. I have no other comment to make.

[Question] But AKTUEL is the union movement's newspaper.

[Answer] Yes, it is. We have a free press, it must be allowed to say what it wants to. It is an open press and if it wants to make some critical remarks it can do so. That may be what is involved here.

Change of Leadership?

[Question] If we do not have a Social Democratic government after the next election, will you still be a candidate for the party chairmanship at the 1988 party congress?

[Answer] I will not say anything about when I am going to step down. That is something I will announce when it is absolutely imminent. Not before.

[Question] Will you say anything about deliberations if you have not achieved government power prior to the 1988 congress?

[Answer] I can only say that we hope and believe that we will achieve government power. There is a good chance we will and in that case I will naturally continue to serve as party chairman and prime minister.

[Question] You have said that Svend Auken is the best person and the only candidate to succeed you.

[Answer] I stand by what I have said. But I have nothing to add to it.

Broad Cooperation

[Question] If you form a straight Social Democratic government after the election, is it conceivable that you would try to resume the traditional cooperation with the Radical Liberals, the Christian People's Party and the Center-Democrats rather than cooperate with SF?

[Answer] I do not have a great deal of confidence in the Christian People's Party and the Center-Democrats [CD] after the years we have been through. But no possibility will remain untried in the effort to win support for the policies that must be carried out. I also think that if we have an SDP-SF majority it should not shut itself off and be self-sufficient. It must be open and make an effort to involve other reasonable forces. It is true that I find it a little difficult to see who they are at this time. But the attempt must be made. We do not intend to enact all the good things with the help of one side of Folketing and then raise the money with the help of the right-wing forces. Broad cooperation is needed.

[Question] There are also people who talk about a cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives. Do you regard this as something you would even dream of in the foreseeable future?

[Answer] I don't know if there is anyone who is dreaming about it. But I cannot imagine that we could possibly form a government, for example, with the party which in fact--although not always in reality--is the strongest representative of the austerity policy. This does not mean that we cannot cooperate with the Conservatives. There are certainly areas where we can cooperate. We have done so before and we will continue to do so.

Agreements and Investments

[Question] You reject a reappraisal of the agreements the Social Democrats have reached with the government. Mogens Camre noted that when he talked about a reappraisal of the Great Belt agreement and the agreement on the hybrid network. Is this intended to underline the fact that a hypothetical future Social Democratic government will stand by the agreements that have been reached?

[Answer] It is. We reached an agreement with the government parties to establish a permanent link across the Great Belt. We stand by the entire agreement. We are especially happy about the first part, which sets a priority on mass transit and it also coincides with technological developments in general. And secondly it is also a fact that this is an investment that will pay for itself. A very high degree of self-financing is involved. A permanent link is also advantageous from the point of view of foreign currency and in other ways. The stupidest thing one could do in such a grave economic situation as the one the government has led us into would be to believe that the problems can be solved with passive measures. Instead there is a need for active measures. I can easily understand why the private business sector lacks the naive optimism Poul Schluter has expressed. I am not exaggerating when I say that an enormous pessimism is taking hold. But we must not abandon in panic the investments that have a perspective and a future.

[Question] Which of the things the Social Democrats intend to deal with do your voters put a high priority on, in your opinion?

[Answer] The entire health area and the social sector, making the job environment better and safer, social reform, joint influence and joint decisions in the form of economic democracy and profit-sharing, an active policy on culture, the environment, peace and security.

[Question] You didn't say anything about the economy.

[Answer] It is inherent in our entire position that we cannot hope to solve all the big problems that exist unless we solve the economic problems at the same time. A very strong savings effort is needed. Not as a tax dodge, but savings with a social purpose, such as pension savings accounts.

Bjerregaard Doubts Heading Party

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 12 Feb 87 p 7

[Article by Ole Lorenzen]

[Text] Copenhagen--The vice chairman of the Social Democratic Folketing group, Ritt Bjerregaard, does not think she will become either SDP chairman or prime minister.

"I made up my mind a long time ago that things would not work out like that. My role is to stir things up, to get debates started. To make people realize certain things that they are well aware of in a way but would rather not talk about. This is not a role that can be combined with that of prime minister or party chairman. It is inevitable that many people will feel offended," Ritt Bjerregaard told AKTUEL.

"The latest example is environmental policy. Calling something by its real name, saying filth instead of pollution, makes some people extremely angry. There are some who think it makes people block things out and that nothing more will be done. But every time the opposite happens. When the debate is over people have moved a little bit farther in their awareness of the problem and changes start coming.

Problems With Shipyards

"On this matter I have not had problems with our own people. In an earlier debate concerning shipyards I said that they are much too expensive per location. We simply have to use the money that goes to shipyards for some other job locations. Otherwise Denmark will be unable to hold its own in the future. That produced some very strong reactions in our own ranks. I do not think my political life should be restricted by what I may say and by what is expedient," Ritt Bjerregaard said.

"The union movement has often been very critical in relation to the things I have said. For that reason I have admitted quite openly that it would make it very difficult for me to entertain any thoughts about becoming Anker's successor," she added.

Svend Auken

But Ritt Bjerregaard also said that Svend Auken is the one who should succeed Anker Jorgensen--when the time comes.

"Svend has been elected as party vice chairman. He was also chosen as the party's political spokesman. In reality this means that a stand has been taken at this time," said Ritt Bjerregaard.

"No one can know when the changeover will take place or whether other candidates will turn up. But that does not change the fact that as things stand now, Svend is the successor and the only one who has been chosen for that role," she emphasized.

"It doesn't matter that one has different functions. And my own outspokenness has not prevented me from being vice chairman of the Folketing group as well as a cabinet minister. I have produced a great many practical solutions and compromises and at the same time I have started debates. Political life is not poorer because one handles a variety of tasks," Ritt Bjerregaard said.

Exhausting Personality Debates

"Finally, I think it is very exhausting for a party to hold personality debates. Some guess one and some guess another. Some think one person will be better than another, etc., etc. Therefore I prefer to say that it is Svend Auken who has been chosen and we can unite on that. I would also prefer to withdraw in order to get out of the perpetual personal race. Of course this does not alter the fact that the decision will be made by a democratic assembly and we will have to see what proposals are made," said Ritt Bjerregaard.

6578

CSO: 3613/50

POLITICAL

MALTA

FUNCTIONS OF NEW ISLAMIC CENTER REVIEWED

Tripoli AL-DA'WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH in Arabic 18 Feb 87 p 4

[Interview with Muhammad al-Sa'di, Imam of Islamic Center Mosque, by Muhammad Jiha: "The Islamic Center in Malta: 'God Is Great' in Malta after a Long Absence"]

[Text] The Islamic center in Malta is one of the centers for the dissemination of Islam which the great Jamahiriyyah has been concerned to establish, so that it will be at the service of Moslems in this island of utmost importance in terms of its location in the Mediterranean basin and the continent of Europe which is negatively and positively affected by all currents in and out of the Arab nation. Through their conquests of the south of the Mediterranean, the European Crusaders sought to rely on this small island and others and to adopt them as a base in which they could cram the instruments of military and intellectual invasion and exploit the religion of their inhabitants in blatant attempts to get them to take part in the schemes of Christianization directed at the Arab nation and Africa in general.

Therefore the Islamic revolution of the first [of September] had its special view regarding action to support the Islamic presence within this island, and it established this Islamic center, in realization of the dream of the Moslems there. It has not stinted material and moral aid to it over a period of 9 years. In our meeting with our brother Muhammad al-Sa'di, we asked him:

AL-DA'WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH: If you would give us first of all a glimpse, however brief, of the Islamic center in Malta -- when was this center established? What are the services it offers?

Muhammad al-Sa'di: The Islamic center in Malta is one of the achievements of the Libyan Moslem Arab people, who aspire to uplift the word of almighty glorious God on earth, the entire earth, thanks to the revolution of the first of September. Through the establishment of the Islamic center, with financing from the World Society of the Islamic Appeal, the dream of the Moslems in Malta and of the Moslems in all areas of the world has been realized, since the presence of Islam in Malta was severed finally in 1250. Seven centuries after this date, the sound of "God is great" has risen up in the skies of Malta after this long absence. No one had expected that the

Islamic presence would return to this country, 80 percent of whose inhabitants once upon a time were Moslems, and there is no doubt that it is a great accomplishment. The Moslem revolutionary Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi laid the cornerstone of this center in 1978 and its construction was completed in 1982. This center includes a public library which contains the major Islamic sourcebooks in Arabic and English. It also includes courses which teach the holy Koran and Islamic culture to the Moslem children present in Malta. It also includes a lecture hall and a meeting hall, in addition to various halls for athletic and social activities. Here we must offer thanks to the World Society of the Islamic Appeal which has realized this great achievement on the territory of Malta. This center, in my view, has two objectives: the first objective is to unify the Islamic community in Malta and provide it with the necessary Islamic culture so that it will commit itself to the teachings of Islam and not deviate in any of the currents of the religion of Islam, and the second objective is to enlighten Maltese society about the teachings of Islam and Islamic culture and explain the principles of the great Islam to these affectionate, sincere people, who support Arab causes and stand alongside us in international gatherings.

Praise be to blessed almighty God, and through his grace, we have been able to realize much in regard to these two goals, and we are still in the process of the Islamic appeal for the sake of realizing more.

AL-DA'WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH: Holy war on God's behalf is a religious obligation from which the Moslems have shrunk in this era in which we are living. They have clung to life at any price, while the teachings of Islam urge us, Moslems, to fight in holy war against the forces of injustice and aggression and crush them. Could you talk to us about this religious obligation, and about its notions and foundations, how the first Moslems understood it and carried it out in the best possible way and how the Moslems in this era have shrunk from it?

Muhammad al-Sa'di: Blessed almighty God has imposed holy war on the nation of Islam for two objectives: the first objective is to defend Moslem society and protect Islamic belief, and the second goal is to crush the political barriers which keep people from Islam. Our religion guarantees freedom of belief to people ("There is no compulsion regarding religion; uprightness has become clear from transgression"), and people are free to choose one religion or another. However, they must indeed be free, and they must not be exposed to any repression or pressure of any kind or any terror in any form. Blessed almighty God has made holy war on behalf of these two objectives mandatory, and the Moslems have in no way fought for the sake of imposing Islamic belief on others but rather in defense of people and defense of belief and for the sake of smashing the barriers which keep people from Islam. That is the goal of holy war. The goal of holy war is not colonialism, self-aggrandizement on earth, exploitation and the plunder of people's wealth, as we have seen with the phenomenon of Western imperialist colonialism. Our pure religion has imposed holy war upon us:

"Rush forward, light and heavy, and fight for the sake of God with your possessions and your spirits. That is the best for you, if you are aware." This is the religious obligation of holy war in the religion of Islam. All

Moslems, light and heavy, men and women, old men and young, must rise up to the field of combat for the sake of defending Islam, which Zionism is threatening and the vengeful Crusader spirit which wants to return to its previous positions is threatening, now that almighty glorious God has bestowed liberation from the grip and dominance of colonialism on the Moslems. The word of almighty glorious God will be as it always was, supreme, and the Moslems will triumph, with God's permission, if they return to their religion. "God has promised those among you who believe and do righteous deeds that he will surely make you successors on earth as he made those who were before them successors, and that he will surely establish their religion for them, with which he has become content, and will give them in exchange, after their fear, security: they shall worship me and not share anything with me in worship." If we adhere to God's book and the guidance of our prophet Muhammad, on whom be God's prayers and peace, and commit ourselves to the teachings of Islam, which orders holy war, we must return to the position of leadership in this world and the position of sovereignty in this world, as we were once upon a time. We are threatened, Zionism is threatening to swallow up more territory and commit more terrorism and aggression against this nation, and we must take a bold stand so that we may defend ourselves, our presence, our freedom, our dignity and our belief.

AL-DA'WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH: Crusader Christianization has started to proceed in accordance with channels which scientific and strategic studies and plans are setting out, with the goal of converting the greatest number of Moslems in this world to Christianity, in particular in Asia and Africa. What do you consider the dimensions of this threat to be? What is the duty of the Moslems, individuals, groups, societies, organizations, bodies and so forth, vis-a-vis this Crusader threat and the dangers it represents?

Muhammad al-Sa'di: There is no doubt that the danger of Crusader Christianization is great and mighty. We consider that this Christianization has unfortunately realized notable success, especially in Africa and East Asia, and we know that the persons performing the conversion and the church have all decided to make Africa Christian by 2000. International organizations which are setting out programs and plans for the sake of spreading Christianity in various areas of the world are standing behind this campaign. Unfortunately, it is a scientific, organized action and a programmed action founded on a study of actual conditions and the adoption of all necessary steps which ultimately will lead to the spread of Christianity in the various areas of the world. This Christianization uses all material and moral means since they print millions of copies of the corrupted New Testament and millions of other books of Christianization. They perform aid which bears a humane character on its outside but within has the goal of converting to Christianity poor people whom want has prompted to accept this aid, so that they are swallowing this bait, the bait of conversion to Christianity. If we want to face this campaign of Christianization, we must face it with the same weapon, the weapon of planning and programming, the weapon of science. There must be organizations behind the Moslem proselytizers which will guide them, plan for them and program their activities. There must be organizations printing millions of copies of the holy Koran and other Islamic books which make the appeal to Islam, show Islamic teachings and show the virtues of Islam. It is not possible for Islam to spread as it must without

organization and work, and the Moslems cannot successfully face this campaign without scientific institutions which organize Islamic action, unite Islamic efforts and unite Islamic action in the international context.

In addition, we must be present in these locations which are exposed to drought and are exposed to famine. If we ourselves are not present, others will be, and they are the ones who will spread their belief and will overtake us in the field.

AL-DA'WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH: There is no doubt that destructive groups in Islamic history have had a great effect on the state of dissension, fragmentation and dispersion the Moslems are living through and suffering from in our present time. Could you talk to us about these groups, about this effect and about this fate which they have brought the Moslems to?

Muhammad al-Sa'di: In the present era, there are many destructive groups on the Islamic stage, or appearing here and there, such as the al-Qidyaniyah, who say that holy war has been put in abeyance until the awaited al-Mahdi emerges before us, and the Bahais, whose centers are spread out in occupied Palestine and America and are firmly connected to the colonialist Crusader circles in the world.

These groups, and their likes, are no doubt standing as a barrier before Islamic action for the sake of spreading Islam and for the sake of the glory of the Moslems. These groups present a distorted picture of Islam, keeping people from embracing this religion. These groups make representations to people that this religion is fragmented and that there is nothing to bring together the people who embrace it. Therefore, many people avoid studying this religion and embracing this immortal message. These groups keep Moslems from Islamic holy war for the sake of regaining the position of leadership in this world and for the sake of defending their nations and their belief, in order that they may have a position on earth and under the sun. These groups, therefore, are playing a dangerous role in obstructing the course of the appeal to Islam, and it is necessary to expose their schemes and expose their cards to the masses of the Moslems, so that every Moslem will know the extent of the danger from these groups to Islam and so that non-Moslems will know that these groups are not connected to Islam in any way.

AL-DA'WAH AL-ISLAMIYAH: How do you view the activities of the World Society of the Islamic Appeal and its effort to uplift the Moslems everywhere and present Islam in its essence and spirit as God revealed it and the honest prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, conveyed it, remote from doctrinaire spirit and fanaticism?

Muhammad al-Sa'di: The fact is that the establishment of the World Society of the Islamic Appeal has been a great achievement on behalf of reviving the glories of Islam, on behalf of explaining true Islam to the people, on behalf of eliminating the superstitions, nonsense and apostasy which have been widespread among Moslems and on behalf of spreading Islam and Islamic and Arab culture in the world. Wherever it has gone in the various areas of Earth, you can see the achievements of this society. You can see a mosque here, a center there or a hospital, and so forth, since the achievements of

this society cover most countries of the world. Here we must mention the great Jamahiriya's role in establishing this society, which has assumed the task of spreading Islam in the world, and we must thank our brother the Moslem revolutionary Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and the people of the great Jamahiriya, who are sacrificing their strength for the sake of standing up to the Zionist attacks, the attacks of Christianization and the attacks of colonialism and are offering what they have for the sake of spreading Islam in the various areas of the world.

11887
CSO: 4504/168

LABOR PARTY YOUTH GROUP SPLIT OVER NATO POLICY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Feb 87 p 7

[Article by Einar Solvoll: "Labor Party Youth Organization Will Have to Live Further with NATO Dispute"]

[Text] The Labor Party Youth Organization (AUF) will have to live further with the dispute about Norwegian NATO membership, in spite of the fact that AUF voted by a scant majority at its national congress this weekend to give up the demand that Norway withdraw from NATO. Withdrawal from NATO has been AUF's official line all along since 1969, but the national congress supported the leadership's new views by 169 votes against 125.

On the other hand, the national congress saw to inflicting defeats on AUF's leadership in a number of other questions, including advertising over the air, grades in school, and extension of the Nordland Railroad. As far as the NATO dispute is concerned, it will doubtlessly continue to the next national congress in 1989. Only 22 votes among the 300 delegates decided the outcome.

It was a unanimous central committee of the AUF which recommended that the national congress vote yes, and AUF Leader Jens Stoltenberg said after the voting that he would have considered resigning as leader if the majority had gone the other way.

Against Advertising

The AUF national congress also voted by a solid margin against advertising's being introduced on radio and TV. It says no to grades in junior highschool and more advanced schools, but yes to admission tests--both in direct opposition to recommendations by the leadership. "We are sorry about these decisions but are coming to respect them," Jens Stoltenberg says. The AUF leader cautioned the national congress against voting for lengthening of the Nordland Railroad because it would cost too much, but the national congress advocated lengthening the railroad to Tromso.

New Names

Jens Stoltenberg (27) of Oslo was unanimously reelected as AUF's leader. Turid Birkeland (24) of Oslo was elected as the new deputy leader. Stale

Dokken (27) of Buskerud was reelected as secretary. The following are also members of the new central committee: Synnøve Nymo (24) of Troms, Karl Eirik Schjøtt Pedersen (27) of Finnmark, Ane Tømmeras (21) of Østfold, Dag Arne Syverinsen (24) of Hedmark, and Inger-Anne Ravlum (25) of Oslo.

Einar Gerhardsen had wanted to come to the national congress banquet on Saturday to make a speech to the youth, but at the last moment had to send word that he was not coming because he did not feel strong enough. He is turning 90 in May.

Planes and Trains

So, the national congress by an overwhelming majority recommended lengthening the Nordland Railroad. A new main airport at Gardermoen received 174 votes, while 103 were cast for Hurum. Likewise, the national congress opposed lowering the retirement age, but voted instead to support a flexible age limit between 65 and 70. The national congress voted by a scant majority to keep the name Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking [the Workers' Youth Phalanx (AUF)] instead of the "youth alliance," as the leadership proposed. But ovations sent the national congress an appeal to return to the name of ARBEIDERUNGDOMMEN [LABOR YOUTH] for its membership newspaper, instead of the more neutral PRAKSIS [PRACTICE], as the newspaper was last renamed around Christmas. A clear majority voted not to support the demand of compulsory military service for women.

The motion to demand canteens in all schools, where pupils can get food and drinks, was voted down. On the other hand, the national congress advocated combating AIDS by distributing free condoms at all pharmacies, and that there must be condom vending machines in all public toilets and higher educational institutions, and, besides, that free one-time syringes must be distributed in order to avoid AIDS infection among narcotics addicts.

8831
CSO: 3639/22

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

SPYING ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRY SEEN 'GENERALIZED'

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 27 Feb 87 p 10

[First paragraph is O JORNAL introduction]

[Excerpts] Portugal is a platform for espionage from which few people emerge unscathed. From the supplying of weapons for very specific purposes to infiltrations--specifically that of the extinct Damiao de Gois Foundation, which provided support for the Office of the President of the Republic--there is a little bit of everything.

Who Spies on Whom

Espionage and counterespionage activities in Portugal, with special emphasis on spying for commercial interests, can be described "without exaggeration" as being generalized.

According to one expert on the subject, "innocence is a thing that is becoming rare." The same source claims that those activities occur on both the left and the right, although differences can be seen in operational matters and in the size of support structures.

The Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Matters, Rights, Freedoms, and Guarantees has decided to summon the Committee for Supervision of the Intelligence Service on 6 March to debate the so-called case of "surveillance of members of political parties."

One member of the parliamentary committee has revealed that a "general survey" will be made of the report produced by that supervisory body, which was elected by the Assembly of the Republic and consists of Marques Junior (Democratic Renewal Party), Montalvao Machado (Social Democratic Party), and Anselmo Rodrigues (Socialist Party).

Meanwhile, the morning newspaper O DIARIO, which has assumed a prominent role in denouncing the activities of DINFO [Military Intelligence Service], especially the role played by Mario Correia da Cunha, seems to be "less well informed" about the intelligence service's expansion of its activities to include the political parties.

Information gathered by O JORNAL mentions, for example, the activities of a Chilean exile in Portugal. That individual, married to a Cuban citizen employed by the Cuban Embassy in Vienna, was an agent for G-2 (the Cuban intelligence service) and allegedly infiltrated the Damiao de Gois Foundation, which once provided support for the Office of the President of the Republic but was abolished at the beginning of Mario Soares' term.

Documents from the Office of the President of the Republic--specifically those concerned with the People's Republic of Mozambique--supposedly wound up in the hands of the agent in question.

That agent's activity was also focused on NATO objectives and on documents which were channeled to the "rezidenturas" (the name given to intelligence sections in embassies) of Cuba and Mozambique.

The agent in question came to constitute a "security risk" because of alcohol abuse. G-2 withdrew him from Lisbon and stationed him in Vienna, where he is undergoing "treatment for alcoholism."

Examples of collaborators in embassies and the party organizations are not rare, and some of them are on file at the Ministry of Internal Administration.

A particularly interesting case is that of a Bulgarian working for the press attache at the Bulgarian Embassy in Maputo. He has opened a photographer's studio in Lisbon.

Another curiosity from a completely different standpoint is the security protocol established between a country and a party. In this case, special equipment--.22 and .22 caliber [as published] Hornets with silencers and telescopic sights and phosphorus grenades for Mozambique's rezidentura in Lisbon were "imported" from Reggio Emilia in Italy in 1979. Part of that equipment was allegedly supplied later to the Polisario Front [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro].

Lemos Ferreira Requests Files and Recordings

The chief of the Armed Forces General Staff this week submitted an application to the Ministry of Defense in which he requested access to the party files and the recordings of telephone conversations between Mario Correia da Cunha and Colonel Fernando Ramos.

Fernando Ramos has allegedly admitted only to maintaining "personal relations" with Mario Cunha.

11798
CSO: 3542/67

POLITICAL

PORUTGAL

SOVIET SCIENTIFIC SHIP IN LISBON DESCRIBED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Feb 87 p 14

[Text] The Soviet ship M. Keldyesh, belonging to the Oceanographic Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has been at Conde de Obidos Rock in the port of Lisbon since the day before yesterday. It will leave tomorrow for the Mediterranean, where it will continue its geological, oceanographic, and biological research.

The ship, especially designed by the institute and built in Finland in 1981, cost approximately \$27 million and has 18 laboratories, including a weather station and a hydrographic station.

Prof Rostislav Ozmidor, who heads the team of 65 scientists (including 14 women) on board the ship, explained to reporters the main objectives of the M. Keldyesh--named after an eminent mathematician, now deceased, who once headed the USSR Academy of Sciences--and the work that it has been doing in almost all of the world's oceans.

The M. Keldyesh is 122 meters long and 17.8 meters wide. It has a draft of 6 meters and displaces 6,300 tons. It has four engines (6,000 hp) and develops a cruising speed of 12 knots. With a crew of 65, the ship also has two propellers (whose configuration can be altered depending on the requirements of the work being done, and steering of the ship during that work is completely automatic), and it is equipped with highly sophisticated technical and technological equipment, as the reporters were able, for that matter, to see for themselves during their lengthy visit.

The work in question is concerned in particular with measuring and studying the characteristics of water in the open sea (density, salinity, temperature, and continuity--in short, its physiological characteristics) by collecting it at depths ranging from 2,000 to 6,000 meters. It should be noted that the USSR Oceanographic Institute possesses several similar ships and four just like the M. Keldyesh.

This ocean research ship left Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea last 9 January and will return there this coming 4 April. On this latest trip, as Captain Kashmin said, the research was carried out in South America (near northern

Brazil), in the former Guyanas, on the equator, and in the Canary Islands. He later described the special features detected in each of those regions as far as ocean water is concerned.

Professor Baca, director of the Atlantic Section of the USSR Oceanographic Institute, discussed in detail the scientific equipment carried on board, while the heads of a number of laboratories discussed their specific missions.

It should be noted that three instructors from the Department of Physical Oceanography at the Lisbon School of Sciences were on board the ship yesterday. They were Professors Armando Fiuza and Isabel Ambar and Dr Fatima Sousa. The reporters were accompanied by Sergei Khramtsov, press attache at the Soviet Embassy in Lisbon.

11798
CSO: 3542/65

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

PROFILE OF CAVACO SILVA'S CLOSE COLLABORATORS PROVIDED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 12 Feb 87 p 15

[Article by Joao Rosa]

[Excerpts] The disclosure in our last issue that a secret meeting was held recently between Eurico de Melo and Adriano Moreira, along with our revelation and analysis of the strategic prospects for the PSD [Social Democratic Party] in the medium term, was the dominant topic in the media and in talks among politicians beginning last Thursday morning.

With a view to early elections, the PSD foresees the need for a policy of understanding with the centrists that will provide it with a parliamentary majority in the future.

That strategic approach by Cavaco Silva has not been fully accepted within the party. But several informants in the party tell us that the top leaders with whom he has informally surrounded himself are probably capable enough to get it accepted throughout the Social Democratic structure without encountering any major obstacles.

In fact, we also disclosed last week that an oversimplified but basically realistic analysis of the philosophy of internal policy being pursued as part of Cavaco Silva's leadership of the PSD and the government reveals that functioning with him as an advisory council of "notables" is a small elite group--an "advance guard" in which he has special personal confidence. It is the leader's genuine private "committee," and behind the scenes in the party and government, it has already been nicknamed the "Group of Five" or "The Magnificent Five." Its members meet with "the chief" every Wednesday to analyze the political situation jointly and thoughtfully.

According to reliable informants, its members are Eurico de Melo, Fernando Nogueira, Santana Lopes, Durao Barroso, and Dias Loureiro (the order in which they are listed is not intended to indicate any hierarchy beyond the obviously well-known fact that Eurico de Melo has more maturity).

But except for the northern "patriarch" (who is only 61)--and it should be remembered that Cavaco Silva himself is only 47--the most revealing feature of

all the others is the fact they are extremely young for the job: two of them are only 30 (Santana Lopes and Durao Barroso), one is 35 (Dias Loureiro), and the last is 36 (Fernando Nogueira). But all of them have enviable academic and political credentials and possess intellectual and temperamental qualities that are certainly suited to their high responsibilities, judging from the special confidence placed in them by Cavaco Silva.

The only one who is not and has never been a member of the government is Dias Loureiro, the party's powerful secretary general. Incidentally, it was immediately after the PSD's latest congress--where we saw the appointment of so many deputy chairmen (six)--that we wrote concerning him that he was in fact--as events have shown that he is continuing to be--the real number two man in the Social Democratic hierarchy at the party level.

As far as special academic and biographic background is concerned, attention should be drawn to Eurico de Melo's career in business, Fernando Nogueira's special inclination for regional matters, Santana Lopes' militant support for Sa Carneiro's doctrine, Durao Barroso's political science studies abroad, and Dias Loureiro's practice of law.

As far as other special features are concerned, specifically as regards the image each has conveyed to us in the course of our personal contacts with them and statements made about them by the people who claim to know them best, we can sum them up as follows:

Eurico de Melo: Shrewd, determined, cautious, ambitious, much given to reflection although not a cerebral type, and very courteous and refined. A manorial baron well equipped for city life.

Fernando Nogueira: Introverted, excellent at planning, a conciliator, astute, hardworking and ambitious, good at detail, and organized. A man of sturdy stock from Beira who has grafted well into Lisbon life.

Santana Lopes: Headstrong, enthusiastic, bold and determined, dauntless, and one of those most capable of diving right in. An idealist full of faith in whatever he believes in, beginning with himself.

Durao Barroso: A born cerebral type, speculative, observant and provident, studious, and a cultivator of self-control and the structuralist spirit. A pragmatist being forcibly converted to the idea of improvisation.

Dias Loureiro: A Latin and a native of Beira with all the generosity, vitality, instinctiveness, and skill at his job that one expects from such a person, he has a talent for leadership and organization. A fighter on behalf of all necessary and sufficient causes.

It is probably superfluous to say that all of those "Magnificent Five" are frequently the targets of envy and speculation on the part of some of their fellow party members who are most jealous of their special status, just as it is no doubt natural that some of them should not always succeed in remaining rigorously indifferent to those negative stimuli.

And which of those five--especially the four youngest--is the one who may become the heir apparent and receive official approval as such in the future?

POLL SHOWS PSD GAINING IN POPULARITY, PS STATIONARY

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 28 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Rui Ramos]

[Text] The PSD [Social Democratic Party] is the big winner in today's poll, both because it is maintaining the rate of growth shown in the previous poll (+2 percent) and because it is approaching 40 percent, as SEMANARIO predicted it would in its analysis of the previous poll.

The rise in the PSD's score is not based on overly solid foundations, however, since the party is benefiting mainly from the increase in the number of people not knowing who to vote for, and, as is known, the extrapolation is carried out with a universe that includes only those with definite voting intentions.

Be that as it may, it is now clear that the PSD's voters seem stable and insensitive to fluctuations in mood, so much so that the successive polls show that indecisiveness never strikes them.

Standing in clear contradiction to the Social Democrats' capacity for growth is the PS [Socialist Party], which began by showing signs of stagnation in January and is now down, though only slightly.

It seems obvious that the strategy adopted by the Socialists has paid off as much as it is going to and that only the complete disintegration of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] and the congenital limitations of the APU [United People's Alliance] will be able to make minds rest easy at PS headquarters.

In the last poll, as we reported, the level of abstention had increased mainly because of defections by communist and related voters, an indication of the crisis between the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement] and the PCP. The fact is that with that crisis having been alleviated or forgotten, the APU is up again (+1.7 percent), although still below its figure for November 1986 (-1.8 percent).

The CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] performed a significant feat in this poll: although continuing to decline (-0.3 percent), it overtook the PRD in the hierarchy of big parties, thus leaving the PRD in the dust, so to speak.

If you look at table 2 (political profile of those polled) and table 3 (unextrapolated results), you will see that of the 595 people who responded, 9.4 percent voted for the CDS in 1985, but only 5.4 percent would do so again. A very significant drop has therefore occurred, as is confirmed in particular by the three latest polls.

It is important to point out that the PSD and CDS together again have a combined percentage (45.7 percent) that would allow them to enjoy a very wide parliamentary majority. Today's 45.7 percent is the highest combined total for those two parties since May 1986, as can be seen from table 1.

For its part, the PRD is declining again, thus interrupting the rising curve clearly indicated in January. It must be remembered that this poll was conducted from 16 to 20 February in the agitated aftermath of the Radio Law and in the "heat" of yet another hesitation by the party and a rift between the party's chief and its other leaders. But the most important factor in the PRD's decline was probably the easing up of its slant to the left, which had been giving it such good results.

Contrary to what might be supposed, the fact that the PRD has two faces--its own and that of General Eanes--is not helping it at all, because instead of winning votes on the left and the right, it is losing on both sides.

Also deserving of special mention is the fact that the PSD alone is doing better than the PS and the PRD combined. That is a significant fact in terms of political and electoral prospecting.

Lastly, it should be noted that abstention continues to range between 15 and 20 percent, a margin that is in line with the Portuguese tradition of abstention and gives greater credibility to the results obtained.

Table 1: Distribution of the Vote
1985

| election results | May 86 | Sep 86 | P o | 1 Nov 86 | 1 Jan 87 | s* | Feb 87 |
|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|-------------|------|--------|
| PSD | 29.8 | 35.0 | 35.6 | 35.6 | 37.4 | 39.4 | |
| PS | 20.8 | 25.6 | 24.8 | 31.3 | 30.3 | 29.6 | |
| APU | 15.6 | 14.6 | 14.8 | 16.8 | 13.3 | 15.0 | |
| PRD | 18.0 | 12.3 | 9.2 | 5.8 | 7.0 | 6.1 | |
| CDS | 9.7 | 9.6 | 9.8 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 6.3 | |
| Other | — | — | — | — | — | 1.5 | |
| Blank ballot | 2.6 | — | 3.9 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 2.1 | |

* Note: The universe used in extrapolating the results of the successive polls includes only those respondents indicating a definite voting intention in each of them.

Table 2: Political Profile of Those Polled

| Party | How did you vote in 1985? | 1985 election results | How would you vote today? |
|------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| PSD | 26.3 | 29.8 | 39.4 |
| PS | 18.1 | 20.8 | 29.6 |
| APU | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.0 |
| PRD | 18.1 | 18.0 | 6.1 |
| CDS | 9.4 | 9.7 | 6.3 |

Who were the 595 people polled by NORMA? For whom did they vote in the 1985 elections? Here is the political profile of those polled. As can be seen, it reflects almost exactly the political profile of the country as revealed in the most recent election, held last year. Treated "unfairly" were the PSD and the PS, whose percentages in the poll were below the percentage of the vote they received in the election.

Table 3: Unextrapolated Poll Results

| TOTAL | Sex | | Age | | Socioeconomic class | | |
|-------|------|--------|-------|-----|---------------------|----|------|
| | Male | Female | 18-44 | 45+ | A/B | C1 | C2/D |

How did you vote in October 1985?

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| CDS | 9.4 | 4.6 | 13.1 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 21.4 | 5.2 | 2.2 |
| PSD | 26.3 | 33.5 | 20.8 | 25.5 | 26.8 | 28.3 | 37.4 | 18.0 |
| PS | 18.1 | 16.0 | 19.8 | 17.1 | 18.8 | 6.7 | 16.3 | 28.4 |
| PRD | 18.1 | 20.3 | 16.4 | 21.8 | 15.5 | 24.7 | 3.2 | 21.7 |
| APU | 15.6 | 10.4 | 19.5 | 15.9 | 15.3 | 9.1 | 17.9 | 19.4 |
| Other | 1.3 | .2 | 2.2 | .3 | 2.1 | — | 5.0 | .2 |
| Blank | 3.2 | 5.4 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 3.8 | 1.1 | 8.5 | 1.6 |
| Don't know | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 2.0 | .4 | 1.7 | 2.4 |
| No answer | 6.4 | 7.9 | 5.3 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 8.2 | 4.8 | 6.0 |

Would you vote in elections today?

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Yes | 86.6 | 87.5 | 85.8 | 89.3 | 84.0 | 94.0 | 80.0 | 85.5 |
| No | 8.1 | 10.0 | 6.6 | 7.2 | 9.1 | 3.1 | 14.6 | 7.7 |
| Don't know | 5.0 | 2.5 | 7.1 | 2.9 | 7.0 | 2.9 | 5.4 | 6.3 |
| No answer | .3 | — | .5 | .5 | — | — | — | .6 |

How would you vote in elections today?

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| CDS | 5.4 | 3.8 | 6.7 | 2.9 | 7.8 | 11.5 | 4.6 | 1.5 |
| PSD | 33.3 | 39.1 | 28.6 | 32.4 | 34.2 | 40.6 | 37.9 | 25.5 |
| PS | 25.0 | 28.5 | 22.2 | 26.6 | 23.6 | 21.0 | 12.4 | 35.0 |
| PRD | 5.2 | 7.5 | 3.3 | 10.4 | .2 | 10.7 | 1.9 | 3.1 |
| APU | 12.7 | 6.4 | 17.8 | 15.0 | 10.6 | 5.2 | 14.0 | 17.4 |
| Other | 1.3 | .5 | 1.9 | .5 | 2.1 | — | 4.4 | .5 |
| Blank | 1.8 | 3.9 | .2 | .3 | 3.3 | .0 | 6.7 | .4 |
| Don't know | 9.7 | 2.6 | 15.4 | 8.1 | 11.3 | 3.8 | 10.8 | 13.4 |
| No answer | 5.5 | 7.5 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 7.3 | 3.3 |

Universe: Residents over 18 years of age in the cities of Lisbon, Coimbra, Evora, Porto, Vila Real, and Viseu. Sample: 610 individuals. Sampling: Random, using the random route method to select homes and the Kish method to select the individual to be interviewed. The sample has nonproportional imputation, being weighted in the data processing phase to ensure representativeness of the universe constituted by the six cities. Method: Direct and personal interviews using a structured questionnaire in the home of the respondent. Sampling points: Six cities, in which 120 starting points were selected. Field work: Interviews conducted between 17 and 20 February 1987. Margin of error: At the overall level, the error is plus or minus 4 percent for a confidence level of 95 percent and $p = 50\%$. Responsible institution: The poll was conducted by NORMA, Inc., the Portuguese member of Gallup International.

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CSO: 3542/65

INTRA-PARTY MOVEMENTS, PERSONALITIES DISCUSSED

'Unknown' Gama

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 Mar 87 p 3

[Commentary by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text.] Jaime Gama, who is meeting with the PS [Socialist Party] minority today, is one of the wiliest politicians of the new generation.

No one knows exactly what he thinks or what he wants.

He rarely takes risks (and the only time he took a serious risk, he lost).

He always gives the impression of having all the time in the world; he is never in a hurry.

Nonetheless, despite his distaste for risk and his lack of inclination to "grand gestures," Jaime Gama continually attracts the attention of the press and has already built an enviable curriculum vitae.

He had a career in the previous regime (as a member of the opposition) and he has one in this regime.

He was a prominent leader in the student movement.

He was a founding member of the Socialist Party.

He has held almost every post in the party (and was always unopposed).

He was a minister (and emerged unscathed).

He has an advantage over Vitor Constancio in that he never withdrew his support from Mario Soares in moments of crisis.

He has an advantage over Antonio Barreto in that he has never left the PS.

He has an advantage over Almeida Santos in that he was never completely locked in with the former Socialist leader; he backed away from or moved closer to Soares, but always gave the impression of preserving his own identity.

This, incidentally, is his big trump card: the art of taking a position in which he is not on the attack (thus giving his adversary no opportunity to counterattack), but does not give his support, either.

This is precisely what Jaime Gama did recently when he decided to bring the party's minority faction together.

He did not affront Vitor Constancio, since he asked for Constancio's permission to call together the faction which was defeated in the last party congress.

With this gesture, however, he also made it clear that he has his differences with the present secretary general.

How far will Jaime Gama go in the coming days?

What risks will be willing to take?

As usual, no one knows.

For now, he will make every effort to avoid giving anyone a pretext to accuse him of weakening the party and thus contributing to poor results in future elections.

He will also want to make it clear, however, that he does not agree with the political direction which the PS is taking, so that, in the event of an election disaster, Vitor Constancio will have to assume sole responsibility.

This is what, at this moment, Gama has in mind.

He does not want to be accused of being divisive--and so he will not publicly criticize Constancio, nor will he refuse to collaborate with him, if he is asked.

However, he wants to maintain the necessary distance so he can capitalize on each misstep of the Socialist leader and so that, if the elections do not go as the PS militants hope, he will not be included in the group that goes down to defeat.

Gama's Minority Faction

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 Mar 87 p 24

[Excerpt] Jaime Gama took a harsher tone in his criticism of the Socialist Party leadership during the meeting of the PS Political Committee last Thursday evening. This escalation by the minority faction leader came on the eve of the first official meeting of the faction which was defeated in the last party congress. That meeting will take place today at 1000 hours in the Largo do Rato and out of it should come a document recommending that the PS leadership adopt a clear political strategy and one which is "properly tailored to the times," sources close to Jaime Gama told EXPRESSO.

In last Thursday's meeting of the Political Committee (called by the PS leadership precisely to "head off" the meeting of the minority and to negate its reason for being), Jaime Gama declared that the party is not asserting itself in the nation's political life and that the public has not been informed as to the goals of the Socialists. In a tone which some members of the Political Committee considered overly "dramatic," Gama added that the PS is facing its own "historic decline," if it does not find a direction quickly.

Although his statements had the same ambiguous tone which has characterized various speeches by this Socialist leader, they provoked some heated reactions from the Socialist leaders in the provincial federations, who reminded the minority leader that it was the previous party leadership which took the party from 36 percent to its worst election defeat ever, in the elections of October 1985.

Minority To Present Strategy to Constancio

It is also noted that, in Thursday's meeting, Jaime Gama confined himself to criticizing the current situation of the PS, offering virtually nothing in the way of an alternative to the political conduct of the current leadership. Gama is waiting until today's meeting with his colleagues to launch this alternative strategy, which will later be presented to Vitor Constancio as the "recommendation" or "contribution" of the minority faction. Incidentally, of the four points noted in the final communique from the meeting of the Political Committee, which were offered for approval by the party secretary general, the minority abstained only with regard to the present PS strategy, voting favorably on the other points.

Among Socialists of various sentiments, meanwhile, it is foreseen that the meeting of the Gamist minority could create some conflicts within the PS. Actually, the fact that a meeting of the Political Committee was called on the eve of the first official meeting of the minority (with a meeting of the National Committee also scheduled quite soon) could indicate that the current leadership will accuse Gama's supporters of failing to offer their criticisms and recommendations to the competent party organs and reserving them for parallel meetings and for public disclosure.

PRD and Artificial Crises

Last Wednesday's meeting of the Political Committee began with an address by Vitor Constancio, lasting for about 1 hour, in which the PS leader denounced what he called the "morbid political life" which only "lives on crises" or the threat of crises and is incapable of adapting to normality and democratic stability, believing that an opposition party is obliged to denounce the government every day and to threaten it weekly with presenting censure motions.

He also criticized some aspects of the behavior of the Socialist parliamentary group, noting, on the other hand, that his party should not be creating problems for the president of the republic and should rather be strengthening its political and institutional relationship with the president. The PS leader made a point of noting, incidentally, that it is the PS "which stands to gain" from a good relationship with Mario Soares.

We note with curiosity the position taken by Manuel Alegre at that meeting. This member of the PS National Secretariat, who has delivered countless statements in defense of a coalition between the Socialists and Renewalists to defeat Cavaco Silva, finally admitted that, under the present circumstances, such a strategy appears impractical.

Meanwhile, among the members of the Socialist minority, a certain amount of concern was created by the statements of two members of the Liberal Left (Pacheco Pereira and Villaverde Cabral) which were recently made public and which pointed to a possible collaboration between this group and Cavaco Silva.

Constancio To Intensify Opposition

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 7 Mar 87 p 3

[Commentary by Afonso Camoes]

[Text] The Socialist Party will intensify its opposition to the government in the next 2 months. However, its goals do not include any action which would precipitate a political crisis and open the way for early elections.

"Cavaco Silva is the one who is working to prepare for elections, but he is not taking any basic initiatives, either in terms of institutions and constitutional revision or in terms of the country's structural development," Socialist Party leader Vitor Constancio declared to SEMANARIO. According to Constancio, "the Socialists will remain firmly in the opposition, but the strategy does not require the immediate resumption of power."

Just as 9 months ago, when he assumed the leadership of the party, Constancio does not appear to be in any hurry. He pledges to lead the PS (today reduced to its poorest parliamentary representation on record) back to its place as the first party and to put it back in power. He made it clear, however, that he did not want to do this through parliamentary expedients and even admitted, "if necessary, the idea of its recovery as an opposition party."

Forces Assessed in May

A year after [he assumed the leadership], at the end of this May, Constancio will call together the national party organs to take an accounting and assess the balance of forces. Only then will he decide whether or not it is time for the PS to come forward with its own initiative--a censure motion against the government--which would open the way for possible early elections.

Before then, however, the Socialists will commission a "great national survey," enabling them to evaluate the party's capacity for a recovery at the polls and to assess the image of its new leader. It will be a "thematic survey" which will reveal the "deeper motives of the voter and provide indicators of the direction which the undecided voters will take," a PS leader told us. Such a survey will also enquire about the positive and negative aspects of the profiles of the various political leaders, a concern which is much greater

for the Socialists because, as we know, Constancio is the only party leader whose popularity rating is still below that of his own party, as revealed in the most recent surveys.

Even so, according to the same source, the Socialists "cannot be lured into risking a crisis if the overall results of the survey do not indicate that the PS could go higher than 30 percent, the margin beyond which it is possible to wipe out the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] and galvanize the party to turn the balance of electoral forces in its favor."

Others May Call up Crisis

Therefore, the PS cannot be expected to provoke any political crisis before the end of May. And after that? Antonio Barreto, member of the Socialists' "shadow cabinet," says not then, either. He said this on the Radio Comercial program "Press Club" and added that, even before the formation of this government, he "had dreamed of a government by legislature, even if it were led by Cavaco Silva." This means that the PS would do nothing to overthrow this government in the next 18 months. This, however, is not exactly the /official/ [in italics] position of the party leadership. Antonio Guterres, for example, told us that the PS would soon have to consider two kinds of costs to the country: those which could be created by unleashing a political crisis; and those which could result from the perpetuation of the current impasse, with a government interested only in keeping itself in power, without bringing about any of the basic reforms that are essential to the solution of the nation's problems. Thus, he says, when the PS understands that the cost to the country of maintaining this government is greater than that of opening up a process leading to new elections, it will not hesitate to take the initiatives provided on the Constitution for this purpose.

What if other opposition parties (namely, the PRD or the PCP [Communist party]) are first with these initiatives? This is another "nuance" of difference in the rhetoric of the Socialists. Whereas Antonio Barreto says clearly that the PS should not vote on censure motions presented by other parties, Guterres tells us that the "PRD and PCP can do what they want, but they cannot be certain that we will vote on it. We will not give them this free pass...."

Nothing for Eanes, Everything against Cavaco

The possibility of a pre-election alliance with the PRD appeared to be definitively ruled out. In this regard, the firmest rejection of such a solution comes from the secretary general himself--the same man who, as a candidate, almost a year ago, was still admitting that he looked favorably on "fraternal dialogue" with the Renewalists, for which he was attacked by his Gamist opponents.

Incidentally, the internal pressures from some party members for Constancio to agree to discuss an accord with the PRD for an alternative government seem to have diminished in direct proportion to the gradual decline which Eanes' party has been showing in the latest surveys. Constancio is noting this and is congratulating himself for having declared last May, when he was elected

secretary general in the party congress: "The assertion of a Socialist Party faithful to itself will inevitably reduce the PRD's electoral space. For this reason, we say to the PRD: We are competitors and our first objective is to win back the electorate which we lost."

"Nothing with Eanes, everything against Cavaco" is the internal order of the day, then, at a time when the PS is preparing to redouble its opposition to the government, with the declaration of its own alternatives.

'Shadow Cabinet' Concludes Program

On 7 April, Constancio will go on television again. It is his second RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System] interview since he was elected. At that time, he will take along a "program for an alternative government," which is in the final phase of preparation by the party's "shadow cabinet."

The PS is holding several sectoral meetings to divulge the proposals. After public meetings on transportation and communications and another on health, two more will follow: one on education and one on employment and social security.

At the end of April, the Socialists will subject the government to two more parliamentary question periods, one of which will be on labor issues, assures a party leader.

Meanwhile, the office of studies is preparing, for this month, two new bills for parliamentary debate: one on tax reform, produced by a task force coordinated by Medina Carreira, and another one proposing a model for the reorganization of the state business sector, produced by Mario Valadas, Joao Cravinho and Antonio Guterres.

With regard to the latter, the Socialists advocate "giving the public enterprises the consistency and logic of an economic group, adapting them to a competitive system."

By the end of April, the PS should also announce a draft bill for agricultural policy, including a definitive solution for agrarian reform, to put an end to the political and labor instability in the Alentejo.

Constancio has given particular attention to the work coordinated by Almeida Santos on the PS proposals for constitutional revision. In this area, the Socialists will propose "an alleviation of the ideological weight" carried by the present Charter and the replacement of the principle of the irreversibility of the nationalizations with the principle of controlled reversibility. The bill also contemplates proposals which are aimed to stabilize our political system, namely through the adoption of a motion of constructive censure, an instrument which would prevent governments from falling when no alternative has been arrived at in the Parliament.

Constancio Intensifying Contacts with Grass Roots

"All this," Antonio Guterres told us, "means that we are mobilizing the intelligence in the party to come up with solid proposals and that the PS opposition

will be consistent and will offer alternatives to create the conditions for an effective program for the modernization of the country."

Finally, an intensive effort is underway to reorganize and revitalize the party's regional structures. Guterres is leading the effort, with trips and regional organization meetings every 3 months.

Constancio will follow after Guterres wherever the respective regional structures are in a position to organize local initiatives to welcome the leader, who is still a novice at going out to meet the grass roots and, above all, at direct contact with the electorate.

After the trial run last weekend in Castelo Branco District, Constancio will repeat it in two more districts within this month: on 21 and 22 March, he will be in Viseu, where he will meet with the PS National Committee; and on 28 and 29 March he will meet with the party cells in Leiria District.

"The party is responding calmly, without any great haste to return to power," we were told by Antonio Guterres, who feels the unrest is coming more from the Lisbon party members. Constancio is beginning to feel that he can lead the PS to recovery as an opposition party, without internal shocks.

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CSO: 3542/72

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

BRIEFS

RECRUITMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE--The sons of Generals Salazar Braga and Pedro Cardoso--officers who have long been linked to the military intelligence sector--and the son of Ladeiras Monteiro, head of the SIS, have been recruited by the Intelligence and Security Service, according to what O JORNAL has learned from a source it considers reliable. About 100 new recruits may join that service before the end of this month. Also according to our sources, DINFO [Military Intelligence Department] will devote itself primarily to counterespionage and be particularly zealous in its surveillance of the embassies of Eastern countries. According to the same sources, the surveillance of leftwing political activists will be carried out primarily by other intelligence services, specifically those connected to a few Western embassies. [Text] [Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 20-26 Feb 87 p 2] 11798

CGTP-PRC GOOD RELATIONS--"The CGTP/INTERSINDICAL and the National Federation of Unions of China (FNSCH) may step up economic and cooperative relations between companies of the two countries," said Wang Xun, vice president of FNSCH, during his visit to Portugal at the invitation of the CGTP. In the Chinese unionist's opinion, the contacts now made with Portuguese management and the technological capability of the Portuguese firms could well lead to a technological exchange between the two countries. He then went on to say, "China needs to become modernized and obtain technology and the CGTP can point out economic spheres and Portuguese companies capable of aiding in our country's development." Returning to China, Wang Xun reported that this initial visit by a Chinese union delegation to Portugal revealed certain relatively well-developed sectors whose cooperation could be of interest to China, such as the clothing industry (both tailor-made and ready-made), leather and shoes, air conditioning and winegrowing. The vice president of the Chinese union headquarters also stressed his country's interest in the highly diversified research being conducted by the National Civil Engineering Laboratory (LNEC). Wang Xun stated that the principal objective of this visit to Portugal, made in return for a visit made to China by a CGTP delegation, was to "strengthen the friendship and cooperation already existing between the two union organizations and achieve a greater appreciation of Portugal's reality, culture and history. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 4 Mar 87 p 4] 8568

CSO: 3542/71

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

TWO POLLS AGREE IN SEEING GREENS MOVING TOWARD THRESHOLD

IMU Poll: Center Boosted

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Mar 87 p 13

[Article by Dick Ljungberg]

[Text] The Center is boosted in the first DN-IMU poll of voter preferences this year. The Social Democrats are losing ground for the fourth time in succession, while the Environmental Party, the Greens, for the fourth time in succession climbs beyond the 4 percent limit for access to the Swedish parliament.

The poll comprises 932 persons, who were interviewed in visits to their homes during the period from 26 January to 18 February.

It was clear at the time that Olof Johansson would succeed Karin Soder as leader of the Center.

A defense agreement had been reached between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party.

The government imposed price ceilings a few weeks after the presentation of its budget proposal.

At the same time, the events in connection with the Palme investigation were taking their course.

The IMU poll for February shows that following these events, the opinion polls remain stable, and the balance between the two political blocs remains very even. All changes since the previous poll last November are within the margin of error.

Moderate Coalition Party Losing Ground

The results in February with the changes since November in parentheses:

The Social Democrats 43.0 (-0.5), the Moderate Coalition Party 17.0 (-1.5), the Center Party 11.5 (+1.5), the Liberal Party 17.0 (-0.5), the Communist Left Party 4.5 (+0.5), the Christian Democratic Party 1.0 (-0.5), the Environmental Party, the Greens 5.5 (+1.0), and the rest 0.5 (unchanged). Four percent of those interviewed cannot or will not indicate their party preferences.

That means that the socialist bloc is now slightly ahead, with 47.5 percent as against 46.5 percent for the nonsocialist bloc, including the Christian Democratic Party. This is due to the gains of the Greens. Last time, there was equilibrium between the blocs in the Swedish parliament.

Normal Level

In February, the Social Democrats experienced a slight decline in the polls for the fourth time in succession, and with its 43.0 percent lies below the election result in September 1985, which was 44.7 percent.

After the high opinion poll figures as a result of the murder of Olof Palme 12 months ago, the government party is now back at more normal levels.

The long-term trend--a moving average figure for the seven most recent polls--is 43.7 percent.

Remains Unclear

It remains unclear between Carl Bildt and Bengt Westerberg--who alternately fight and embrace each other--which of them may call himself the leader of the largest opposition party.

The quarrel during the winter between the Moderate Coalition Party and the Liberal Party, especially concerning the defense and fiscal policies, resulted in a setback for both parties.

The Liberal Party experienced a setback by a total of 1.5 percent in the two most recent polls but remains stable above the election result of 14.2 percent. The present figure of 17.0 will have to be compared to the long-term trend of 18.6.

Difficult for Bildt

The new leader of the Moderate Coalition Party, Carl Bildt, still has a difficult time. Seventeen percent--and the long-term trend of 17.5 percent--are well below the election result of 21.3 percent.

It is more or less this result that the Moderate Coalition Party hopes to achieve in the election in 1988.

Olof Johansson was, to all practical purposes, ready to take over as the new leader of the Center Party after Karin Soder when the IMU poll was taken. After having constantly remained at the 10 percent level ever since the election in 1985, the Center Party may become invigorated by its 1.5 percent advance in the poll.

Belief in the Future

It remains to be seen whether it is a question of an "Olof Johansson" effect, but old Gunnar Hedlund--who has political sensitivity--hoped to see "not large, but encouraging" gains for the new Center Party leadership in the opinion polls.

The Center Party remains the party that will decide whether a change of government will take place in 1988.

And it will probably be the Center Party without cooperation with the Christian Democratic Party that will be leading an equally unnoticed existence in the opinion polls as Alf Svensson in the Swedish parliament.

Communist Left Party Stable

The only thing that may be said about the position of the Communist Left Party is that it remains stable.

The Communist Left Party remains dangerously close to the 4 percent limit barring access to the Swedish parliament, but it usually scores somewhat higher results in the elections.

The Greens' High Scores



As far as the Greens are concerned, it is the oppositie, relatively high opinion poll figures but low election results.

The result of 5.5 percent is the highest opinion poll figure that the Greens have scored for a long time, and it is thus the fourth time in succession since the Chernobyl disaster in the spring of 1986 that the party scores support beyond the 4 percent limit.

DN/imu mätning

(1) Procent Valresultat september 1982

(2) (3) (4) Valresultat september 1985



Key:

- (1) DAGENS NYHETER/the Institute for Market Research poll
- (2) Percentage
- (3) Election results September 1982
- (4) Elections results September 1985
- (5) Social Democratic Labor Party
- (6) Moderate Coalition Party
- (7) Liberal Party
- (8) Center Democrats
- (9) Communist Left Party
- (10) Christian Democratic Party

THE OPINION POLL

| | <u>Feb 1987</u> | <u>Nov 1986</u> | <u>Oct 1986</u> | <u>Feb 1984</u> | <u>Long-Term Trend Feb 1986</u> |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---|
| Number of interviews | 932 | 920 | 938 | 907 | |
| Percentages of those with party affiliations: | | | | | |
| The Social Democratic People's Party | 43.0 | 43.5 | 44.0 | 41.5 | 43.7 |
| The Moderate Coalition Party | 17.0 | 18.5 | 17.5 | 25.5 | 17.6 |
| The Center Party | 11.5 | 10.0 | 11.0 | 14.0 | 10.4 |
| The Liberal Party | 17.0 | 17.5 | 18.5 | 8.0 | 18.6 |
| The Communist Left Party | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.3 |
| The Christian Democratic Party | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.3 |
| The Greens | 5.5 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 3.8 |
| Others | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1.5 | |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Cannot or will not indicate "party preferences" | 4.0 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.5 | |

The interview were carried through during the period 26 January - 18 February 1987.

The political opinion is quite stable. All changes between this poll and the previous poll are within the margin of error. For certain parties, however, there are changes in trends. The share of the Social Democrats in the electorate has thus dropped for the fourth time in a row, while the Greens, for the fourth time in succession scores above the 4 percent level.

Changes between two consecutive polls have to be interpreted with great caution unless indicated as statistically significant. Instead one should watch the trends of the three most recent polls or differences compared to the long-term trend.

The statistical margin of error for a single poll is approximately 3.3 percent for the Social Democrats, approximately 2.5 percent for the Liberal Party and the Moderate Coalition Party, approximately 1.9 percent for the Center Party, and approximately 0.7-1.5 percent for the other parties.

The long-term trend is calculated as a moving average over the most recent seven polls.

The polls were carried through among a representative group of Swedish citizens between the ages of 18 and 74. The interviews were conducted

through visits to homes. The persons interviewed were asked, "Which party do you find the best one?" The party preferences were expressed by means of "ballots" or "election envelopes."

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Paper Comments on Poll

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "The IMU Poll"]

[Text] The IMU poll for February shows that the opinion polls have remained fairly stable ever since the end of last year. The socialist bloc remains somewhat larger than the nonsocialist bloc, but this will not be sufficient for achieving the majority among the electorate. As was the case in the poll last November, the Greens remain the party that will tip the scale.

Neither the gains of the Center Party nor the setback of the Moderate Coalition Party are statistically guaranteed. At any rate, it is clear that the Center Party was able to stabilize its position when the question of party leader was decided in practice. The Moderate Coalition Party, on the other hand, did not score any gains on the basis of its criticism of the defense budget. The Liberal Party has remained at a stable level in the IMU polls for nearly 12 months.

The Social Democrats have remained at a level which is a few percentage points lower than when Ingvar Carlsson was entirely new in his post as party leader. But things could have been worse. Last week the disappointment at the government's budget proposal caused the party to lose ground.

The Greens are probably the only party that is really pleased. The established parties will now have to pay attention.

Sifo: Left Has Majority

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Mar 87 p 8

[Article by Willy Silberstein]

[Text] The Greens are on the threshold to the Swedish parliament, the party has the support of 3.9 percent of the voters. The Moderate Coalition Party is losing more than 2 percentage points and the socialist parties have the majority, according to the poll of the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls for February.

The figures of the most recent poll, with the changes from January in parentheses, are: the Moderate Coalition Party 18.1 (-2.1), the Liberal Party 17.6 (-0.1), the Center Party, including the Christian Democratic Party, 10.6 (+0.1), the Christian Democratic Party 1.2 (-0.7), the Greens 3.9 (+0.9),

the Social Democrats 45.1 (+0.2), the Communist Left Party 4.5 (+1.0), and the other parties 0.2 (0).

The only change which is large enough to be statistically certain is the setback of the Moderate Coalition Party by 2.1 percentage points.

the Moderate Coalition Party, the Liberal Party, and the Center Party obtain a total of 46.3 percent, the Social Democrats and the Left Communist Party 49.6 percent.

The long-term trend, which is more certain because it does not reflect any accidental fluctuations, is: the Moderate Coalition Party 19.4, the Liberal Party 17.9, the Center Party with the Christian Democratic Party 10.2, the Greens 2.7, the Social Democrats 45.5, and the Communist Left Party 4.1 percent.

A total of 1,002 persons were interviewed through visits to their homes on 4-24 February, 1,320 persons indicated their party preferences over the telephone on 15-23 February.

New Joy for the Greens

The Greens did not previously receive any ballot in the polls of Sifa, and the name of the party was not mentioned when interviewers called to ask for party preferences. But since the New Year, Sifa has changed its method and now treats the Greens as one of the parliamentary parties.

The results in January gave rise to great joy within the party, which scored 3 percent of the vote.

The present poll should increase their joy, the party has almost passed the magic 4 percent limit that bars access to the Swedish parliament.

At the same time, several warnings are justified; in several polls the Greens have scored high figures which, subsequently, dropped significantly as the election approached. Here, the established parties have dominated the entire scene, and the Greens have considered themselves unfairly treated by the press, the radio and television.

In addition, changes are more uncertain for small parties such as the Greens. At the same time, it may be established that the January gains were no one-time phenomenon.

The current figures may be applied in a dramatic scenario. If the Greens obtain the 4 percent and gain access to the Swedish parliament, they may become the party that will tip the scale on the government issue.

Competition for the Center Party

A party that probably will read the present result of the Greens without too much enthusiasm is the Center Party. Both of these parties appeal more or less to the same voters. The party, nevertheless, scored slight gains.

Last month, the party scored 8.6 percent, not including the Christian Democratic Party; today the figure will be 9.4 percent.

There will probably be hopes within the Center Party for a better result in the spring. Olof Johansson has succeeded Karin Soder as party leader, and after a little while, opinion polls usually welcome new faces with increasing numbers.

In April, the Center Party and the Christian Democratic Party will be deciding whether their political marriage will continue. Within the Center Party, most voters are skeptical, but circles within the Christian Democratic Party, at least officially, claim that continued cooperation certainly cannot be ruled out. The low figure of 1.2 for the Christian Democratic Party will not exactly increase that likelihood.


Bildt's Lowest Figure

With the present 18.1 percent, Carl Bildt gets his lowest score since becoming the leader of the Moderate Coalition Party last summer. The party had a lower figure most recently in June, when Sifo showed 17 percent.

The main rival of the Moderate Coalition Party in the nonsocialist camp, the Liberal Party, is still somewhat smaller. The party has remained at about the same level throughout the summer. The Liberal Party does not seem to be affected by the defense agreement with the Social Democratic Party and speculations that the two parties will have to agree on nuclear power and the tax issue as well.

The Social Democrats, too, have remained at the same level recently. It is worth noting that the party did not lose support in the polls on account of the new debate on employee funds.

Following last month's low score, the Communist Left Party has again exceeded the 4 percent limit barring access to the Swedish parliament. There was probably no major concern within the party about last month's 3.5 percent. The Communist Left Party usually makes gains as the time for elections approaches.



Key:

- (1) Party Preferences February 1987
- (2) SVENSKA DAGBLADET/Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls
- (3) The blocs
- (4) The Communist Left Party
- (5) The Social Democratic Labor Party
- (6) The middle parties
- (7) The Liberal Party
- (8) The Center Democrats
- (9) The Moderate Coalition Party

Center Party Increasing Stability

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Commentary by Gunnar Andren: "Compared to 12 months Ago"]

[Text] The following things have happened in the year that went by:

With Ingvar Carlsson as their party spokesman and prime minister, the Social Democrats have reached a level of support in the public opinion polls that is 3-4 percent higher than the usual level of the party in years between elections.

The explanation is rather trite: an overwhelmingly large number of loyal Social Democratic sympathizers lack every opportunity to even consider changing parties when the economic development on the whole--like the private economic situations of most people--is rather favorable and the party and the country at the same time are managed in an apparently firm and competent manner.

During the same period, the Liberal Party seems to have lost 6-7 percent of its supporters among the electorate. However, that is for the most part a statistical consequence (or optical illusion) of the "Westerberg effect" of the election campaign in 1985 still remaining 12 months ago.

Actually, the share of supporters of the Liberal Party is surprisingly stable if one takes into consideration the enormous fluctuations to which the leadership of the Liberal Party was subjected by the voters in the eighties. In the polls of the last 6 months--September 1986 to February 1987--the support of the Liberal Party has constantly remained at a level of 17-18 percent.

The Moderate Coalition Party has at the same time fluctuated within the range of 18-21.5 percent, the latter figure was registered immediately after the election of Carl Bildt as the new party chairman.

As far as the public opinion is concerned, the most important thing that happened to the Moderate Coalition Party in the past year is the downward trend of the confidence in the party which became clearly evident at the end of the last election campaign in May/June 1986:

Insufficient confidence in the person Bildt has been indicated as a liability for the Moderate Coalition Party. But that is a rather pointless explanation. All party leaders need time to become known and liked by the voters: this was the case with Costa Bohman, it was the case with Bengt Westerberg, indeed, it was once the case with Olof Palme, although the period 1969/70 today seems remote.

The political dilemma of the Moderate Coalition Party is that a number of the profile issues undertaken by the party for a number of years with such gains in the public opinion polls--for example, basic liberties, family and tax

policies, the efficiency and size of the public sector, the opposition to the employee funds as well as the strength of the Armed Forces--no longer in the same way as previously are in the center of the political debate, or that the government party has acquired considerably more than the color of the buttons of the costume of the Moderate Coalition Party, although the Social Democrats, as is well known, avoid indicating the designation of origin.

The Center Party has a very stable support among the voters at present. The once so large transition between the Center Party and the Social Democratic Labor Party is now almost nonexistent. And contrary to what one might be inclined to believe, extremely few former members of the Center Party say that they prefer the Greens as their "party choice."

Consequently, the Greens definitely have acquired more voters from the other parliamentary parties than from the Center Party. It should be pointed out, however, that all statistical information on the voters of the Greens is still quite uncertain.

The most likely explanation to the above is that presumptive voters of the Center Party who give higher priority to the "environment" than to all other political issues, chose already in 1982 or 1985 to leave the Center Party to join parties such as the Greens. (As far as the voter profile of the Greens is concerned, there is reason to revert to this question once a statistically more certain basis is available.)

The foremost task of Olof Johansson as the new party leader will be to expand the platform of the Center Party to include the economic debate, not least in the area of taxation, where the policy pursued by the party lacks clarity, which certainly not in the long run can be compensated by the beauty of haze.

Let us have a look at a survey that deals with "newly gained voters since the last election," comprising first-time voters, those who changed parties and voters who did not take advantage of their right to vote in 1985 but who now have a "preference of party."

| | First Quarter 1985 | First Quarter 1986 | Third Quarter 1986 | Jan/ Feb 1987* |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| The Moderate Coalition Party | 7 | 10 | 15 | 13 |
| The Center Party | 8 | 14 | 16 | 9 |
| The Liberal Party | 65 | 58 | 45 | 42 |
| The Social Democratic Labor Party | 10 | 12 | 18 | 14 |
| The Communist Left Party | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| The Greens | 5 | 1 | 3 | 17 |

*) All figures are rounded off, and the Jan/Feb 1987 figures should be regarded with extreme caution since the statistical basis is less than for the quarterly

figures. The most important thing is the order of magnitudes, not the absolute percentages.

Here, one may note the declining popularity of the Liberal Party as well as the marked force of attraction of the Greens. (The figures for the Greens in the quarterly opinion polls are actually "other parties" but have here been shown as the Greens.)

The question which naturally emerges now is:

"How strong are the Greens actually?"

One may answer by asking another question:

"How many can today say who is the party leader--or the spokesman, as it is called--of the Greens?"

The lack of knowledge of the policy pursued by the Greens, expressed in somewhat drastic terms, is the party's foremost asset at present. The Greens appear friendly--who does not want a good environment?

As far as the strength of the Greens is concerned, it would, however, be premature to draw any long-term conclusions from the results that the party now scores. For Sifo has also previously in its interviews in homes given all Greens sympathizers the possibility of giving their votes to the Greens--the only requirement was that the voter would himself have to write the name of the party on the ballot. Is it possible that the system of oppressed ballots also for parties outside the parliament makes it "too easy" to vote for them?

The most lasting effect in the opinion polls following the murder of Olof Palme is that the Social Democrats managed to catch a very large share of the voters who previously stated that they did not have any "party preferences." In 1986, it was a question of approximately 3 percent of all persons entitled to vote. The tendency now is for the Social Democrats to make bigger gains in the heavily worked category of voters constituted by those "without party preferences."

This increase in voter support more than compensates for the not inconsiderable net losses simultaneously suffered by the Social Democrats to the Liberal Party (about 0.5 percent) and which now, according to Sifo, also occurred in relation to the Greens (1.5-2 percent).

Finally, it should be noted that the share of undecided voters now reaches its highest level since September of last year.

There is reason to suspect that the increase is at least connected primarily with voters who previously belonged to the political bloc comprising the Moderate Coalition Party, the Center Democrats, and the Liberal Party. And that the "bloc ratio"--50 percent for the bloc comprising the Social Democratic Labor Party and the Communist Left Party as against 46 percent for the bloc comprising the Moderate Coalition Party, the Center Democrats, and the Liberal Party--therefore is more even than indicated by the current Sifo poll.

SDP Voters To Greens

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Text] He who takes a hurried glance at today's Sifo poll will ascertain that the support for the Moderate Coalition Party has dropped by 2 percentage points. At the same time, the support for the Communist Left Party and the Greens has increased by 1 percentage point for either party.

However, it is, of course, not to these two parties that the Moderate Coalition Party has lost its sympathizers. The figures contain more complicated shifts within the electorate.

As will appear from the comments available so far on the poll, a very large share of those who now support the Greens used to support the Social Democratic Labor Party. Nevertheless, the Social Democratic Labor Party remains at a high level.

The power of attraction of the government party is great.

An important explanation, probably the most important one, is that the economy proves to be in fairly good shape, better than ever since the mid-seventies. Real incomes have increased in actual terms during the past year.

Another important explanation is that the tragic murder of Olof Palme and the subsequent promotion of Ingvar Carlsson to the post of prime minister neutralized many of the conflicts and the deadlocks in Swedish politics.

The political situation recalls the one prevailing until the early seventies. The Social Democrats had hegemony in politics. The question was how to further expand the welfare state. The nonsocialist parties, including the Conservative Party, sought frantically to establish an opposition policy which did not deviate too much from the Social Democratic concept.

The task of the nonsocialists was primarily to offer government, not to offer policies. The means to achieve the goal of a change of government was not to challenge too much the ideas adopted in Social Democratic Sweden.

But everybody remembering the political discussion the year prior to the nonsocialist election victory in September 1976 knows that the victory was not won through compliance with the Social Democratic Labor Party.

The Center Party under Thorbjorn Falldin and the Moderate Coalition Party under Costa Bohman strengthened their parties through a serious and progressive criticism of the society.

The nonsocialist criticism of the society is not nearly as effective today as it was in the mid-seventies. In a way, it is symptomatic that it is the Liberal Party that is conceived as the progressive party among the non-socialists, at the same time as the Moderate Coalition Party and the Center Party have problems, as far as the opinion polls are concerned.

Is the message to Olof Johansson and Carl Bildt then that they have to copy the policy that was pursued in 1974-75?

After having formulated this question, one realizes that political gains are not achieved as a matter of course by resorting anew to the recipe for scoring political gains that is now over a decade old.

The regained strength of the Social Democratic Party is partly due to the adaptation of the policy that caused the Center Party and the Moderate Coalition Party to score major gains among the electorate in the seventies. The tasks of Bildt and Johansson are thus more difficult than those of their predecessors.

Nevertheless, the nonsocialist criticism of the society remains the necessary prerequisite for the domination of the nonsocialist policies. The challenge to the nonsocialist party leaders is that this criticism of the society is much more difficult to undertake when encountered by half-way concessions from a mellow and reasonable prime minister.

In short, it was easier being a nonsocialist opposition politician in the mid-seventies when it was Gunnar Strang and Olof Palme who had to handle Pomperiposa affairs and other matters that became lucrative to the nonsocialists in the party policy market.

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CSO: 3650/85

CGIL'S LEADER ON UNION RECOVERY, FUTURE PLANS

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 8 Feb 87 pp 178-180

[Article by Salvatore Gatti: "Cipputi Club"]

[Text] The CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] is in the eye of the storm. Unionists attacked by longshoremen in Genoa; resignations by the secretary general of Piedmont, Fulvio Perini, withdrawn after much effort; an increasingly inflamed climate at Alfa Romeo of Arese. But also some successes, such as the signing of the metalworkers' and chemical workers' contracts. "The longterm damage has played itself out," is the bitter diagnosis of Vittorio Foa, one of the fathers of the Italian labor movement. But the attempt to reestablish the biggest union, which has lost hundreds of thousands of members over the last decade, has been going on for a year.

Trying to save the CGIL from the "risk of extinction" that he himself had pointed out a year ago is Antonio Pizzinato, secretary general since March 1986. Pizzinato, the former "king of Sesto San Giovanni," called the Stalin-grad of Italy on account of the hard ideological line of the communists who live there, is not in fact an old-style communist; if anything, he approaches personages such as Napoleone Colajanni, Giorgio Napolitano and of course Luciano Lama. He is a modernist, and in his renewal program he is encountering rebellions and resistances.

But where does he stand in his struggle? He was asked this by L'ESPRESSO, for which he drew up an interim balance sheet of his political activity, describing the union's status and his plans for the future.

[Question] Mr. Secretary, has the CGIL now reached the lowest point in its history?

[Answer] "In 1985 we had reached the lowest point in this past 20 years in our relations with the workers: 800,000 fewer members than in 1975; our ability to bargain, particularly at the corporate level, was slight; there were grave organizing difficulties even in the sectors toward which the economy was trending; we had gone through the break in our unity with the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and the UIL [Italian Union of Labor]; there was the big delegates-councils crisis. But in 1986 we registered a turning-point, and we have now put out low point behind us. We are on the way back."

[Question] Can you back that up?

[Answer] "We got a good deal, and with a few hours of strikes, in the big metalworkers and chemical-workers negotiations, we are getting good contracts in the public sector. But above all, where we have gone in to renew the cards of the members, we booked an increase in membership."

[Question] But there are rebellions of workers and union officials, even leaders, from Piedmont to Lombardy....

[Answer] "Precisely because there is renewal; precisely because there is this CGIL comeback, all these problems are exploding. Because the entrenchment phase, the phase of defensive battles over decimal points, is over, today we are on new ground, and all the problems are coming out in to the open. An example? It was the custom here to see the peripheral organization as people who were just supposed to go and explain to the workers the line adopted at the center. Today we are giving the periphery more responsibility. We're asking it to be an active advocate of renewal. Today, the union is having trouble both in coping with reality and in rethinking its own nature."

[Question] A year ago you came forward with a very bold reform program. After what you have discovered, after the resistance you have been encountering, how are you changing your strategy?

[Answer] "Faced with the exploding problems, there is only one path to follow: not going backward, but speeding up the renewal process. We must change both our mentality and our organization."

[Question] The latter no longer corresponds to the reality of the working world?

[Answer] "No, it really doesn't. You have only to consider that, of the 7 million workers in small firms, only a few 100,000 are members of the 3 unions, CGIL, CISL and UIL. How absurd! We are negotiating for 7 million workers without being their representatives, without having them in the union. This alone is a gigantic problem: our foremost problem for the next few months: to get them involved in the union. But to do this, we need a new organization, a more flexible one: no way meetings can be held in artisan shops, and then again, some workers can only meet in the evening...."

[Question] But it's not just an organizational problem.

[Answer] "No, of course not. For example, the new CGIL will have to provide all its members with multiservice centers, where insurance and financial help is offered free."

[Question] Isn't this rather similar to the "citizens' union" of Giorgio Benvenuto's UIL?

[Answer] "We want the union today to take on the problems of the home, of health, of the environment, and of quality of life, by organizing appropriately throughout Italian territory--but for the workers, not for citizens in general."

[Question] These profound changes that you want to introduce into the CGIL are, however, running up against the old attitudes and the cultural boundaries of a great many of the union leaders and officials.

[Answer] "We need union people who have a broad picture of the problems, not a corporate one, and who at the same time have greater professionalism and specific capabilities. But the problem is broader, if we really want to renew the CGIL. Indeed, the specific capabilities can't always be found within the union. Let me give you an example: If we are to cope with the restructuring of an entire industrial sector, I'm going to have to call on the members, of course, but also on university professors, economists, outside experts. Even when the CGIL was being reconstructed after the defeat of the fifties, they did what I intend to do now in order to launch a new program for the union: mobilize the best brains in the country."

[Question] This union you are aiming for still involves painful problems: many union people will have to go off and find other work, because they are not suited to the new CGIL.

[Answer] "That's true, but the CGIL has never fired anyone, and is not going to start doing so even now. And certainly, this renewal process that I envision will go on for years. It will be one more problem to cope with, but they definitely will not be left without new employment."

[Question] Mikhail Gorbachev, the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party, wants elections in the USSR that are still communist, but with greater secrecy. In the CGIL, by contrast, to elect leadership groups, voting is drawn up from the top, and cast on non-secret ballots. Wouldn't a little more democracy be welcome with you as well?

[Answer] "From now on our elections will take place according to new rules: if there are not at least 95 percent of the voters who favor open voting, the vote will have to be by secret ballot. But there will be more to it than that: as in any political election, there will be democratic rules concerning the drawing up of the lists and the handling of the votes. But these rules of democracy, appropriate in and of themselves, also have the purpose of bringing the workers closer to the CGIL again, of raising the degree to which we represent the entire working world, from the production-line people to the white-collar people, all the way to the technicians and the research people: we want to represent the totality of the new working world."

[Question] Taken in its entirety, an ambitious program still, as in the days--the calmer days--of your appointment....

[Answer] "There have been some changes, as compared to those days. While the renewal project (we termed it a re-foundation process) was at that time a subjective desire of the leadership group, today both the subjective and the objective conditions for it are being fulfilled, because they are no longer defensive choices and they have more staying power. In order to change, certainly, we need the whole of society."

[Question] The appeal to the intellectuals....

[Answer] "Now only that. We are spending many billions (which are reported in our statement, which we are making public for the first time starting this year), many billions on information handling, on equipping our whole organization with computers. They will link our information system with the CNEL [National Council for Economy and Labor], with that of the Higher Council of the Magistracy, with the Appeals Court, with ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute], with the regional labor observers. In short, the key word still remains professionalism."

[Question] A program in full upswing. But isn't the world trend rather toward a downscaling of unions--you have only to think of the United States or England?

[Answer] "There has been such a trend, as a result of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. But the wind is changing."

[Question] Are you sure of that?

[Answer] "Of course: it was the unions that had an old model of society in their heads, and because of this they have lost many battles. But even today in Italy, for example, professionalism is rewarded: we are no longer for egalitarianism, but for the recognition of individual capacities, and of the diverse nature of different lines of work. And we are in favor of a concept that we once rejected: the compatibility of wages with the national economic parameters. Not only this, we want more: a European compatibility matrix, from which the national ones are derived, because the true problem today is that Italy can be saved only by re-launching Europe. Otherwise the contest with Japan and the United States is lost at the outset."

[Question] Within the framework of relations that are still adversarial, but are no longer dictated by ideological rigidities, what relationship do you now want to have with the "bosses"?

[Answer] "The kind we already have today with IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute]: a 'protocol' which allows us to get--from our opposite numbers--all information on the firms that is needed for understanding the implications of the decisions carried out by the businesses, and for getting this across to the broader membership. There is already something of this kind with Zanussi; we are about to sign an analogous protocol with GEPI [Industrial Participation and Management Company], but we want to extend the rights won at IRI to the whole of big business in this country. This is economic democracy."

[Question] You envision, then, a comprehensive struggle of vast proportions, as much within the CGIL as without it. But haven't you said there is a risk of extinction for the union?

[Answer] "If anything, that there is a risk that a dryrot--the dryrot of bureaucracy--would eat away at the CGIL. But today the risk is smaller precisely because the conflicts have burst out and there is a fierce political battle, but one that is out in the open. This in itself is the antidote to the crisis."

[Question] If you win, what will you be able to offer, as the CGIL, not just to the workers, but to the country as a whole?

[Answer] "A union able to bring unity into an increasingly splintered and diversified work world, something which is in the interests of our opposite numbers and of society more generally. An organization with a real presence at every level of society, which will make its own choices, not on the basis of egoisms and group-centered motives, but on that of the overall interests of the country (a country which today is divided, which is becoming fifth in the world, but in which the South is going backward). We want social equality which is not egalitarianism but rather its direct opposite, and solidarity. It is not up to our opposite numbers and to the political and social forces to decide whether they will take on this struggle, which is in the interests of all."

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PROGRESSIVE ABANDONMENT OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Mar 87 p 11

/Text/ Beira Baixa is headed for a "gradual human abandonment" if public and private funds are not forthcoming in the immediate future. This is one of the conclusions reached in a study on Castelo Branco District made by Deputy Rogerio de Brito, member of the Parliamentary Commission on Agriculture.

The exodus of members of the youngest age groups immediately upon reaching their majority (from 20 to 40 years of age) is the principal reason why the average age of the farmers is greater than that of the country's people in general.

Comparing the age groups of the working people in general and those in agriculture, we see a "more pronounced aging of the agricultural group"; to be precise, 64.5 percent of the agricultural workers are more than 45 years old, while only 36.5 percent of the workers in general are more than 45 years of age.

If we analyze the socioeconomic structure of the agricultural population, we see that there is a definite predominance of individual or family-owned tracts and this amounts to more than 66 percent of the total area, according to Deputy Rogerio de Brito's study.

On only 25.2 percent of the cultivated tracts do the people earn more than 50 percent of their income, while only 9 percent of the farms provide their owners with their total income.

Individual Farms Predominate

In Castelo Branco District 29.5 percent of the total work force exercises farming as a profession, according to the study.

With regard to family farming, which includes about 111,699 inhabitants and represents 56.7 percent of the resident population, more than 75 percent work full time or part time in agriculture.

Of the remaining population, 34 percent of those who do not have their own cultivated tracts work in agriculture for others.

Women make up 48.6 percent of the work force engaged in family-owned farming.

As for individual producers, there are 38,601 in the district, indicating a definite predominance of individual or family-owned farms and amounting to more than 66 percent of the total area, according to the document.

As for the capability of using the land, it has been ascertained that it is the smaller tracts which are most benefited by irrigation.

"Thus, large tracts account for an extensive portion of the agricultural effort but use an extremely limited amount of the natural resources," the study concludes and emphasizes that with tracts of more than 100 hectares there is an abundance of absenteeism, a characteristic phenomenon of large farms.

Low Productivity

It has also been ascertained that "the productivity of both the land and labor is very low" with "a high level of consumption by the producers themselves"; this applies particularly to tracts up to 20 hectares, the study reveals.

Speaking of the productive effort in Castelo Branco District, the study concludes that the rate of crop growing in the agricultural area seems paradoxically to be diminishing as the farming area increases.

With regard to cattle raising, the picture is the same as that of crop growing, while 34 percent of the total farming area is occupied by forests.

The principal crops grown in the area in descending order are olives, vineyards, apples and, to a lesser extent, peaches and cherries.

As for temporary or annual crops, the most important in descending order are grains, forage and a combination of horticultural and vegetable produce.

Impositions by the EEC

The conditions imposed by the EEC with regard to eligibility for funds immediately exclude more than 50 percent of the district's agricultural tracts, or 40 percent of the total area. "These percentages will grow worse in view of the requirements of economic viability of the cultivated tracts and funds," the study stresses.

Moreover, "the lower EC prices and the quality norms and standards dictated by the EC will make competition very difficult for most of the producers of grains, competitive wines, dairy products, fruit, beef and pork."

As for possible EC programs aimed at financing the agricultural sector, no support will be given to help increase production in areas where the EC already has surpluses, such as grains, dairy products, wine, beef and pork.

EFFORTS TO NARROW BUDGET DEFICIT FOR 1987

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5 Feb 87 p 9

[Article by "kh": "Rise in Budget Deficit Slowed--Minimal Rise in Spending"]

[Text] Vienna--Last year, the net budget deficit climbed to 73.1 billion schillings or 5.1 percent of GNP. This year, despite the cut in wage and personal income taxes which took effect on 1 January, the budget deficit will rise just slightly, to 75 billion schillings. The original budget proposal had called for an 81.7 billion schilling deficit. Spending not covered by the debt ceiling will rise by just 0.4 percent. The new budget, adopted by the coalition government, will be presented to the cabinet on 24 February and the budget message to parliament has been scheduled for 25 February. Discretionary spending will be cut across the board by three percent or 1.7 to 2 billion schillings. The partial reprivatization of Creditanstalt, Laenderbank and the OeMV will add 1.8 billion schillings to the state's coffers.

One of the most important things the new budget must do, Lacina stressed, is to find solutions for the most urgent structural problems. Old ways of controlling the economy are passe, he said. If need be, one will have "to step on the gas in selectively," perhaps by subsidizing exports.

In the public service sector, spending for personnel and equipment will have to be cut--among other things by limiting overtime and by not filling vacancies. Last year alone, costs for overtime in the public service sector rose by 8.6 percent. The extent of the farm problem can be seen from the fact that "we will soon have to think about whether it would not make more sense to destroy our corn surpluses rather than subsidize our corn exports."

Special emphasis will be placed on making the budget more flexible--among other things by earmarking as few revenues as possible for specific purposes.

Final agreement was reached on repealing the 32-percent luxury tax on all commodities with the exception of automobiles. This measure "helps the middle class" and will put the brakes on "the grey economy," i.e. illicit imports from neighboring countries with lower tax rates, both Lacina and State Secretary Ditz emphasized. But at the same time, the tax on high-test gasoline will be raised by 30 groschen per liter and that on regular gasoline by 10 groschen.

The debate on new rules governing personal income and wage taxes will be "completed later this year." The language of the appropriate legislation should be finalized by the spring of 1988. The main goal, according to Ditz, will be to lower the marginal tax rates and to make [the tax law] "fairer and more equitable." A public opinion poll, he said, showed that 50 percent of those questioned "were unclear about how to claim deductions." Tax simplification will benefit the individual taxpayer and the economy as a whole as well as the government which will be able to save on personnel in the internal revenue service.

No decision has yet been reached on the repeal of the investment premium and the turnover tax on stocks which in recent years had accounted for annual revenues of 130 million schillings. As regards the reform of the corporate tax structure, Lacina is worried about "silly mailings such as the one by the industry association" which deplored the 77.5 percent tax on business profits. This, he said, is a purely theoretical figure. He would be happy to suggest cutting this tax rate in half, he added, "but then the industrialists will claim that in actual fact this amounts to a tax increase."

State subsidies of the family equalization of burdens program will be reduced from 10.5 to 9.5 billion schillings. The reprivatization of Laenderbank will call for a public stock offering and as far as Creditanstalt is concerned, the government will not participate in the upcoming recapitalization of that financial institution. Through the issuance of registered shares and multiple-vote shares, however, care will be taken that capital distribution and stock ownership by foreign nationals will not impair Austrian control of the institution.

9478
CSO: 3620/173

ECONOMIC INSTITUTE ISSUES PESSIMISTIC PROGNOSIS

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 14/15 Feb 87 p 10

[Article by Erich Hoorn: "Austrian Economy Still Sluggish--Danger of Recession in 1988"]

[Text] Vienna--The cold weather in December 1986 and January 1987 has prolonged the economic slowdown in Austria which began in late September. It is therefore hard to tell at this time whether the two-percent growth rate forecast for 1987 at the end of last year will hold up. In an interview with DIE PRESSE, Dr Helmut Kramer, the director of the Institute for Economic Research (Wifo), draws attention in this context to the most recent pessimistic prognosis of the German Ifo Institute in the aftermath of the German Bundestag election. The positive forecasts prior to the election were dictated by "calculated optimism."

In Austria, on the other hand, the economic forecast put out in December was based on a more pessimistic assessment, Kramer says. The sole hopeful sign for the domestic economy is the sharp rise in Austrian mass income in excess of the rate of inflation. In the past, this money usually went into savings; but now the hope is that it will go into consumption and thereby stimulate the domestic economy.

The two other previous pillars of the economy, i.e. exports and investments, have been weak. Investment in equipment and construction rose by 4.3 percent last year but this year Wifo expects it to rise by only 2.8 percent. Kramer says it is hard to predict whether even this increase can be achieved. Exports have not picked up since late last fall; but there is some hope that exports to Western Europe will increase because of an expected rise in consumption there.

Kramer does not rule out the possibility of a recession in 1988 which would occur if the decline in the value of the American dollar were to have an excessively adverse effect on West European exports to the rest of the world. It would also have a major impact on investments.

Because of the lack of sufficient information, however, Kramer feels he is not

yet in a position to make any firm predictions about the economic situation. At the moment, he is still busy preparing a background paper on the state of the economy to be presented at the economic policy forum on 11 March.

Uncertainties of the World Economy

Meanwhile, foreign economic experts have also been drawing attention to the uncertain state of the world economy. The U.S. balance of payments deficit of \$170 billion last year and the huge export surpluses of Germany and Japan have been responsible in part for the decline of the dollar. The Americans expect the cheaper dollar to help improve the competitiveness of their products on the world market.

At a recent economic forum held in Davos, Switzerland, U.S. economist Lester Thurow declared that the devaluation of the dollar is designed to reestablish the U.S. balance of payments. It would also result in the creation of four million jobs in the United States while the rest of the world would lose the same number of jobs.

The Rhenish-Westphalian Economic Research Institute points out that the revaluation of the German mark has had a decidedly unfavorable impact on the sales and profits by German companies dependent on exports. This, in turn, has an adverse effect on investments. According to the German Bundesbank, the German economy has been marking time since last October. While the GNP grew by one percent in real terms in the third quarter, the rise in overall economic output did not continue in the fourth quarter.

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CSO: 3620/173

EXPORTS TO NORDIC COUNTRIES SEEN SOON LARGER THAN TO USSR

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSLADET in Swedish 16 Feb 87 p 10

[Article by Birgitta Jernvall Ingman]

[Text] It seems likely that Finland's business sector will sell more to Sweden and Norway this year than to the Soviet Union.

Last year our exports to the Soviet Union were still around a billion marks higher than our combined exports to our western neighbors. But the reduction in trade with the East combined with increased demand, especially in Sweden, make it likely that the situation will be reversed.

In 1986 our exports to the Soviet Union amounted to 16.8 billion marks. We sold goods worth 12.1 billion to Sweden, 3.7 billion to Norway and 3.3 billion to Denmark, according to figures from the Customs Bureau.

We had a trade surplus with all the Nordic countries. The largest surplus was in our trade with Norway, + 2 billion marks, followed by Sweden, + 1.7 billion, and Denmark, + 1.1 billion marks.

Started in the Sixties

Our exports to Sweden increased by 10 percent last year while exports to Norway increased by 6 percent. However there was a decline of 2 percent in our trade with Denmark.

Department chief Sampsa Saralehto of the Central Industrial Federation said that our trade with Sweden really got going back in the 1960's. Before that it amounted to only a few percentage points of our total exports, but since then it has stabilized at a level of around 13-14 percent. Last year it amounted to 14.7 percent of our total exports, the second highest figures in the 1980's. In 1980 the share was even larger, 16.5 percent.

Similar But Slightly Different Products

Saralehto mentioned two main reasons why trade has been so stable. In the first place the two areas are close to each other. And in the second place

trade has had the nature of domestic market sales to a large extent. Similar but slightly different products are exported and imported. Saralehto illustrated this by saying that Finland might export women's bicycles to Sweden while Sweden exports men's bicycles to Finland. Industrial trade and specialization have been carried to extremes.

In addition trade is characterized by subcontracting activities (especially with regard to our metal exports) and the establishment of subsidiaries in both countries.

Textiles and Metal

Sweden is especially important as an export market for our textiles--and the garment industry. Almost a quarter of the exports in this branch go to that country.

And Sweden is almost as important--or perhaps even more so, depending on one's method of calculation--for the metal industry. About a fifth of metal industry exports go to Sweden and the sector accounts for 53 percent of our total exports there. Metal exports rose by 24 percent last year.

"If things go well in Sweden, it is a good sign for our exports," said Saralehto, who pointed out that an economic recovery in Sweden has immediate repercussions in Finland, especially within the metal industry, since a third of our imports from Sweden go to that branch.

No Precise Statistics

Which companies export products and where do they go? There are no precise statistics on trade, according to Saralehto. But for Finnish companies exports and internationalization often begin with Sweden--after which they try to maintain their contacts there.

Is the Swedish market saturated or is there still room for growth?

"There is certainly room to increase our exports to Sweden," Saralehto said. "The possibilities have not been completely exhausted."

Openings and New Needs

"New Needs will always arise along with new demand in Sweden and this has not been given enough emphasis," said Saralehto. "Instead we have set our sights on new markets that are farther away."

But the reorganization of Swedish industry means that openings occur that the Finns could fill. And tastes and habits change, all of which contributes to new demand, Saralehto said.

This is especially true of consumer goods and other light articles. Heavy industry has found its way.

Four Percent to Norway, Denmark

Because of its weight and size Sweden has a dominant position in our Nordic trade. Our exports to both Norway and Denmark have stabilized at a considerably lower level, i.e. around 4 percent of our total exports.

Our exports to Norway also chiefly involve metal (47 percent) and textiles, mainly clothing (16 percent).

Sales to Norway have amounted to about 4 percent of our total exports all through the 1980's, apart from a drop to 3.4 percent in 1983. Imports from Norway have stabilized at around 2 percent of our total imports.

Surpluses the Rule

Our exports to Denmark are more traditionally Finnish, with 40 percent coming from the shoe industry. The metal industry's share is around 30 percent and textiles and clothing also play an important role here.

In the 1980's exports to Denmark accounted for between 3.3 and 4.1 percent of our total exports while imports from that country have varied between 2.2 and 2.8 percent of our total imports.

With respect to both Norway and Denmark, the trade balance has shown a surplus during the 1980's. In trade with Sweden, Finland has noted one deficit of 322.5 million marks in 1982.

| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|---------------------------|----------|----------|---------|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| Exports | 8717.5 | 8058.5 | 7547.2 | 8635.2 | 9961.4 | 11084.6 | 12148.7 |
| Share of Total Exports, % | 16.5 | 13.4 | 12 | 12.4 | 12.3 | 13.2 | 14.7 |
| Imports | 7022.6 | 6920.3 | 7869.7 | 7995.6 | 9194.1 | 9620.5 | 10473.3 |
| Share of Total Imports, % | 12.1 | 11.3 | 12.2 | 11.2 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 13.5 |
| Trade Balance | + 1694.8 | + 1138.2 | - 322.5 | + 639.5 | + 767.4 | + 1464.2 | + 1675.4 |

Finland's trade with Sweden, 1980-86, in millions of marks.

Source: Customs Bureau

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ECONOMIC INDICATORS: CONSUMPTION UP, DEBT DOWN

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 20-26 Feb 87 p 4-E

[Text] Higher consumption and fewer outstanding debts are the dominant notes in the indicators presented here.

The volume of protested commercial bills declined at a faster rate than the volume of discounted bills, revealing signs of an improvement in the financial situation of the firms.

The rate of inflation is continuing to slow, thus strengthening a degree of recovery in real wages.


Supermarket sales and requests for new telephones are up--an obvious sign that purchasing power is growing stronger again.

The electrical and electronic industries experienced a bad year but are now showing some recovery.


The port of Lisbon handled more goods as a result of the economic recovery and the improved competitiveness of its port facilities.

Electricity consumption is rising, perhaps because production activity has intensified.


[See graphs beginning on the following page.]




This week the job supply index registered a significant increase on the order of 15 percent. It is a revealing indication of the dynamics of job supply on the employer side, all the more since it contrasts with the declines noted during the same period in the other three job market indicators and the housing indicator, which O JORNAL DA ECONOMIA publishes regularly.



The rate of inflation dropped by 0.3 points in January to 11.4 percent. That annualized price variation held true for all items in the "basket," with the most significant change occurring in "housing expense" (down 0.8 percentage points). The monthly variation for January was +1.2 percent.




The number of applications to have new telephones installed in the cities of Lisbon and Porto covered nearly 80,000 sets last year. That is a 70-percent increase over the year before. The symbol of modern communication systems and a basic means of contact in large cities, the telephone now appears to be growing more accessible.



Electricity consumption during the second week of February totaled 449.8 million kWh, up slightly over the preceding week (+2.1 percent). That figure is also higher than the consumption figure for the same week last week (+3.9 percent). Considering the mild weather we have been having, that increase is probably the result of increased industrial consumption--in other words, stepped-up production activity.


**Supermarket Sales up: Supermarket Sales
(change from the same period in the
preceding year)**



According to data from the National Supermarket Association, the volume of sales by those firms rose by about 30 percent last year at current prices. Considering an inflation rate on the order of 9 percent for supermarket items, the real increase would be about 20 percent. The sample used represents only 4 percent of the universe, but the results are indicative of improved purchasing power and of the growing competition among businesses of this kind.


Commercial Credit: Fewer Protests

Protested Commercial Bills




The value of protested commercial bills declined by about 27 percent during the first 10 months of last year. During the same period, the drop in the value of discounted commercial bills was significantly lower (-11 percent), a sign of improvements in the situation of trade. In October, the values protested represented less than 1 percent of discounted values.

Port of Lisbon: Movement up
General Movement of Goods Through the
Port of Lisbon (January to November)



During the first 11 months of 1986, the port of Lisbon handled about 11.3 million metric tons of goods, for an increase of 3.6 percent over the same period the year before. This reverses the downward trend in movement through that port that had been noted since 1981. The higher increase in unloaded tonnage (+6.5 percent) accounted for the recovery.



According to the latest quarterly economic summary by the national association of businesses in this sector, 1986 was a bad year. Sales increased by about 5 percent at current prices, meaning a decrease in real terms. The collapse of the foreign market was the main reason for the decline. But some improvement could already be seen in the fourth quarter, and growing optimism concerning order books points to continuing recovery this year.

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INTERALLIED ENGINEER TRAINING AT MUNICH NATO TRAINING CENTER

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German Nov/Dec 86 pp 247-249

[Article by Dieter Kirchhoff and Klaus Wondratschek; "Interallied Engineer Training"]

[Text] "Interoperability Is a Question of Attitude." (General George S. Blanchard, COMCENTAG)

For years now, the Bundeswehr has been interfacing with allied armies on numerous occasions in the course of each training year--not just in joint major formation and unit training exercises. Until now, only some of the equipment, hardware and explosive ordnance have been standardized--very little, for engineers. This can have disastrous consequences, as is illustrated by one example from a training exercise: Following the transfer of a bridge that had been readied for demolition, the release mechanism failed. A soldier from the other country involved was unable to seat the right-hand thread of the detonator properly. He kept turning it without getting it to engage, and in his excitement destroyed the entire ignition cable. The bridge fell into enemy hands undamaged.

The mere fact that in the AFCENT region alone there are about 28 different types of mines and 66 different explosive charges with 57 different igniting and detonating agents makes more than clear the need for joint training. Since similar problems exist and have existed in other branches of the service, a EURO NATO Training Group was established on the ministerial level back in 1971.

The goals set at that time are still valid today:

- improvement of existing training programs,
- development of new training programs,
- reduction of training costs,
- improvement of training methods.

In recent years new types of explosive ordnance and equipment have enabled engineers to provide increasingly effective support for combat troops. New weapons, hardware and types of ammunition are also influencing the methods and modalities of cooperation by engineers at all levels of NATO.

As a result, in 1977, following a proposal by the CENTAG of CINCENT, a concept for a NATO engineer training school was put before all the central European nations. The request was based on the following arguments:

1. Barrier preparation by engineers is a prerequisite for effective defense in the Central European region.
2. Engineers set up barriers in other countries' areas, trigger foreign barriers, or most close barriers prepared by other countries.
3. Changes in lines of command and control due to position on the battlefield require that barriers be transferred from one country to another.

These problems can be solved only by intensive reciprocal training in all explosive ordnance and barrier procedures.

The CINCENT request did not actually result in an engineer training school being set up, but with the establishment of the EURO NATO Training Engineer Centers (ENTEC) in 1977--a cooperative project involving six countries (Belgium, the FRG, Canada, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Great Britain)--a permanent agency that could be dedicated to this task was created at the Munich Engineer Training School.

The ENTEC Working Group was responsible for drawing up the entire ENTEC program. All AFCENT countries are represented in this group and have a voice in its decisions. The chairman is the commander of Training Group A of the Engineer Training School and Army Technical Training School for Structural Engineering.

ENTEC's permanent training team consists of officers and NCO's from four countries. The two liaison officers (UK, Canada) at the Engineer Training School are members of this team. To date, 1,742 participants, from platoon leaders to battalion commanders, have undergone training in a total of 57 different courses.

On the platoon leader level--which is probably the most important level of cooperation--courses are given on the following subjects:

--Delivery/takeover of barriers, including the handling of barrier records.

--Demolition material and detonating agents, mines and accessories:

Reciprocal briefing and instruction is especially intensive in this area.

British and American munitions are exploded for the final examination.

--Prepared barriers:

Here course participants gain the capability and readiness to charge and trigger Dutch and German barriers that have been structurally prepared during peacetime. Participants are also trained at the German 5-(metric)-ton barrier munitions house and in the use of the NATO barrier folder.

Training for company commanders emphasizes the following areas:

--barrier preparation, including the necessary documentation,

--Host National Support (HNS).

--Territorial armies, including the Wallmeister organization,

--advances in the field of standardization.

The one-week course for senior officers in command supplements the other courses offered and covers the following sets of problems:

--tasks of the AFCENT reserves,

--international barrier agreements,

--Wartime Host Nation Support,

--missions of the German Territorial Army.

Members of the NATO headquarters AFCENT, NORTHAG and CENTAG are also invited as advisers and instructors. They handle the brigade and division training levels.

Where cooperation is desired, mutual comprehension is a necessity. Language is a problem with so many different countries involved in the program. Interpreters whose native language is English are present for the courses. To facilitate matters, multilingual forms have been developed for the most important fields of study. One such checklist is also included in STANAG 2989 and the Central Region Directive for the delivery/takeover of barriers.

Cooperation does not work when it is present only in regulations, documents or agreements. The best basis is personal contact and effective mutual understanding. This fact is taken into account by having special emphasis placed on partnership and friendly relations during the courses, so that this "bridge" can be used to heighten the motivation for mutual assistance. As former COMCENTAG General G. S. Blanchard said in 1977:

"Interoperability is a question of attitude."

Many engineers among the U.S. Army's reinforcement troops never come to Europe during peacetime, although that would be where they were employed in the event of an emergency. For reasons of cost, therefore, a mobile training team (MTT)

has been formed, which periodically flies to the U.S. with 5 tons of equipment to provide the necessary training and instruction on site. The permanent team for these training missions consists of one Belgian, one Dutch and one British instructor. The first training program of this kind was conducted at Ford Hood, Texas, in 1984, for the Third U.S. Corps. This team is now also training allied engineers at various locations in the FRG with the participation of the sponsoring battalion concerned.

Every type of instruction has its practical training aids, and this is true of ENTEC's program as well. The first task was consequently to prepare a three-part Interoperability Handbook in four languages, printed by the U.S. Army.

Part I is in the form of a dictionary and contains organizational diagrams and equipment data for all the participating countries.

Part II is a four-part handbook for use by squad leaders.

Part III gives information on national detonating agents, demolition material, mines and accessories, and on prepared barriers. It is aimed primarily at platoon leaders.

The remainder of the mission catalog consists of standardization programs and suggestions for simplifying operational procedures for engineers, together with the contribution to a technical glossary of engineering which is an inevitable outgrowth of this type of material.

The work done by ENTEC led to the desire to set up a central agency for combat engineers in Europe, in the form of an information center where all the available supports such as NATO documents, pamphlets, training films, and graphic and training material would be kept on hand and updated. The goal would be to make everyone's knowledge available to everyone else. To satisfy these high requirements an increase in the number of personnel on the ENTEC staff will clearly be necessary. Belgium and the Netherlands are currently providing assistance on a trial basis.

The importance and interest of ENTEC's contribution to the engineer training school is demonstrated by the long and prestigious visitors' list, from the COMCENTAG to the army chief of staff. The guest book also is decorated with flags of nations from the U.S. to Italy, from Canada to Australia, and from Norway to Nepal.

Increasing importance has been given to cooperation in the rear combat zone and the communications zone between American and British reinforcements and the engineers of the host country concerned, such as Belgium, the Netherlands and the FRG. ENTEC was accorded the responsibility for conducting the first "AFCENT Rear Area Conference" in the fall of 1986.

In the interest of all the allies, joint work in the field of engineering within NATO must be further intensified. The goals should be:

--to make NATO engineers mutually interchangeable during operations, especially now that they are equipped with fast, mobile delivery systems, and

--to familiarize each engineer with the types of explosive ordnance used by his NATO partners.

As one participant aptly put it: "Engineers must feel as comfortable in an allied minefield as in their own."

This is the goal of the EURO NATO Training Engineer Center at the Engineer Training School in Munich.

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CSO: 3260/155

MILITARY

DENMARK

DEFENSE MINISTER ENGELL WARNS OF BUDGET FREEZE AFFECTS

Would Mean Less Capability

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 24 Feb 87 p 16

[Article by Peter Bergen: "Engell Wants More For Defense"]

[Text] "An unchanged defense budget will definitely mean significant reductions in the defense situation over some years. In other words we cannot maintain the present defense with the same economic expenditures."

This is what Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) wrote in the annual Defense Ministry report. This year the report has more than just informative significance. Engell is clearly getting ready for negotiations on a new defense agreement that will take effect this year. He wants more money for defense, and he is more than just suggesting that politicians of another persuasion (read: Social Democrats) are at fault in the flight of personnel from defense.

"In my opinion it is important for the responsible political parties to show sympathy and understanding for the importance of defense. If the personnel feel that defense is being made a plaything for chance political currents and is not taken seriously by the parties or by society as a whole, the departure of personnel from defense can increase significantly," Engell said.

But on official military stationary -- namely in organ for the Defense Information Service, FORSVARET I DAG -- Hans Engell received a direct answer to his demand for more money for defense: "I do not believe that the large majority of the population will agree to increased appropriations for defense at the same time that there are cuts in social budgets and in appropriations for education and health," Karl Hjortnaes, the Social Democratic coordinator for defense policy, said.

He also demands greater political control of how defense uses its money, 13 billion this year: "We can no longer be satisfied with the establishment of a few general guidelines and the presentation of a bag of money so that the service branches can fight about the purchase of equipment. This won't work anymore. As politicians we must go much more into detail and take a political stand on the current problems of the Danish defense forces," he said.

The report also reveals that Denmark and Great Britain are negotiating an agreement on depots in Jutland for a British brigade of 13,000 men that is earmarked as a reinforcement for Denmark in time of crisis or war. This is spite of British statements that one intends to use this brigade at another place.

In advance in 1986 ammunition and reserve parts were stored at Tirstrup Air Base for two British fighter-bomber squadrons.

In a Danish-American planning group peacetime depots were discussed for American air and land forces. Agreements were made on the storage of material, including vehicles, and at two air bases construction of warehouses has begun, paid for by the Americans. In addition, warehouses for American ammunition will be built.

Last year an agreement was also made on the plans and partial establishment of an American field hospital with 500 beds at Holstebro Barracks. The U.S. will pay most of the expenses for this.

Army Would Lose Barracks

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 March 87 p 5

[Article by Ole Dall: "Engell: Reductions in Army Cost Barracks"]

[Text] "Those in favor of defense must stand together and not use all their powder on the barracks problems," Hans Engell said as he stressed at a debate in Haderslev that there is a large overcapacity at Jutland and Funen barracks.

"The plans to reduce the number of barracks in Jutland and Funen are a direct consequence of a great many years of reductions in the Danish army. Today we have an overcapacity of army barracks in Jutland and Funen of about 30 percent. Theoretically this means that every third bed in the barracks stands empty. This does not make for a sound defense economy," Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) said last evening when he took part in a debate meeting in Haderslev on defense plans for the closing of barracks. Among other things it has been suggested that Tonder Barracks be closed.

He called the closing of barracks "an extremely painful process for both the defense forces and the local population."

"But for the defense forces it will be extremely bad if the ratio of strength and barracks is not reasonable. Defense must have a healthy economic situation in which we must naturally prioritize the tasks that must be handled first in a preparedness situation," Engell said. He added: "Therefore it is also completely decisive that those favoring defense stand together in the coming defense debate and not use all their powder on the barracks problems. The decision on future barracks policy must quite naturally be made by the parties that today support the present defense arrangement -- that is, the governing parties and the Social Democratic Party."

Schluter Enters Budget Debate

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Mar 87 p 4

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Engell: More Money or Weakened Defense"]

[Text] Unchanged appropriations for defense will mean a weakening of defense, according to Defense Minister Hans Engell. He says that there is no security policy basis for this.

It is a myth that the government has allowed defense appropriations to rise more than social expenditures. Defense expenditures have risen 13.6 percent since the government came to power in 1982, and the social expenditures have risen by 19.6 percent.

Schluter into the Debate

Prime Minister Poul Schluter entered the debate in the Folketing yesterday on defense's future economic framework to settle the discussion on defense appropriations in relation to other areas of expenditure.

Social Democratic Spokesman Karl Hjortnaes rejected the comparison and asked where an extra 800 million kroner for defense can be found in the government budget.

Hjortnaes flatly rejected a solution of an agreement with the government as took place in the Great Belt issue without the Radicals.

"The government has said that extra appropriations will be found from savings in other places. The Social Democratic Party intends neither directly nor indirectly to recoup these losses," Hjortnaes said.

In this way the debate became a test of the larger financial policy framework, as the debate earlier had been a clash between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party.

Social Democrats: Neither Larger Nor Smaller Budget

Social Democratic Chairman Anker Jorgensen said to the Socialist People's Party spokesman Pelle Voigt that the Social Democratic Party will take the defense agreement the party itself finds correct, and that will be a zero solution with the existing built-in regulating mechanism for wage and price developments. The Social Democratic Party will agree neither to a larger or a smaller budget.

Hans Engell found it impossible to maintain Danish defense strength if increased appropriations were not now made available. "Nothing at present speaks for reductions in Danish defense. Quite the contrary is closer to the truth," he said.

It was the Socialist People's Party that had raised the question, and in addition to the Socialist People's Party's own proposal for an agenda, both the Socialist Left Party and the Social Democratic Party proposed an agenda. All three agendas were voted down, as the government voted against all three and the Social Democrats could not obtain support beyond their own ranks for their agenda on an unchanged appropriations framework.

Budget Seen Campaign Issue

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Mar 87 p 10

[Editorial: "The Demands of Defense"]

[Text] Every indication now is that defense expenditures will be one of the issues that will characterize a coming election campaign. After the debate yesterday in the Folketing it is clear that it will be extremely difficult for the government to obtain an acceptable defense agreement before the elections. The Radical Party statement that it cannot accept co-responsibility for a finance law with increased defense appropriations binds the government in a situation in which the Social Democratic Party in its opening position has demanded an unchanged appropriations level. The Radical flexibility in other areas, which are regulated by agreement without Radical participation, can obviously not extend also to include expenditures for Denmark's defense.

Defense Minister Hans Engell is correct when he says that nothing at present speaks for a weakening of our preparedness. In fact, the present negotiations on a reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals in Europe mean a greater dependence upon conventional forces -- and Denmark must also realize this. Compared with the constantly increasing demand for material acquisitions, an unchanged continuance of the present margins of expenditures will mean a weakening of Danish defense and its options. The defense negotiations must therefore have a real chance, and it was good in spite of everything that the Folketing yesterday refrained from entering into agenda questions before the negotiations have begun.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

ADMIRAL DESCRIBES NATO SCENARIO 'IF DENMARK IS OCCUPIED'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 20-26 Feb 87 p 8

[Article by Rear Admiral Ib Rodholm: "If Denmark is Occupied"]

[Text] Major Michael H. Clemmesen has discussed in WEEKENDAVISEN of 6-12 February the problems of Danish defense as they are now. Some of the information and judgements given in the article require deeper comments.

When one discusses the necessity for a Danish defense force and its size and composition, it is obviously very important to evaluate Denmark's strategic importance, that is, the value Danish territory has for the Eastern powers and respectively NATO's interest in seeing that the area remains in Danish hands within the Atlantic Pact. This question has also been actively debated within NATO circles for many years.

From North to South

About 25 years ago the dominant view was that the value of the Northern area for the Atlantic Pact was concentrated in northern Norway, which as is known flanks the departure of ships from Russia's ice-free base area on the Kola Peninsula, and where advanced bases for submarines can be established. The Danish straits were not so important but were nevertheless to be blockaded to prevent the Soviet Baltic Sea fleet from being used on the open seas. The problem was first and foremost with the Russian submarine fleet, because the rest of the Soviet sea power was more like a sea-going coast guard, even if the building of larger ships (in the international sense of the word) had begun.

This view has since been changed greatly, and today the so-called BALTOP area (that is, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein) is accorded great importance in NATO. In brief, the new concept is that the following factors must be considered in the evaluation (the order of presentation does not indicate any priority).

Shipyards

The Danish straits are of great importance for both sides. It is not so much a problem for the Soviet Union to be able to come out, for this can always be done in peace time by arranging the transfer to other base areas and maneuvers in the Atlantic Ocean. There would be nothing at all abnormal in this, because transfers and fleet exercises are always taking place, and the exercises are

becoming more and more extensive. The essential point in the control of the straits (mainly the Great Belt) is that the main part (more than 50 percent) of the Russian logistic support for the fleet is always in the Baltic Sea area, and it will therefore not be possible for the Warsaw Pact to carry out naval warfare for an extended period if this area cannot be used. On the other hand, one can certainly object that Russia will not necessarily need to repair its damaged ships, because a war may be very short. This possibility exists, of course, but since it is known that the Soviet Union, as far as ammunition, etc., is concerned, is prepared for prolonged hostilities, it would be illogical to assume that the Russians were not making plans for the possibility of the fleet being used for a long time.

Southern Norway

But the Danish straits are not at all the only factor making the BALTOP area interesting. Political circles in Denmark must certainly have noticed that Norway to a continually increasing extent is becoming concerned about the defense of southern Norway, concurrently with the continual weakening of the Danish defense forces. With Norway's large area, its small population, and its limited economic resources, it is impossible for our Scandinavian brother country to establish an effective defense of both the southern and northern parts of the country. Up to now one has had confidence (and still hopes) that an effective barrier against attack from the south can be created in Denmark and Schleswig Holstein, but if this assumption is wrong, the situation for Norway (and with it all of NATO's northern flank) will be catastrophic.

Air Defense

If Denmark is occupied by the Eastern powers, there will also be far-reaching consequences. As the land lies today, the BALTOP area acts as a forward air defense for England and the maritime traffic in the North Sea. If this defense falls away, and if an enemy power is able to establish its own air bases on the Jutland peninsula, the situation in Great Britain and for the ports in northern Germany and in the canal area can become very serious, with effects on both the struggle for air superiority and the landing of reinforcements and supplies. And the situation will not be improved by the fact that the Eastern naval powers after Denmark's fall will have free access to lay waste in the North Sea and the adjacent waters. Here it would be a great mistake to believe that sea transport of materiel and personnel to the European continent will not begin until a later time. The necessary reinforcement of NATO forces in Western Europe will in all probability be begun before the outbreak of hostilities, and passage must be continued until hostilities stop, if an attacker is not to have an all too easy time of it.

But it is not just England and the North Sea and canal areas that will be affected by a Russian occupation of the Jutland peninsula. Today there is already serious concern about the strength of the Danish air defense. The Atlantic Pact is counting on a combination of a missile belt down through Europe and fighter aircraft to prevent the Warsaw Pact from gaining control of the air over Western Europe in case of war. If the Danish part of the missile belt and the rest of

the air defense is too weak, or if it fails completely, the path can be free for an attacker to fly to the north around the central European defense forces, and attack targets in Holland, Belgium, and Germany from the west, concurrently with the other attacks from the east. It does not take much imagination to grasp the serious consequences such a situation entails.

If the Atlantic Pact's defense lines on dry land in north Germany remain intact, an Eastern power occupation of the BALTOP area can also be used to establish a flank attack from Jutland toward the south and in this way bring NATO's forces in central Europe into danger.

Political Threats

There are therefore several military reasons for Russia to want to occupy Denmark rapidly after the outbreak of a possible war. But in addition, foreign experts (among others, Mr. Donnelly in WEEKENDAVISEN) have recently pointed to another factor that cannot be ignored, either. One claims that our country is considered to be one of NATO's weak points and that the Soviet Union will try to force a Danish capitulation as rapidly as possible after the outbreak of hostilities, partly for the above-mentioned strategic reasons, but also (and not least important) because one hopes in this way to be able to get countries such as Belgium and Holland to follow suit. This Danish surrender can, according to the Eastern concept, be brought about by concentrated attacks on Danish positions in Schleswig Holstein or a land march on Zealand. There can hardly be doubt that from a purely military point of view the Jutland peninsula is more important than the Zealand island group, but the psychological effect on the Danish population of an occupation of Copenhagen seems on the other hand to be very great. Where and how an attack on Denmark will be made in a given case will naturally depend upon the situation, including the Danish moral power of resistance.

Hope

But there is certainly no reason to lose courage for this reason. the BALTOP area can only be attacked from the air or the sea, or up through Holstein, and neither an amphibian operation against Zealand nor an advance toward the north up through the Jutland peninsula is an easy operation. Nor are we alone. Both at sea and in the air we will receive the support of West German forces, and there are many German troops in Holstein. Moreover, there will certainly come aircraft from the U.S., and it is by no means ruled out that army reinforcements can also arrive in time. For this, Danish political will is necessary to prepare their arrival, for example, by the storage of materiel in peace time, so that the personnel can to a great extent be flown into position. This will has up to now been missing, and the troop reinforcements that are at present ready on short notice have been earmarked for other purposes, with the exception of the English "Mobile Force," which at the moment is being debated. But planning is not static, and from the American side one is now trying energetically to speed up the times in which reserve forces can be ready, so changes are not ruled out. It is also possible that in time some reinforcements could be distributed if the materiel in the future is stored in large, fast ships that, if necessary, can sail to the appointed location long before there is need for troops. But the Danish government must have the courage to ask for

reinforcements so early that the battle is not lost ahead of time, and there must be a minimum of ability to resist in the Danish defense forces that they are not overrun before NATO's machinery gets started. This is not a task that is impossible for Denmark. All that is needed is the will and a few preparations in the defense budget that seem very small when compared to our other government expenditures.

It has been reported that the government will soon present its initiative to the defense arrangement that will replace the present one in a year. Even if the indications (and the political discussion of recent months) are frightening, one must nevertheless hope that a thorough-going and professional discussion can be had on the basis of the expected proposal, so that the result can be an objective defense arrangement. If the descending effectiveness curve of the Danish defense forces is not stopped now, the task can become insurmountable the next time it is tried.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

ARMY TO WAIT AT LEAST SEVEN YEARS BEFORE GETTING NEW MISSILES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Feb 87 p 6

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] All negotiation results have been cancelled, and the Defense Materiel Command is starting from the beginning to look at all four missile systems that were under consideration for short range air defense.

Nothing will be done to modernize the army's short range air defense during the present agreement period. Lack of political approval has stopped the negotiations with the American firm that produces Stinger missiles and has caused all negotiations to be cancelled. Instead, the army's Material Command in Hjorring has reopened the whole project. This means that all four of the originally considered missiles are again in the picture, and that after renewed market investigations a new position will be taken. The selection of a type can therefore not be expected until 1989 at the earliest. The new, much needed short range air defense cannot therefore be expected to be operational before 1994, according to the Defense Command.

The acquisition of an up-to-date short range air defense will be included in the present defense agreement. The idea is for the missiles to replace the aging Red-Eye system, which was acquired in 1972.

In 1986 offers were obtained on four missile types. They are the American Stinger, the French Mistral, the English Starstreak, and the Swedish RBS 70.

After evaluation of the offers and the possibilities of compensation agreements, the Defense Command recommended last August the American Stinger missile. Partly because it lived up to the desired quality, and partly because delivery would begin in 1990.

Disagreement in the Folketing's 11-man committee led to a postponement of the purchase of 850 Stinger missiles for a total of 768 million kroner.

Must Start From the Beginning

Now the Defense Materiel Command must begin from the beginning in its investigations, with orders to look particularly carefully at mainly the French Mistral

missile and the British Starstreak.

But the experts are anything but happy with the situation. "We are risking buying a cat in a sack. The Mistral missile dropped from the competition at an early stage, and uncertainty surrounding the Starstreak missile was much too great," Defense Command spokesman Lt Col Ole Kandborg said.

"There were reports that the Materiel Command was at one time ready to accept Starstreak -- provided that one accepted several uncertainties. If one could not do this, then the command preferred the American Stinger missile.

"The point here was that Starstreak was not -- and is not -- completely developed, and therefore one had to make reservations in several areas such as delivery time, technical specifications, economic conditions, as well as Great Britain's own attitude toward the missile on delivery time. For the Defense Command it was also significant that the question of the missile's kill-effect was not sufficiently clarified," Kandborg said.

The military experts are quite astonished at political claims that too many steps are necessary to fire the Stinger missile. It is quite correct that according to the instructions for use there are 18 steps, but when one considers that the first one is, "Open the transport case," and the second, "Take the missile out," then it really is not so bad.

It is a fact that Afghan partisans, who are to a great extent illiterate, have used Stinger missiles -- even if they were of a slightly older type than the one the Danish Defense Command decided it wanted -- and that they have shot down a gradually impressive number of Soviet aircraft and helicopters with Stinger missiles.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

POLL FINDS FEWER SUPPORT ARMED DEFENSE OF COUNTRY

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 10 Mar 87 p 19

[Article by Peter Bergen: "Denmark is Worth Fighting For"]

[Text] The will to defense in Denmark has sunk the past two years. But it is still steadily high, according to an opinion poll from October. Only every tenth Dane does not think that the conditions in Denmark are worth defending against a military attack. And 85 percent of the Danes say they are ready to defend the country in a war "in the way they can."

Toward the Middle

The will to defense reached its peak in 1984, according to the defense opinion poll. Since then it has sunk a little. Behind this conclusion there hides a development away from the extremes and toward the middle. Fewer give the most positive and most negative answers to questions on defense. While the number of moderate supporters and moderate opponents has risen.

Eight Questions

The will to defense is measured by eight questions. For example, "Do you believe that defense contributes to assure freedom in Denmark? And, "Do you think that armed resistance should be used if Denmark is attacked?"

Seen from the point of view of the defense forces, there is least support for the question, "Is it necessary to have a military defense so that Denmark can support its positions internationally?" Only slightly over half of those questioned agreed with this.

The poll also shows where in the population defense has the fewest and the most supporters.

Women Say No

Men have always been more for defense than women, and this difference is rising. More and more women are taking a negative position toward defense, and this is the main reason for the decline measured in will to defense. Among the men the will to defense is almost static.

The will to defense is strongest among farmers, among people with high incomes, among people in mid-life (35 to 64), among married people, and those in the country. It is a myth that the military is most popular in the Jutland rural districts. The Jutland cities are not particularly favorable to defense.

The Capital

The will to defense is weakest among the 20 to 34 year-olds. Or in the group that is actually drafted or recalled. And among students, families with income between 60,000 and 100,000 kroner, highly educated people, unmarried people, and residents of Copenhagen.

9124

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LAND MINE DEVELOPMENTS, MINE WARFARE DOCTRINE REVIEWED

Frauenfeld SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD in German Feb 87 pp 10-17

[Article by Alfred W. Krueger, Bonn: "Land Mines and Mine Warfare"]

[Text] Within the framework of the FRG Army's long-term planning, the improvement and maintenance of CONVENTIONAL defense capability until the end of the century remains in the foreground, especially for the FRG Army, which is ranked among the most modernly equipped armies of the Western alliance.

To operate with mobile, heavily-armed armored forces against the offensive, massed, operational, and especially the following echelon of the Warsaw Pact's ground forces is the mission of NATO's FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack) concept for Central Europe-- and is of exceptional importance for the FRG Army within the framework of FORWARD DEFENSE.

In this case, the increase in weapon lethality, especially of indirectly aimed weapon systems (WS), and in the BARRIER EFFECT through use of mines has the highest priority in the goal setting process of FRG Army armament planning-- closely tied to the concept for modernization and further development of the armored combat unit system and deeply imbedded in the interconnection with command, control, and intelligence systems.

This development is accompanied by a turning toward the systems approach, that is, future systems will be optimized for one main purpose by renouncing the overburdened multi-purpose approach.

New Barrier Concept

According to statements by General Wolfgang ALTENBURG, former Chief of Staff, FRG Army, and now Chairman, NATO Military Committee, there are for the FRG Army 3 unrenounceable military-strategic principles:

- FORWARD DEFENSE,
- RAPID ENDING OF THE CONFLICT, and
- LIMITING DAMAGE.

Development and deployment of new mine systems are part of an overall concept for the BARRIER CONCEPT of the corps of engineers. A prepared barrier system

which is as versatile as possible, independent of the terrain, and imaginative is a good part of deterrence. Switzerland is a good example of this. This concept differs in its complete coordination with the planned, independent conduct of operations:

-- Prepared and infrastructure-sparing barriers (Use of "home advantage," "explosive barriers" in road and bridge demolition shafts, barrier installations created by dropped objects, and beam post obstacles.)

-- Preplanned barriers (Mine barriers, but also antitank trenches, field-type artificial obstacles; also on the reported advantages of certain tested liquid explosives, that is, pourable or pumpable fluids and paste-type multi-component mixtures for explosive purposes). [Editor's note: words missing in text]

As part of the overall barrier concept, the MINE BARRIER CONCEPT requires:

-- Just before or immediately after the outbreak of imminent hostilities, a repeated high barrier effect through "terrain-oriented" barriers which are hidden as much as possible and which, as needed, have both a long (several-week) field life and the capability for re-use.

-- Through economical barriers which are "situation-oriented," of varied density, and restricted in period of use, either in front of or in defense positions, to ensure for one's own forces the time necessary for deployment and battle disposition, but to prevent the enemy's rapid forward movement with his forces. For this type of action, a flexible mine launching system is suitable as a means of reducing the number of vehicles and helicopters needed.

-- During the battle, to increase the number of "terrain-oriented" barriers wherever enemy tanks are expected, appear unexpectedly, or have broken through.

-- To lay "target-oriented" barriers in front of and in the enemy's following echelon, and to prevent or delay the unrestricted bringing in or up of new enemy forces. For the deployment of "target-oriented" mines, the Light Artillery Rocket System (LARS) with the AT-2 antitank mine (PzAbwMi) is introduced.

Development of New Combat Engineer Systems

The corps of engineers has to support the Army's battle against enemy armored forces which have a projected numerical superiority of 7:1, which are qualitatively equal, highly mobile, and heavily armed, in order to stop him early and near the border. Built-up and forested terrain is used to force the attacker into open terrain and to destroy him there.

First, a complex "Antitank Defense System" consisting of

- Barriers,
- Antitank hand weapons,
- Battle tanks and other antitank artillery weapons,
- Antitank guided missiles, and
- Helicopter and airplane antitank weapons

makes possible the efficient use in battle of various military action principles.

The tank will lose none of its significance in the foreseeable future. The penetration capability of modern antitank weapons, however, indicates weaknesses in the armor which, for weight reasons, can no longer be unilaterally optimized--even by the enemy. Tanks are vulnerable on all sides, especially from the side, from the rear, from above, and underneath, and when in motion. They must be attacked in a correspondingly appropriate manner. Terminally-guided and "top-attack" munitions offer such possibilities, as do conventional antitank barriers, but especially a wide variety of mines with intelligent fuzes.

Along with the firepower of combat units and artillery in combined arms combat, barriers erected by combat engineers have attained greater importance, in view of the problem of limited financial and manpower resources. In this connection, the mobility, defense, and command capabilities of the field army's combat engineers are being increased, and their deployment processes are being improved.

This guarantees even closer collaboration by the engineers in direct support of combat troops in battle. The engineers' range of missions has thus been displaced from the earlier classic combat engineer missions principally toward INTERDICTION OF ENEMY MOVEMENT through destruction of his tanks.

In this connection, enemy barriers must be quickly recognized and overcome, but one must also be able to rapidly cross neutral terrain obstacles. To protect his battle gains, his positions, and his flanks, the enemy is also capable of laying his own mines, even from deep within his own territory. One's own process of locating mines is a subtask of the field army's intelligence system.

In the future, searching for and clearing mines at the leading edge will require:

-- Remote-controlled unmanned (automatic) mine-locating devices (for example, Dornier robots), in order to locate, identify, and mark mines, without endangering personnel. Such devices are already being used by the police in the disposal of explosives and in the campaign against terrorists. Their military use is expected, starting in 1990.

-- Under development are some simple mine-clearing devices designed as add-on attachments for deployment outside the range of enemy fire.

-- Mine-clearing tanks for quick penetration of barriers within the enemy's field of fire have been technically tested since 1985. One can imagine, for example, the modification of older tanks (M-48, for example) for use with front-mounted mine-clearing plows. By the end of the 1980's, introduction is expected of the first armored mine-clearing device--developed by MaK--capable of almost 100 percent success in clearing all presently known anti-tank mines.

-- In the future, special attention will be given to recording the locations of friendly and known enemy mine barriers, through the use of information and data processing.

New Mine Developments

New mine developments either take into consideration or fulfill the following requirements of the combat engineers:

- Shortened deployment times for installation of barriers;
- Lower manpower and time requirements;
- Improvement of cost-effectiveness ratios (fewer mines, more results);
- Greater resistance to clearing techniques; and
- Less limitation of one's own movements.

These have already been broadly achieved through:

- Large triggering area;
- C-Kill (means destruction of the tank);
- Protection against detection or shock;
- Intelligent fuzes;
- Selectable period of activation; and
- Mechanized laying techniques.

For this purpose, the following were required in addition to modern mines in order to carry out the mission:

- For defense preparations, a MINE-LAYING system (MiVS) which saves both manpower and resources,
- For running battle, a highly-flexible mine-LAUNCHING system (MiWS),
- For the blocking of road traffic routes and bridges, as well as for the completion and improvement of both systems, an antitank DIRECTED-BLAST mine (PzAbwRMi, or PARM).

The development process for these is indicated below:

- The order for the mine-launching system (MiWS) was placed in 1972, and it was put into service in 1985.

-- New developments for the mine-laying system (MiVS) and for the directed-blast antitank (PARM), which were in their infancy in 1980, will not become available before 1992-1999. However, the mission of the corps of engineers requires that all three systems be available simultaneously. The usual procurement period of 10-12 years had to be cut in half. Therefore, they chose a mine-laying system which both satisfied the requirements of the barrier concept and was available on the market with only minor modifications needed.

-- As a result of this substitution and replacement, the following modern and more effective mine system has been in service since 1986:

-- Mine laying system (MiVS; photo 2 - not shown)

-- SCORPION mine-launching system (MiWS; photo 3 - not shown)

-- Antitank mines (PzAbwMi; photo 4 - not shown), and

-- Directed-blast antitank mines (PARM; photo 5 - not shown), a type of "combat field robot"

which, in some cases, have already been procured in larger numbers.

In a crisis situation or in case of war, mine warfare is based upon the following tactical criteria:

-- Early deployment near the border of highly effective barrier devices, in order to force the enemy to expose his forces prematurely and thus either to delay or to prevent rapid unrestricted forward movement by enemy forces.

-- Effective deployment of barriers in close support of friendly forces in a rapidly changing situation, in order to contain enemy forces, to direct them into predetermined areas, and either to absorb or to weaken the force of their attack.

In response to these tactical requirements, the new mine systems have the following characteristics:

-- Effectiveness upon the entire width of the tank; thus fewer mines are necessary per running meter of barrier width.

-- No longer effective just upon wheels and tracks (inability to move) but also strengthened by shaped-charge and phosphorus loads through the hull armor into the crew compartment or the engine room (complete loss of tank and crew). Modern mines destroy tanks in a cost-effective manner.

-- Increase in resistance to clearing operations through use of "more intelligent" fuzes, as well as barriers against lifting and shock.

-- Savings in both manpower and mine-laying time through mechanized mine laying.

-- Coordination with allied [troop] movements through selectable operating periods.

-- Limited operating periods for all mines.

The 85 Mine-laying System (MiVS 85)

As a replacement for the DM 11 and DM 21 antitank mines, the MiVS 85 is available from the beginning of a crisis situation for all engineer units assigned to rapid deployment of barriers. It is especially well suited for:

-- Combat support of the covering force--beginning near the border.

-- Directing the enemy into defense areas with allied [troop] superiority.

-- For interception of the enemy in front of the security line to deceive him as to actual location of the Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA).

-- To force the enemy [to move] in front of the FEBA for massive destruction through concentrated fire.

The planned conduct of operations by friendly forces determines the barriers' location, time, and situation. A magnetic sensor activates the mine. The period of operation ranges from a few days to several days. The laid mine is equipped with self-destruction capability, protection against detection, and a shock barrier.

MiVS 85 consists of:

-- Mine layer (MiV), towed (trucks of 5 tons or more), System FFV 028 (photos 2, 8 - not shown),

-- Antitank (laid) mine 3 (PAVM3, DM 31; photo 7 - not shown).

The electronic mine fuze reacts to changes in the surrounding electromagnetic field, that is, driving over a mine produces sensor signals which blow off the upper part of the mine (possibly camouflaged), before the mine's effective load (shaped charge) explodes.

This either damages the tracks and suspension system including the bearings or penetrates the hull floor armor with pressure and shrapnel effects in the interior of the vehicle.

The mine automatically disarms itself after expiration of the operating period set at time of laying and shows its disarmed (neutralized) condition through use of a marker charge. Reuse is possible. The mine weighs 8 kg, of which 4 kg is explosive; it has a diameter of 25 cm, a height of 12 cm. The logistics process involves storage, transport, and field-laying packaging of 90 mines each ($8 \times 90 = 720 = 7$ tons [sic]). The rubber-tired single-axle mine-laying trailer weighs 2.6 tons. With a crew of 4 men (including the driver of the towing vehicle), and with mechanical disarming, the device's hourly production rate is 500-600 mines with open laying, 300 mines with covered laying.

"SCORPION" Mine Launching System (MiWS)

The MiVS 85 is complemented by the MiWS. It is mainly held in readiness for situation-oriented barrier deployment upon command of the troop commander (also combat unit commanders in armored engineer companies [PzPiKp] of brigades [photo 9--not shown] and engineer companies [PiKp] of division engineer battalions [PiBt1]). It permits direct--as parallel in time as possible--support of combat units in running combined arms combat in all types of combat.

The engineers' mine launchers and the artillery's rocket launchers provide the troop commander with rapid, situation-related, and time-restricted blocking of large terrain sectors against attacking armored forces.

The mine launcher is particularly well suited for:

- Rapid, time-restricted blocking of areas which must be free for allied movements either after or as of a specified point in time,
- Rapid defense of flanks,
- Rapid closing of barrier gaps,
- Direct support of combat units engaged in delaying actions, during slow withdrawal under fire, or during defensive actions in rear areas.

The MiWS consists of:

- Unarmored mine launchers (MiW) on M548G-A1 tracked vehicle (photo 3--not shown), mounted with 6 mine magazine racks, which are trainable upwards and to the sides. Each rack contains 5 mine magazines of 4 projectiles each, and each projectile contains 5 antitank launched mines (PAWM). Each magazine thus contains 20 PAWM's. The MiWS's full combat load comprises 600 PAWM's, with which a 1500-meter wide barrier can be laid in 10-15 minutes. The unarmored launcher should not be used under direct enemy fire.
- With regard to effectiveness, there is difference between the PAWM and the artillery's rocket-launched AT-2 mine (photo 8--not shown). Its period of operation is preprogrammed for a few hours to several days. The mine has protection against detection and a shock barrier. After expiration of the specified period of operation, the mine destroys itself.
- Triggered by a trip-wire sensor, the PAWM is effective across the entire vehicle width. It explodes upon change of position. With a much sparser density of about 0.4 mines per running meter, it is as effective as previous mines with pressure-activated fuzes, which were triggered by the tracks passing over them and which required a mine density of 1.0 mine per running meter. The mine-launching density is adjustable from 0.1-0.6 mines per running meter. A strip of mines reaches from 1000 to 6000 meters. The munitions stocking level is in line with usual Army supply rates for items used in large quantities. The basic combat load for the PAWM allows some latitude in time for resupply.

The following illustrations (photos 11, 12--not shown) clarify the impact patterns of both the engineer and the artillery barriers.

ENGINEERS can, with the mine launcher (MiW), tailor the barrier exactly to the terrain. It should be laid down in basically 2 strips (bent if possible) in a depth of at least 100 meters. The combat load of 2 mine launchers makes possible the blocking of a 3000-meter terrain sector with a density of 0.4 mines per running meter. In the example given in photo 11 (not shown), the single mine launcher uses a density of 0.2 mines. During the automatic launching of the mines, the safety interval for one's own troops is 200 meters.

ARTILLERY has an effective range of 9-14 km (MFRakWFr) for the firing of mine barriers. The impact pattern of a single firing unit (photo 12--not shown) shows 4 elliptical, overlapping fields of 400-500 meters in depth. The safety interval for one's own troops is supposed to be 500 meters.

Aimable Antitank Mines (PzAbwRMi, or PARM)

The PARM (photo 5--not shown) closes a mine-warfare equipment gap existing until now; it complements terrain-oriented and situation-oriented barrier deployment; and, without time-consuming preparation, it makes possible

-- Rapid blocking of traffic routes (expressways, roads, paths), bridge approaches, crossing points, along bodies of water susceptible to fording or amphibious crossings, etc.

-- Rapid reinforcement of antitank-mine barriers against mine-clearing operations, in combat in built-up areas, and

-- Closing of barrier gaps and barrier lanes.

Triggered by a variety of sensors, the PARM is effective horizontally at distances of up to about 40-45 meters with a modern shaped-charge warhead; and it is aimed at the tank turret or the tank hull from either an open or a concealed position. Reusable if not exploded, it has an on-off switchable fuze. One soldier can make the PARM ready to fire within 5 minutes. Someday, countermeasures will be found against even these modern barrier weapon systems. To permit integration of future technologies, such as more intelligent fuzes for the PARM, the mines are constructed in modular fashion. The procurement program also envisions several stages which, for example, plan for the use of fiber optics, infrared and acoustic fuzes, and even a variety of warheads. The 1990's will bring additional innovations, perhaps such as seismic fuzes and sensors for target discrimination (wheel/track). In this way, the barrier weapons modern in 1986 will, through proper integration of future technologies, remain modern, appropriate in cost, and appropriate for the threat, even until the final years of this century.

Summary and Outlook

Mines are a completely defensive weapon, and mine barriers are both an important part and a necessary condition for successful forward defense.

Economical in use of manpower, money, and time, but still very effective, barrier employment with minelayers, mine launchers, and directed-blast anti-tank mines will become more capable of reacting, more dynamic, more mobile, and will be placed into the position, depending upon the situation, of being able to follow the combat units. Modern antitank mines destroy the tank, and they are especially cost-effective. Limitation of their period of operation reduces the danger to friendly forces and the civilian population, and it significantly improves and facilitates one's own movements. New fuze technologies and the mixture of various types of mines prevents an enemy from being able to concentrate upon only a few technologies to get around them.

Operations research studies such as

- "Defense 1990,"
- "Ratios of the Army's Troop Types," and
- "Cost-effectiveness of the Mine Barrier Mix"

created the bases for evaluation. They came to the following conclusions:

- Deployment of mines achieved the highest losses (37 percent) at the lowest expense (13 percent).
- Successful defense against an enemy with quadruple superiority is possible only through use of modern mines.
- Maximum barrier effectiveness is attained (according to the barrier concept) through use of terrain-oriented, situation-oriented, and target-oriented mine barriers, or in a mix of various mines. Engineer mines are twice as effective as other types of troops, such as artillery, and 6 times as effective if the directed-blast mine is included.
- PARM mines are 10 times as cost-effective as all other types of mines. In a stalemate situation, they can decide the battle.

Troop and field tests further served the examination and certification of usability by the troops, as well as verification of the results of the studies. These results are supposedly illustrated by the example of the mine-launching system (MiWS):

- In the military exercise "Bold Action (Kuehner Zugriff)," a tank company attacked two barriers of launched mines laid down in two rows, one after the other. Thirteen tanks were lost. Only one reached the second barrier, where it nonetheless remained motionless after being hit. Losses through 2 mine barriers laid down in 30 minutes: 100 percent.
- During the exercise "Wet Heath (Nasse Heide)," 9 of 14 attacking tanks were destroyed by this--undefended--mine barrier, and the exercise was broken off. Only after clearing mines from a lane could the barrier be overcome. A barrier laid down in 15 minutes led to 64 percent losses and a two-hour loss of time.

The military exercise "Wild Hunt (Wilde Jagd)" serves as a third example, where a barrier created by rocket-launched (LARS) mines inflicted 28.6 percent losses upon the attacker.

The FRG Army's corps of engineers, with its technical deployment processes and the politically approved mine-warfare equipment, sees itself equipped in principle up to the year 2000. The new mine systems are a significant contribution to the ANTITANK DEFENSE of all troop units and thus an important part of credible deterrence.

13275/12947
CSO: 3620/161

INFANTRY TRAINING FOR NAVAL RESERVE BASE SECURITY UNITS

Bonn LOYAL in German Mar 87 pp 5-7

[Article by Volker Hogrebe: "The Navy and Navy Reservists--Stalking the Enemy"]

[Text] What Hammelburg is to the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve Training Center in Glueckstadt/Elbe is for the Navy. Here the Navy trains reserve troops earmarked for mobilization assignment to the naval security service, i.e., for employment on land. Since the center was established ten years ago--it was first located in Ploen--the permanent staff has put approximately 16,000 reservists through basic and advanced training.

Carefully using all the available cover, two trucks made their way along a narrow, sandy trail studded with wide mudholes. The gray light of a cold November day lies over the Nordoe training area, four square kilometers of steppe at the southern edge of Itzehoe, the administrative center of Schleswig-Holstein, cut by footpaths and vehicle trails and broken by wooded areas and underbrush. The men in the backs of the trucks give anxious glances in every direction. Readied machine-guns stare threateningly into space. The troops work their way forward, the trucks proceeding at a foot-pace and then speeding up again, moving in close formation or with one vehicle remaining in safe cover to give the other fire protection as it feels its way along; when necessary, the men dismount and crouch down to comb the underbrush on either side of the road. This is a motorized reconnaissance patrol from Company 3 of the Naval Security Group in action.

These are all naval reservists, wearing somewhat atypical olive-drab uniforms to train for a mission of which most of their comrades in blue are only marginally aware. But if this duty were not discharged conscientiously and professionally, naval bases, air bases, supply dumps and command posts would be in for some very unpleasant surprises in the event of a war, or even in a crisis.

The protection of such installations from acts of sabotage by commando troops--a task known as vulnerable point protection--is the responsibility of the naval security units. Without its reservists, however, the Navy would have no hope of providing such protection.

The central training site for this mission is the Naval Reserve Training Center (NRTC) in Blueckstadt, on the Lower Elbe. This is not the alma mater of all navy reservists, as might be mistakenly assumed from the sound of the name. However, troops that are to be called up on mobilization and used aboard vessels or for special applications on land must either go to this training center or take appropriate courses at one of the navy training schools in order to keep their knowledge and skills up to date. Naval security is the central concern at the NRTC. This also explains its organizational involvement with the Navy Coast Guard Training School at Grossenbrode in East Holstein; the NRTC shares the Am Neuendeich barracks with the Coast Guard Training School's basic training class, which also is stationed in Blueckstadt.

The center was established ten years ago in Ploen, and was moved to the location on the Elbe in May 1982. Since then, most of the more than 16,000 reservists who have been trained and taken care of by the unit's current 22 soldiers and five civilian employees have come back to Nordoe for additional training at regular intervals. This is currently the case for Horst-Dieter Krueger of Hamburg, for example. Krueger, a 27-year-old petty officer second class in the reserve, is a wholesaler and import/export dealer in civilian life. Today he is leading the reconnaissance patrol, under the watchful (and critical) eyes of permanent-staff instructors, since Krueger is up for promotion to chief petty officer. Even without this special situation, the raid (commando operation) is a thankless task. The mission is to determine whether enemy airborne commandos who are supposedly planning attacks against Bundeswehr munitions and equipment depots in the Itzehoe area are carrying out their machinations in the company's sector. And naturally the troops have been told to expect an ambush, on the orders of an administration concerned with the success of the training. Suddenly there is the sound of gunfire. The trap is sprung in an area of the forest which is ideal for closing off the already cramped trail in front of and behind the convoy. The men jump out of the trucks and slip into the underbrush. There is gunfire on all sides. Dummy ammunition explodes with an impressive bang, smoke generators release stinging fumes into the brush.

After the uproar subsides, the instructor gives a short critique of the maneuver: Was the patrol leader's estimate of the situation realistic? Were the orders given and the actions taken appropriate? Did the soldiers act correctly under the circumstances? What needs to be improved? After this the troops are ordered back into the trucks and the maneuver proceeds. The men comb an open area, staying low and moving quietly. Then Krueger assembles his detachment to issue further instructions.

This is a typical scene from one of the 13 courses that are conducted here the year round as mobilization training for reservists. A complete unit is called up for each course, which last for 12 days. The unit may be a heavy naval security company equipped with 20-mm field artillery, a company equipped only with small arms, or a naval security platoon intended to provide independent protection for a specific installation. For the first 4 days, only key personnel are called to Glueckstadt: the company commander, platoon leader, squad leader, motor sergeant, company sergeant major and pay clerk--all the

personnel necessary to take over the unit independently after this pre-training interval, train it and lead it into action. "Our goal is to train the officers, senior NCO's and NCO's so that when the main body arrives we can remain in the background and just offer support when needed," explains Lt Commander Harald Wentzel, the director of the NRTC. The reservists have plenty to do. Not only must they reactivate their own knowledge and skills--the usual 2- to 3-year period between exercises generally gives them enough time to forget a good share of what they've learned--they have a whole series of preparations for this exercise to take care of. Vehicles must be taken over, the Refue [not further identified] has to make preparations to disburse military pay and travel expenses, the top sergeant must tackle organizational matters. For reasons of safety, special emphasis is placed on small arms training. On Friday the platoon arrives, like the command staff before them, from all parts of the FRG.

For some of the men this is their first time here. The majority, however, see familiar faces among the crowd, since the composition of the units is left basically the same for as long as possible. "Everybody is excited to find out who will be back and who won't," says Wolfgang Lukas, a bank clerk from Osna-brueck who is the lieutenant (junior grade) in command of the company's 2nd platoon. On Saturday the unit is already in the midst of training. Says Lieutenant Commander Wentzel: "Setting a reasonable limit for the workload is important for motivation. NCO's and officers have suggested that leave be granted for Saturday or Sunday afternoon. I do not consider this to be proper. It is always somewhat painful for the unit to have to spend Friday traveling and then get right to work on Saturday and Sunday. This goes against the grain for many of the men, because of the weekend. That is understandable, and if we were to grant leave now for half a day the men would rightfully be asking why they couldn't get here later." Besides, there is no spare time to be had.

Following orientation, a safety briefing, small arms training and intensive work with the facility's sand table, whose protection is the core of the training exercise, the troops are sent into the field on Sunday--first for work detail, and then for tactical exercises. The company works independently. The instructors limit their involvement to providing assistance and making any necessary corrections. The reservists are committed to what they are doing, and the atmosphere is businesslike. There is no trace of the "naval bush-fighting" of previous years.

Command posts are set up, sentries posted, telephone cables laid. The eerie masquerade of NBC canisters leaves the men sweating under masks and ponchos. "Sniper! Look at this, this guy's a killer!" "Permission to smoke, sir?" is the reply from inside the protective gear.

Sometime later there is a lunch break. The food is from Blueckstadt; it is set out by company headquarters personnel at the distributing point and picked up there for the platoons. The men eat at their positions. "No food, no fight." The spaghetti with meat sauce isn't exactly gourmet, but it's palatable. Since there is construction going on in the mess kitchen, the laundry room has had to serve as a substitute. Today ten burners went out, and the

cooks were barely able to manage. Not so Sgt Major Joseph Kochem, who supervises distribution. He has left his job at the internal revenue office in Ploen for these few days to perform the military task he has been trained for. During his period of active service he was most recently inspecting chief petty officer at the Eckernfoerd Naval Weapons Training School. His driver, Timo Klotzbuecher, here for his first reserve duty training, had to let his interior decorating business in Luebeck get along without him.

The degree of enthusiasm with which an employer greets the news that his reservist employee has been called up depends on the size and structure of the business involved. Flat refusals for reasons of indispensability, either during a given season or overall, are rare. However, many smaller businesses unquestionably have more problems giving their employees time off than do large corporations. The Navy is broad-minded in these situations. It has to be,

People who are self-employed have their own problems. Here in Nordoe, Michael Kluge is a chief petty officer commanding a platoon of reservists. At home in Lilienthal, near Bremen, he has his own insurance company, where six employees are now getting along without their boss as best they can. "There is somebody there who can represent me, of course, but for me this reserve duty training is always connected with financial losses." He comes out for training regularly, nevertheless. He knows the Navy for a number of different angles, has sailed a Fletcher destroyer and served on fast patrol boats. Long years spent as an instructor in Glueckstadt have given him the right technical background for his present assignment. Having completed three training exercises under the same program, he knows what he is talking about when he says that the training at the center is effective. There is one aspect that he doesn't like, however, and in this opinion he is not alone.

Security detachments that are earmarked to protect specific naval installations should be used at those locations even during training exercises. No one can become familiar with the special conditions at the Olpenitz base when he is being used to defend some depot on the western coast as a substitute "armed object." Lt Commander Wentzel knows what a pain in the neck it can be to use bases as objects for defense from his own experience with fast patrol boats. "Before, when we made port after a sortie we had no desire whatsoever to go through a vulnerable point protection exercise; all we wanted to do was sleep." Although he understands such feelings, he now considers practice with permanent objects a necessity. However, he noted with satisfaction that many naval officers also show a growing "awareness of needing protection."

Meanwhile, the radio operator out on the battlefield has reported that the reconnaissance patrol is about to come in. Tomorrow the company will embark and head for the armed object--which is, unfortunately, yet another substitute.

13114/9274
CSO: 3620/159

MILITARY

FRANCE

GIRAUD DISCUSSES EUROPEAN POLL ON DEFENSE ISSUES

European Defense Spending

Paris LIBERATION in French 16 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Jean Guisnel: "One French Person Out of Three Would Abandon the Bomb"]

[Text] Are the French the least responsive Europeans in the debates concerning defense questions? According to a survey taken over a 2-month period in four European countries, this seems to be the case since the largest number of people who say they have no opinion live in France. Whereas only 1 or 2 percent of Germans have no opinion on the topics dealt with, the corresponding number of French is a blithe 11 to 21 percent. For example, 20 percent do not know what to make of a possible break-off of military relations between Europe and the USA, while 21 percent of them have the same attitude towards the American Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). Do these figures reflect real ignorance or indifference to these subjects, France being the only country to possess a purely national nuclear force--since Great Britain's is heavily dependent on American technology?

One may conclude that this situation illustrates some of the limitations of the renowned national "consensus" on questions of defense. The absence of any real debate among the politicians, except in regard to minor details or the recent fights over turf between the Elysee and Matignon, is the most likely explanation of the attitude of public opinion. France's withdrawal from the unified military organization (NATO) in 1966 also contributed in a striking way to deflating passions. For the French would have certainly renewed their interest in these questions if, for example, they had had to decide on the possible establishment of American "Euromissiles" on their territory. In this regard, one cannot fail to point out that 60 percent of them disapprove of the countries that have permitted the United States to base nuclear weapons on their soil.

Can one continue to speak of a "national consensus on defense" when 35 percent of French people questioned say they favor reducing military spending, and 45 percent declare that they want it maintained at its current level? If one notes that the present government has chosen to increase the military budget so that it eventually totals 4 percent of the commercial gross domestic product, in this continuing the policy previously followed by the socialists, one will agree that the 9 percent of French people who approve this approach do not constitute a solid base for a "consensus."

On this point, the close correlation between the answers and the political affiliation of those questioned is extremely interesting. Thus only 14 percent of RPR and UDF voters favor increased military spending, compared with 58 percent who would maintain it at present levels. Whereas communist supporters are the only ones who include a majority (59 percent) calling for a reduction of the military budget, 41 percent of socialists hold the same opinion even though more of them (51 percent) prefer maintaining it at present levels. There was a large number (45 percent) favoring the budgetary status quo in the National Front, where those who lean towards a reduction (23 percent) are balanced by the those who favor the contrary opinion (24 percent).

Political differences concerning military spending count for little in evaluating the French nuclear effort. Thus, only 7 percent of communists in France favor the continued development of nuclear weapons, compared with 48 percent who would prefer to see France renounce them. On this same question, 14 percent of socialists favor renunciation and 31 percent continued development, 26 percent and 22 percent for the RPR-UDF, and 41 percent and 20 percent for National Front voters. In France altogether there appears to be a significant minority (32 percent) who want the country to abandon its nuclear weapons. One third of French people is no trifling number! Andre Giraud (see page 3) prefers to consider the fact that 57 percent of his fellow citizens favor either development (17 percent), or maintaining the French nuclear stockpile at its present level (40 percent). It's the same old story of the glass that is half empty or half full!

Such statistics throw a very instructive light on the present state of public opinion. The French have certainly not reached the point where they openly challenge French military options. All the same a significant number of them are wondering about one of the key points of national policy. Does the "consensus" still exist?

Dependence on U.S.

Paris LIBERATION in French 16 Feb 87 pp 4, 5

[Article by Carlos de Sa Rego: "Uncle Sam's Umbrella Has Lost Some of its Attractiveness"]

[Text] Discussions between the two superpowers on disarmament have left Europeans wondering about the American nuclear guarantee. The trend is towards independent defense. It remains to be seen whether it should be a joint defense.

There is an astonishing coincidence between European public opinion and the discussions going on among experts concerning defense. It is as if the debate over European security had finally moved from the small circle reserved for "strategists" and had become everyone's business. Only France still stands out with its approximately 20 percent of those who have no opinion.

Since the Reykjavik meeting where Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev placed a drastic reduction in nuclear weapons on the table, European leaders have been worried about the turn taken by the negotiations on disarmament. Nothing has changed in the relationship of military forces, but the "Reykjavik logic" points to the establishment of a new balance between the two superpowers in which nuclear weapons, without disappearing, would lose some of their importance in favor of conventional forces. What then of the American nuclear guarantee in western Europe? Is there not a danger of undermining deterrence and in the event of a crisis making possible a "classic" conflict on the old continent?

These are old questions but the fears are new; each European country is reacting according to its geopolitical position, but the survey also reveals shared opinions. First of all, the most obvious: a degree of reserve and even mistrust of the United States. Large numbers emerge who disapprove of the installation of American Pershing 2's and cruise missiles in Europe, and reject any European participation in "Star Wars." Even more significant is the fact that the majority of French, British, and Italians (as well as a large minority--44 percent of Germans) believe that it would be better to establish a defense independent of the United States and NATO, whether joint or individual, with each country taking responsibility for its own defense.

This desire for independence from the American ally--not as strong in Germany --seems to be accompanied by a certain confidence in the European capacity to guarantee its own security with current financial and military means. There are very few who think that military spending should be increased. The majority want to maintain spending levels as they are or even reduce them (62 percent in Italy and 57 percent in Germany). There was a similar reaction concerning European atomic weapons: an overwhelming majority is against their continued development (even in France, only 17 percent are in favor). In countries possessing their own nuclear weapons (Great Britain and France), people think that it is enough to maintain present capabilities, whereas in Italy and Germany people are squarely in favor of abandoning this type of weapon.

Whereas this trend to keep Washington at a cool arm's length is a feature shared by the countries participating in the survey (with the exception of the particular case of Germany), the situation is not the same when it comes to defining an alternative a bit better. Only one thing is certain: Europeans are not very anxious for the French and British nuclear forces to replace the American umbrella without the non-nuclear countries participating in the decisions.

Should European defense be shared or should each country take care of itself, and with or without nuclear weapons? It is not surprising that the countries that already have nuclear weapons should be the most favorable to a European deterrent based on a joint nuclear force (35 percent of the French and British, but only 14 percent of the Italians and Germans). They are even prepared to share control of atomic arsenals with their non-nuclear neighbors.





The new element can be seen in the fact that one quarter of French people and 35 percent of the British believe that this joint European defense could be based solely on conventional forces and could do without atomic weapons. Does this represent renewed confidence in the deterrent capabilities of traditional forces or a growing distrust of nuclear weapons? Whatever the case may be, this desire to give a central role once again to the good old conventional forces has also made progress in Italy (70 percent of those polled are in favor!) and even in Germany (29 percent).

There remains the specific circumstances of each country. In West Germany, although one notes a certain distrust of the United States, one does not find for all that a confidence in their European neighbors for guaranteeing the security of the country. As long as there is no credible alternative, 54 percent of West Germans still prefer their ties with the United States and NATO. Looking to the future, they would rather lean towards a defense policy according to which each country would assume responsibility for its own defense (25 percent favor this solution compared with only 19 percent who favor a joint European defense). NATO or an independent defense based on conventional forces seem to be the two poles in the German debate.

Italy, for its part, afforded the greatest surprise in the inquiry. Rejection of ties with the United States, nuclear weapons, "Star Wars," and even military spending reached high levels. Such an attitude may seem paradoxical in a country that depends totally on the United States for its security. But it corresponds quite well to a new desire for independence and to the return in the last few years of an element of national pride. Italy is finding interests of its own in the Mediterranean that do not always correspond with those of its big protector from across the Atlantic. Confident of Europe and themselves, the Italians--if our poll is to be believed--are ready to cast their Atlantic moorings loose.


Great Britain seems to be adapting itself to the new strategic situation while at the same time trying to preserve its pivotal role between the United States and Europe. Although the British prefer a defense independent from Washington, nevertheless 41 percent of them want to remain in NATO. But like the Germans, if the Atlantic Alliance were abandoned, they would favor a strictly national defense rather than a joint European defense.

Question 1. Taking into account the international situation on the one hand, and the national economic situation on the other, do you think your country should:



Key:

1. Great Britain
2. Italy
3. West Germany
4. Increase its military spending (in percent)?
5. Maintain spending at its present level (in percent)?
6. Reduce military spending (in percent)?
7. No opinion (in percent).



The Poll's Technical Details

Using the quota method, this European inquiry was conducted by OPTEM and was carried out on location from November 1986 to January 1987 by BVA (France), based on a sample of 993 individuals, by Marplan (Great Britain) based on a sample of 1,463 individuals, by Demmaskopea (Italy) based on a sample of 510 individuals questioned by phone, and by Marplan (FRG) based on a sample of 1,869 individuals. It was published simultaneously in each of these countries.

Question 2. Great Britain and France have their own nuclear weapons. Personally, would you prefer to see the West European countries:

| <u>Option</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>Britain</u> | <u>Italy</u> | <u>ERG</u> |
|--|---------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
| Pursue the development of nuclear weapons? | 17 | 9 | 5 | 8 |
| Keep things as they are? | 40 | 52 | 13 | 35 |
| Abandon their nuclear weapons? | 32 | 34 | 79 | 57 |
| No opinion | 11 | 5 | 4 | 1 |

(Figures represent percent)

Question 3. do you approve or disapprove of the decision made by some European states to allow the Americans to base nuclear weapons in Europe?

| <u>Option</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>Britain</u> | <u>Italy</u> | <u>ERG</u> |
|----------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
| Approve | 23 | 35 | 17 | 33 |
| Disapprove | 60 | 56 | 78 | 66 |
| No opinion | 17 | 9 | 5 | 1 |

(Figures represent percent)

Question 4. Most West European countries are tied to the United States for their defense as part of NATO. Do you think that West European countries should:

| <u>Option</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>Britain</u> | <u>Italy</u> | <u>ERG</u> |
|--|---------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
| Maintain their military relations with the US within NATO? | 26 | 41 | 19 | 54 |
| Establish a joint European defense independent of the US and NATO? . . . | 35 | 23 | 38 | 19 |
| Each separately assume full responsibility for its own defense? | 20 | 26 | 31 | 25 |
| No opinion | 20 | 10 | 12 | 2 |

N.B. The total for the answers is not strictly equal to 100 percent because of decimal adjustment.

Question 5. Supposing there were a joint European defense independent of the United States and NATO, which of these three alternatives is most desirable in your opinion?

| <u>Option</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>Britain</u> | <u>Italy</u> | <u>ERG</u> |
|---|---------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
| Use the nuclear weapons existing in Britain and France as the basis of a European nuclear defense, without the other European countries participating either in their development or in decisions to use them | 8 | 13 | 3 | 12 |
| Build a European nuclear defense jointly with all countries wishing to participate in the development and use of nuclear weapons | 35 | 35 | 14 | 14 |
| Build a joint European defense without nuclear weapons, by strengthening conventional forces | 25 | 35 | 70 | 29 |
| None of the above | 13 | 4 | 6 | 44 |
| No opinion | 18 | 13 | 7 | 2 |

(Figures represent percent)

N.B. The total for the answers is not strictly equal to 100 percent because of decimal adjustment.

Question 6. The American government has begun a research program called SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) to develop a defense system in space against nuclear weapons. Do you think this is likely:

| | | | | |
|--|----|----|----|----|
| To increase chances for maintaining peace in Europe? | 23 | 28 | 17 | 23 |
| To increase the risks of war in Europe? | 21 | 30 | 42 | 40 |
| To have no influence in either direction? | 34 | 38 | 22 | 35 |
| No opinion | 21 | 4 | 19 | 2 |

(Figures represent percent)

N.B. The total for the answers is not strictly equal to 100 percent because of decimal adjustment.

Question 7. The United States have asked the European countries to participate in the development of the SDI program. Do you think that the European countries should:

| | | | | |
|--|----|----|----|----|
| Participate in this program? | 19 | 27 | 20 | 22 |
| Cooperate among themselves to develop a similar system which they would control? | 25 | 20 | 19 | 19 |
| Not involve themselves in such a system at all? | 35 | 48 | 46 | 58 |
| No opinion | 21 | 5 | 15 | 2 |

Giraud Interview

Paris LIBERATION in French 16 Feb 87 pp 3, 4

[Interview with Andre Giraud: "The Dangers of Indifference"; date and place not given]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense commented on the survey carried out for LIBERATION; it is good that the idea of European defense is making progress. But too many French people are outside the debate on security.

[Question] In West Germany and especially in Italy, significant majorities want Great Britain and France to abandon their nuclear weapons. Among the French, 32 percent hold the same opinion and 40 percent would like "things to remain as they are at present." Does that pose a threat to going ahead with the planned modernization of the national nuclear arsenal? Does France not run the risk of finding itself all alone in Europe?

[Answer] The statistics seem to me to say the opposite. The survey is indeed a very interesting one. It tells us first of all that there is an overwhelming majority, both in France and Great Britain, in favor of maintaining a system of defense based on a nuclear deterrent: 57 percent compared with 32 percent in France, and 61 percent compared with 34 percent in Great Britain, i.e., almost 2 out of 3.

As far as the two other countries are concerned, three reactions may be involved: frustration that they are not themselves in possession of the undeniable asset which a nuclear potential represents for the independence of a major power; distrust of (or hostility towards) nuclear weapons; an inadequate understanding of the threat.

This third factor is certainly more significant in Italy's case than in West Germany's. In the latter country where, as everyone knows, the pacifist and antinuclear movements are very active and where national pride cannot allow them to approve of a situation in which others are at an advantage, I find it extraordinary that nevertheless 43 percent of West Germans, i.e., nearly one out of two, favor maintaining or improving the French and British nuclear arsenals.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that a smaller percentage supports development than that which favors maintaining current levels.

The question was ambiguous. The answers would no doubt have been different if the question had dealt with "perfecting" rather than "development." Besides, everyone is in favor of disarmament, ourselves included. But when the lamb was questioned, it wasn't told whether or not the wolf had disappeared.

[Question] The majority of Europeans—in West Germany it was a large minority (44 percent)—think that their country should establish a defense independent of the USA, either a joint defense or each country separately. In your opinion, does this constitute an indication of the suspicion that the USA will join the Soviets in negotiations that could result in an American withdrawal from Europe?

[Answer] I don't think so. The survey shows a dual reaction present in varying degrees in the different European countries.

On the one hand, West Europeans are in favor of the Atlantic Alliance, and on the other hand are aware that the defense of Europe is the affair of Europeans first of all. Only 41 percent of the British, and 19 percent of Italians support staying in NATO, and even in Germany, which however is very directly threatened (this explains the low percentage of those with no opinion), 44 percent of citizens (as against 54 percent) would like either a purely national defense or a European defense. These statistics are very significant. If the idea of a European defense were to become more credible, I am convinced that this percentage would increase.

[Question] Among the French, 35 percent compared with only 19 percent of Germans want a joint European defense independent of the USA. Could this fact eventually call in question the Paris-Bonn military cooperation that successive French governments have sought to establish?

[Answer] For 25 years, and more precisely since the time of General de Gaulle, France has chosen an independent defense policy with a nuclear deterrent as the keystone. Under these circumstances, a large proportion of French people believe that what is good for France should in principle be good for Europe. West German public opinion, burdened with a contemporary history that is hard to bear, a compulsory partner in NATO and obsessed with its dream of reunification, is more reticent about the idea that Europe should take responsibility for its own destiny.

This being the case, Franco-German military cooperation is a continual process and European awareness requires its expansion and acceleration.

[Question] In desiring a purely conventional defense, are many Europeans indicating that they believe in a world in which nuclear weapons will no longer play a central role in deterrence?

[Answer] I don't think so. With the exception of Italy, only a minority believes one can rely on a purely conventional defense. The large percentage in Germany that rejects the proposed European solutions undoubtedly reflect the

desire in this country, which comes under immediate threat, that these solutions should not mean the breakup of the Atlantic Alliance.

[Question] What is your analysis of the fact that Europeans have little sympathy with the American Strategic Defense Initiative, and are reluctant for the old continent to have a part in it?

[Answer] A large majority are worried that SDI might lead to trading off the current system of defense--which is a reality--for a perspective which has not taken shape to this point and which is clearly entertained with America in mind first of all--something one cannot be surprised or get angry about.

The non-nuclear countries are the most concerned, which is quite natural because they depend for ultimate protection on the American nuclear deterrent. The others are less concerned for the opposite reason. But neither group is very keen on the idea.

[Question] The French more than anyone else responded with "no opinion" to the questions asked. Was it because in France there is no real debate on defense questions?

[Answer] Indeed, it seems that compared with the English, Germans, and Italians, the French answered most with "no opinion" to the defense questions asked in the survey. That could reflect the current political consensus.

A number of French people, thinking that things are going fairly well, prefer to rely on others, no doubt believing with some modesty that they are not competent in the matter. However, this should not cause them to lose an awareness of the dangers and become indifferent. The defense outlook would suffer for it.

Editorial Evaluation

Paris LIBERATION in French 16 Feb 87 p 3

[Editorial by Marc Kravetz: "Defense Without Stars"]

[Text] Europe exists; the pollsters found that out. It even has some idea of its defense and despite serious national differences, Europeans in significant numbers--even though not the majority anywhere--opt for a joint European defense. Conversely, and with the sole clear exception of West Germany, no majority came out in favor of maintaining military relations with the United States within NATO.

The reaction was not anti-American but definitely defiant in regard to Uncle Sam. And even clearly reluctant when it came to taking part in the strategic defense initiative proposed by President Reagan. Even though it is true that the question is a complex one and that the general public--perhaps rightly--only sees in it a variant that is scarcely more credible than the mega-productions of science fiction, "Star Wars" leaves Europeans confused.

But by a clear majority in the four countries they are definitely hostile when it comes to the installation of American nuclear weapons in Europe. On the other hand, there is a clear difference as concerns the local nuclear arsenal. Those who do not have it are against it; those who do are for it. Nothing very surprising in that, one may say, except that it can be shown, if that were necessary, that for two citizens out of three a nuclear capability has become part of their culture. That's what's called a consensus. Whether nuclear or conventional, the very principle of defense does not seem to be rejected anywhere, even though the question was not explicitly asked. Does that represent a consensus or simply the acceptance of a more or less obvious fact? Whether a national asset or evil necessity, the army is part of the surroundings. And war is not at our doorstep either.

Real war, of course. Our contemporaries have other, more pressing wars on their minds. Trade wars, terrorist threats, insecurity, and unemployment are much more certain to mobilize them. But for the time being, certainly not under the same flag.

9824

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MILITARY

FRANCE

CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW-GENERATION SUBMARINE DESCRIBED

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 11 Oct 86 pp 4-7

[Article by Captain Blejean: "A New-Generation of SSBN's [Strategic Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines]"]

[Text] Twenty-three years have separated the presentations to Naval Headquarters of project Q252 which subsequently became the "Redoutable" and a new-generation nuclear submarine. There was a reason to launch a new program inasmuch as the "Inflexible," sixth submarine in the initial series, was not put on active service until 1985. The research and discussions which led to this decision were held simultaneously at three levels: political, operational and technical.

Defense Policy: Maintenance of Credibility

In the report on scheduling military expenditures for the period 1984-1988, the legislator points out that "the primary mission of the armed forces is to safeguard national territory against any attack and preserve the nation's freedom in all circumstances; in this regard, the nuclear deterrent, protector of our vital interests and expression of the national will, remains the basic principle and foundation of our security." He further specifies: "Our nuclear forces will be maintained above the level of credibility: invulnerability of our strategic forces; effectiveness of our weaponry and their penetration, security of liaisons."

An analysis of these resolutions has led to research into the evolutionary process of the various elements making up the strategic nuclear force, their weapons and related communications equipment.

Insofar as the Strategic Naval force is concerned, the maintenance of its credibility leads to activating a new type of submarine capable of thwarting the detection equipment which will probably be deployed against it in about 25 years. In terms of weapons, the requirement for a new submarine is linked to the ability to launch a missile, when the time comes, whose size will probably be incompatible with layouts in current missile-launching nuclear submarines (SSBN). Lastly, a new-generation submarine must be able to handle radio-electronic communications at greater depths and speeds.

Operational Requirement: Responding to Anti-Submarine Detection Developments

In response to a government directive, an SSBN must also satisfy an operational requirement.

The submarine field has been the subject of investigations which have expanded in quantity and quality over the past 10 years: the efforts undertaken have convinced some people that soon the high seas will be transparent and that submarines will probably lose the advantage ascribed to their silence.

The knowledge acquired invalidates these hasty assertions because the facts are something entirely different. Admiral Watkins, chief of naval operations of the U.S. Navy, recently stated: "The more we learn about the oceans, the more impenetrable they seem to us." This is in response to attempts at long-range detection by submerged submarines using equipment as varied as visual or infrared observation, radars, lasers, magnetometers, wake detectors, etc., regardless of whether this equipment is ship-, aircraft- or satellite-borne.

However, one phenomenon of physics makes possible certain detection procedures: sound transmission through water. Everything moving on the surface or under the surface of the sea creates noise (propellers, flow, internal equipment) which radiates around it, all the moreso because the frequency is low. Research revolves around detection and interpretation of these noises, especially within the range of very low frequencies. Submerged listening devices (hydrophones) are carried aboard surface ships or submarines or installed on favorable bottoms. The pursuit submarine is especially feared because it exploits the same data as the submarine it is hunting which is forced to seek an evasion within the limitation of the noise it is radiating.

To avoid the risks of detection by non-acoustical equipment, all the submarine needs to do is navigate submerged and remain sufficiently far below the surface: several hundred meters. But in order for it not to be heard nor recognized by acoustical equipment, the submarine must be fitted out with the most noise-free installations and whose slightest noise is not transmitted outwardly into the sea around it. This idea is easy to express but places extremely heavy requirements on our methods of installation design, their integration aboard the submarine, connections between them, and even their utilization. Working up these methods must be the result of research efforts undertaken by the technical services for several years. Earmarked first for SSBN's, they will also be supplied to attack submarines as well as surface ships.

The objective is to activate an SSBN which, in a normal patrol situation, will not be detectable among the sea noises.

With the New Technology, New Ambitions

Another argument leads to the requirement for submarine replacement: technological evolution. Procedures for producing electronic and data processing equipment or electromechanical machines have come to light recently and eliminate the former components from the industrial market. The integration of these new things gives rise to new ambitions for installations which can benefit from them (insofar as such a change is reasonable).

New-Generation SSBN

The new-generation SSBN will be a larger vessel than current submarines of this type: a bit longer but primarily of greater diameter. The shape of its hull must avoid all turbulence in the flow of trickling water. The quality of the steel used will allow it to navigate at greater depths.

Propulsion plants, among other things, will be acoustically isolated from the hull. The turbines which will drive a single shaft assembly will be powered by secondary steam produced by a nuclear stokehold of the "integrated ex-changer-reactor" type common to the nuclear aircraft carrier "Richelieu" and SSBN's. Turbogenerators will supply electric power which, transformed into voltages and frequencies required by each plant, will be distributed in the whole submarine by secure and redundant systems.

Navigation security while submerged will be increased by an appropriate centralization of commands and data useable in monitoring. Submarine controls will be simplified and supported by automated aids.

The regeneration of the inside atmosphere will be supplemented by a more improved monitoring system with a view to eliminating various pollutants which might be given off into breathable air.

The new-generation SSBN will be manned by a crew whose small size will ensure control of plants in operation with automated systems which will take over repetitive tasks.

Similar systems will allow for spotting and identifying possible damage to facilitate the work of maintenance crews.

Crews, reduced by approximately 15 percent in comparison with current crews, will be quartered in more comfortable conditions, made possible by the space available and the use of new materials.

The new-generation SSBN will have aboard missiles which will at first be type M, already in service, then a new type which may be more cumbersome and heavier. As of now the architecture of the submarine has been designed with this future missile in mind so as to facilitate modernization.

An overall navigation system will integrate, around high-performance inertial power stations, navigation aids, radio-electrical or otherwise. The gyroscopes, sensitive elements in the power stations, will have characteristics which, while maintaining the accuracy of data required by the strategic weapons system, will allow the submarine to remain completely silent while submerged, with drift fully controlled.

Radio-electrical waves, depending on their frequency, will penetrate from a few centimeters to several dozen meters into the sea water. The SSBN will be equipped with reception antennas whose performance will allow it full-time on-air capability for regular contacts at depths and speeds guaranteeing its silence.

Blind and invisible, the submarine is not deaf. The developments in its under-water detection equipment will ensure, when dealing with a possible adversary be it submarine or surface ship and even aircraft, its being able to detect its presence with sufficient forewarning to take up the best tactical posture. To do so it will exploit data picked up by the antennas installed on the hull and towed. The power of the data processing equipment will make available knowledge of a vast area around it, identification of every noisemaker picked up and a summary analysis of the situation.

Improvements in Every Field

On reading the foregoing description, one may imagine what will differentiate the SSBN's of both generations: the requirements are the same, the mission is unchanged, but actually everything will be different. The threats which may hang over the submarine come to mind, primarily the threat of acoustical detection. The new-generation SSBN will have greater mobility, better overall freedom from noise, and it will be manned by a smaller crew; it will be more aware of an environment which technical progress has made more hostile. This means that it has been necessary, in all fields, to increase performance in every area: propulsion, security, submersion, weapons system, navigation, communications and detection.

To this increase in performance must be added a greater requirement for reliability: major careenings must be less frequent and the durability of materials must be greater. By way of comparison, a car engine which travels 100,000 kilometers at 100 kilometers per hour runs 1,000 hours. On the submarine some pumps will have 50,000 hours of running time before they are overhauled.

All these efforts are essential: the most recent submarine built in this series will still be navigating in 50 years and will have to be capable of ensuring the credibility of deterrence.

But Also the Environment

To achieve the ambitious goals which have been set, a collection of testing equipment is needed within the framework of research and adjustments. Some involve equipment already existing in laboratories belonging to Naval Construction Directorate (DCN) research centers; others must be created to satisfy new requirements. We must cite, for example, the Submarine Detection Research and Study Group (GERDSM) at Le Brusc, the Testing and Research Center for the Silent Running of Ships (CERDAN) at Toulon and the Cherbourg Center for Technical Testing and Evaluations (CETEC). The propellant unit will be assembled and tested in a specially-constructed vessel at the Indre establishment, research into hydrodynamic streamlining is carried out in specialized DCN evaluation areas. The principles of submarine detection and radioelectric reception will be tested aboard the "Dauphin," "Narval"-type submarine fitted out for the occasion.

The nuclear stokehold will be checked out at Cadarache on a new-generation reactor, an adaptation of an existing prototype stokehold. Just one unit will

be missing: the "Gymnote" which allowed for integration of the successive M1, M2, M20 and M4 weapons systems. It has been decommissioned and will probably not be replaced by an equivalent unit. Tests involving the new-generation SSBN will be carried out as realistically as possible from regular land or submersible facilities.

A Major Program

In order to build this kind of submarine whose dimensions and weight preclude utilization of the ancient Cherbourg shipyards, in this port a construction site has been developed (see our article in COLS BLEUS No 1909, p 4). The SSBN will be constructed ashore by a large number of "operators" who will take it to the launching dock. Completion will take place in the existing form of the Homet before the submarine leaves Cherbourg for sea trials.

Sites at Brest will be adapted as appropriate: Longue Island will have to be able to accommodate this more cumbersome submarine, provide maintenance for new equipment such as the nuclear stokehold, then the weapons system; when the time comes dock 10 will be able to accommodate it for major careening. Lastly, crew personnel quartered at the Roland Morillot submarine training center will be trained on submarine training center equipment, brought up to standard for this purpose.

Government will, operational necessity and technological evolution justify the launching of a new-generation SSBN program.

A submarine's hull lasts 25 to 30 years, a weapons system or equipment generation about 15 years. This explains the "target" dates marked on the calendar for maintenance and refurbishing of the Strategic Naval Force, submarines and missiles.

The SSBN has a single function but cannot be isolated from the navy, one of whose missions is to ensure the security of the Strategic Naval Force. The equipment needed for patrolling coastal areas and support on the open sea figures in the fleet refurbishing program.

SSBN's represent a major program whose importance is measured by the strategic mission which they ensure; they must fall within the overall purview of navy programs and within the parameters of its resources: all the programming outlines proposed by the navy aim at satisfying this dual requirement.

[Box, p 5]

Major Developments

Silent running:

1. Reduction of noises at the source;
2. Muffling noises transmitted toward the outside of the submarine; and
3. Improved hydrodynamics (including propeller).

Increase in maximum submergence:

1. New hull steel with very high elastic limit; and
2. New technology on circuits subjected to submergence pressure.

Submarine detection:

New hull antenna technology

Tactical operation and command assistance system

Navigation system

Propulsion:

1. New nuclear stokehold; and
2. Silent engine equipment with low rotation speed.

[Box, p 5]

Main Characteristics of the New-Generation SSBN

Compared to similar characteristics of the type M-4 SSBN (1)

| <u>Item</u> | <u>M 4 SSBN</u> | <u>New generation SSBN</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Displacement on surface | 8,080 metric tons | 12,700 metric tons |
| Displacement submerged | 8,920 metric tons | 14,200 metric tons |
| Length | 128.7 meters | 138 meters |
| Diameter | 10.6 meters | 12.5 meters |
| Crew | 127 men | 100 to 110 men |

1. I.e., the "Inflexible" and the "Redoutable"-type SSBN identical to the M 4.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

INTELLIGENCE CHIEF OF NEW SOVIET MILITARY THREAT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 4 Feb 87 p 13

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Admiral Eikanger on Soviet Army Materiel by Plane: New Threat to Norway"]

[Text] Leangkollen. Tanks and other heavy army materiel can be landed by plane by means of parachutes. There is new growth in the Soviet military forces in the northern regions. The Armed Forces Supreme Command's intelligence staff chief, Rear Admiral Egil Eikanger, said this at the Atlantic Ocean Committee's security policy conference at Leangkollen near Oslo. Eikanger said in addition that the Norwegian Intelligence Service recently was attentive to Soviet missile launching beneath the polar ice.

Sonar tells a submarine skipper where he can come up under the polar ice and fire his strategic weapons, according to Eikanger.

To the question of what foreign submarines are doing during visits to Norwegian fjords, the rear admiral (who himself has a background as a submarine skipper) answered that all submarine captains have to go through exhaustive training before they receive their certificates, and he suggested that this can be one reason that foreign submarines have been venturing into Norwegian fjords. Admiral Eikanger stated at the same time that it is considerably more difficult to detect submarines in narrow fjords than below the surface in the open sea.

Secret

"The politicians did not put muzzles on the intelligence service. The Armed Forces Supreme Command is engaged in greater openness concerning the so-called secret services than previously. All the same, we must be allowed to have something to ourselves. This applies to capacity, our sources, organization relationships and procedures," Eikanger said. And he added that NATO as an organization does not have any intelligence service of its own. The countries exchange information among themselves.

Eikanger thought that those who attend to stations and airplanes which take part in the gathering of intelligence and information within the "Norwegian interest area" in the north (the Baltic, the Leningrad Military District, the

Kola Peninsula, the Arctic Ocean and the ocean west of the Norwegian coast) are highly qualified people.

The admiral would of course not answer questions from the floor regarding how many people work for the intelligence service in Norway, but to the question of how he viewed increasing competition from civilian sources as far as the procurement of intelligence data is concerned, he said: "I do not disregard the fact that the day can come when the armed forces will have to go to civilian authorities--newspapers, for example--to buy satellite photos which we ourselves will not be able to obtain with the resources we have at our disposal."

8831
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MILITARY

NORWAY

INCREASED CONCERN OVER GUARDING AGAINST USSR SUBS, AIRCRAFT

Finnmark Air Warning Problems

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 27 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Per Ellingsen: "Weakened Control"]

[Text] The air force is not able to exercise as effective control over the airspace over Finnmark as could be desired. The monitoring and warning system is old, and it cannot be expected that the air force will be able to register everything moving in the airspace over the country's northernmost county. Colonel Gullow Gjeseth of the Armed Forces Supreme Command says this to ARBEIDERBLADET.

While the debate concerning the Widerøe accident off Mehamn in Finnmark is going on most heatedly, the armed forces come out and state that the monitoring and warning system in Finnmark is not good enough. On the one hand it is stated that it is inconceivable that the Widerøe plane which crashed on 11 March 1982 was struck by another plane, and on the other, several in the armed forces state that it is not possible to register and document everything moving in the airspace over Finnmark.

Problems

"We have problems in exercising effective control over the airspace because the equipment does not measure up to today's requirements. The stations are also not distributed in relation to the 'picture of the threat' of today," Colonel Gjeseth says.

The chief of the press and information department of the Armed Forces Supreme Command was previously backed by Major General Per Utgard. The major general stated to FINNMARK DAGBLAD that the air force is struggling with old equipment and has problems in exercising effective control in the airspace over Finnmark. At the same time, Utgard denies that the Widerøe plane which crashed almost five years ago collided with another plane.

The armed forces view the old monitoring and warning system so seriously that it is to be modernized in the next few years. When this will take place has not yet been clarified. It is first and foremost a budget question, Colonel

Gjeseth tells ARBEIDERBLADET. He adds that the monitoring and warning system in Finnmark is one of the armed forces' most highly prioritized objectives.

Personnel Crisis

At the same time as the radar stations in Finnmark are not measuring up, the armed forces are struggling with big personnel problems. The personnel trained for this work are sought in the civilian sector, and the armed forces have experienced a mass flight from the stations in North Norway the last few years. As recently as last fall the radar stations in Finnmark had big problems in standing watch. Very much overtime was used in order to get through this difficult time, Colonel Gjeseth says.

Kautokeino

There are plans to dismantle the radar station in Kautokeino, in order to be able to operate the two stations in Vadsø and Honningsvag. What will come to happen is not yet known. The matter is being discussed in the Defense Ministry. The reason that the maintenance of full operation in Kautokeino is not regarded as necessary is that the station lies outside what is called the "picture of the threat."

Radar Stations Understaffed

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 27 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Inger-Lise Finstad: "Flight from the Radar Stations"]

[Text] "Poor pay and not very attractive places to live are the reason that technical personnel are fleeing from the armed forces' radar stations in Finnmark," the president of the Air Force Officers Association, Hans Fredrik Dahle, says to ARBEIDERBLADET.

"The armed forces can assign newly trained technicians to Finnmark. But the turnover is high, and the radar stations are losing technicians with a lot of experience."

What consequences this will have for control of the airspace over Finnmark Dahle will not say anything about. But he states that it takes time to become familiar with the equipment.

The air force's collective organization pointed out the manning problems in Finnmark as early as 1985. They turned to the military authorities, and certain measures were agreed on. But nothing happened, according to Dahle.

When the change in government took place, Cabinet Minister Johan Jørgen Holst wanted to look at the issue. He appointed an officer recruitment committee. It is at work, but nothing concrete has come out of it for the time being.

Dahle says that, in addition, the Telecommunications Agency prizes its technicians more highly. So many from the armed forces land there.

In addition to the fact that the technicians are dissatisfied with the pay, it is difficult for their partners or spouses to get work in Finnmark. And today it is not easy to raise a family on one salary, Dahle says.

Civilian Radar Staff Proposed

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 2 Feb 87 p 9

[Article by Per Ellingsen: "Civilians Will Solve the Radar Crisis"]

[Text] "Give civilians a chance in the armed forces. We can solve the desperate manning problems which the armed forces are experiencing in Finnmark." These are the words of the president of the Armed Forces Civil Servants National Federation, Ove Nilsen. He is concerned about the manning crisis at our northernmost radar stations, and says right out that preparedness has been strongly weakened.

Several months ago, Ove Nilsen approached the Defense Ministry and armed forces leadership and presented concrete proposals for solving the manning crisis in the north. By giving the armed forces' civil servants a chance at new duties it will be possible to totally avoid the radar stations' being without a watch. Last week Colonel Gullow Gjeseth of the Armed Forces Supreme Command stated that the monitoring and warning system in Finnmark is not functioning satisfactorily. He referred to a persistent manning crisis and poor equipment.

"We have the solution as far as the manning crisis is concerned," says Ove Nilsen of the Armed Forces Civil Servants National Federation.

Necessary Resource

The civilian appointees in the armed forces are a necessary resource. The armed forces leadership has just not discovered how important it can be. By giving the civilians a chance at new duties, the radar stations in North Norway, for one thing, can be manned by a stable and capable occupational group, Nilsen believes.

"The civilian appointees at the country's defense installations are recruited from the local people. There is a major difference between the civilian appointees and the military group. The military move frequently, and they have no desire to stay in remote areas. Last but not least, the civilian group is almost as large as the military group. Today the national federation has organized 4000 members."

More Courses

The Armed Forces Civil Servants National Federation is asking the armed forces to be able to benefit from course offerings on an even keel with the military. Today civil servants are put at the bottom of the list as far as further training is concerned. This is true for both course work in the monitoring and warning system and other technical courses.

"Specialists in telecommunications and computers and general construction are needed in North Norway. Civil servants are used to a great extent in these fields today, but never in upper-level positions. The armed forces have problems in getting enough personnel here, too," Ove Nilsen says.

Increased Preparedness Against Submarines

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Feb 87 p 7

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Intensified Preparedness Against Soviet Submarines"]

[Text] The air force's 333rd Squadron is holding multiple celebrations these days: It is 45 years since the squadron was established, and it is 25 years since it moved to Andøya. The country's first female military pilots are beginning the training program these days in order to take over the captain's seat in the squadron's P 3 Orion planes. In addition, the squadron commander, Major Lasse-Erik Hobber, can be happy about the fact that new and still more electronically advanced planes are en route to the squadron.

The four new P 3 C planes, which will replace five somewhat aging P 3 B planes, are expected to arrive sometime in 1988. Major Hobber emphasizes that this will increase the squadron's capacity and ability to detect everything both over and under the water. The modernization of the arctic squadron is an element of Norway's and NATO's intensified preparedness against Soviet submarines. The new Orion planes will be crammed with the latest in electronics for searching, registering, analysis and communications.

It was in Woodhaven, Scotland, in 1942 that the 333rd Squadron was founded by the legendary Finn Lambrechts.

The squadron's main mission was operations along the Norwegian coast, and it was an important link between intelligence agents in Norway and the Norwegian authorities in England. Later it was put into action in attacks on German submarines and planes. The squadron used Catalina seaplanes at that time. Before the Orion planes arrived in 1969, the squadron had Albatross planes to carry out its missions with. Whether it is surveillance of ocean areas, looking for herring, photographing and mapping, or mail for isolated arctic stations, the 333rd does the job in a 2-million-square-kilometer ocean area. But then the P 3 B Orion planes have 20,000 horsepower in their four engines. The planes "gobble up" a couple of thousand liters of fuel per hour, depending on the altitude they maintain.

Girls do not get to fly fighter planes in Norway, but are welcome in the 333rd Squadron. Second Lieutenant Siri Skare tells AFTENPOSTEN that she would be happy to see more take advantage of the opportunity for a free education and an exciting job in the air. For the present she is the only one at the joysticks.

8831
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MILITARY

NORWAY

FORCES SEEN INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER NORDIC NEIGHBORS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 19 Feb 87 p 16

[Article by Ingemar Dorfer, PhD, Fellow at the National Defense Research Institute: "Nordic Security Policy Criticized From Abroad"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] International interest in Nordic security policies has increased greatly in recent years. The American diplomat, John Ausland, now living in Norway, evaluates the Swedish and Norwegian defenses as adequate for creating respect in peacetime, but incompetent in war. Finnish defenses are weak for peacetime, he believes, and the Danish will be taken over by West Germany.

International literature on security policy in the Nordic countries has been sparse for a long time. The standard authority, "Five Roads to Nordic Security" edited by Johan Jorgen Holst was published by Universitetsforlaget in Oslo in 1973, and served well during the 1970's. Its successor--originally a special number of Cooperation and Conflict (No.4, 1982) was never published as a book in English, but was translated into Danish by the energetic Security and Disarmament Political Committee, SNU--"Nordiske sikkerhedsproblemer" (Nordic Security Problems) (Published by Forlaget Europa 1984). It was significant that Holst also played a part in this version in the chapter on Norway. The present Norwegian minister of defense has for two decades dominated the Scandinavian security policy debate.

This meager stream of writings has now turned into a rapid flood. The turning point came with America's rediscovery of Europe after the Vietnam War, the buildup of Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula and the American maritime strategy. The academic starting gun was fired at the Harvard Conference in April 1985. A planned rather ordinary strategy conference at the Harvard Center for International Affairs was transformed through the committed preliminary work of Norwegian diplomat Sverre Jervells and the Swedish journalist Kare Nyblom into the greatest mustering of Nordic strategic superstars since the war. The Norwegian and Swedish ministers of defense, the Danish permanent security policy advisor to the secretary of state, three Finnish ambassadors, the American secretary of the navy, and the Norwegian and Swesdish opposition spokesmen for defense questions, Holst and Bildt, participated. While the discussions were held "off the record," the conference still produced a result in the form of a book, "The Military

"Buildup in the High North" (edited by Sverre Jervell and Kare Nyblom, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and University Press of America 1986).

This publication presents therefore the strengths and weaknesses of the conference report, or rather of the dedication publication. The necessity of instructing the important participating American decision makers (who were not all Scandinavian specialists) in special Nordic security policy elements meant that government representatives throughout presented a sensible, stable and powerful defense policy. The semiofficial framework contributed to Sjaastad and Holst, Thunborg and Bildt, Gottlieb and Bjol showing a moving and perhaps somewhat acted consensus both during the conference and now in the text. It was no coincidence that Professor Kjell Goldmann's attempt to theoretically separate the Swedish way of negotiating into restoration, friendship and alliance met with total lack of understanding by the conference participants. Thereby he indirectly proved his own thesis. Internal disunity makes an effective foreign policy more difficult.

Swedish politicians have used this argument against each other--meaning that the government has used it against the opposition, and thereby prevented an open and sincere debate. At the same time the politicians have not been able to conceal the fact that a certain disunity was present. Disunity has accordingly been demonstrated, but a sincere debate of the new situation has been prevented in the name of unity.

Thank goodness the debate at the conference was more lively than the smooth chapter covering it here. In the American way the biggest dispute arose between the American Navy, represented by Secretary of the Navy Lehman, Admiral Mustin and Marine Corps General Gay, and the academic strategists at the ivy league university, in the book represented by Barry Posen. The question, then as now, was escalation and arms control at sea.

Present at the Harvard Conference was the young political science expert Paul M. Cole, active at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Together with Douglas M. Hart, who is active in another of Washington's strategic think tanks, he has edited an interesting publication, "Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990's" (Westview Press 1986). Cole, who through his network of important contacts knows better than most what Washington thinks about Sweden, also knows how to explain pedagogically the American priorities in Scandinavia. Like other American observers, Cole sees neoneutralist forces in Norwegian and Danish security policy and fears that the 90's will bring in governments in these countries which will put the NATO commitment to a test. In Sweden's case he shows how within NATO they wonder if Sweden has drawn any conclusions from the military provocations and how to deal with them. The thinking behind the reduced military budget was proved to be faulty, said Cole. In the West they are watching attentively to see whether domestic defense policy will in the future favor measures intended to correct the security policy power shift in Northern Europe. Also confidence in the ability of the Swedish security policy elite to make prompt and difficult decisions is now being tested in the eyes of the rest of the world. One must acknowledge that the current defense decision shows that Cole's pessimism was well founded.

But the uncertainty which the book reflects about the Swedish defense is only a westerly breeze compared to the criticism which has been directed against Denmark for the first time in writing. For historic reasons West Germany has turned the role of critic of Denmark over to Great Britain, said retired General Heinz von zur Gathen in a detailed chapter about the West German forces contribution to the NATO commander in Northern Europe, and especially the defense of Denmark. After mobilization 200,000 German soldiers will be available for defense of the Baltic exits. The late assistant chief of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, Colonel Jonathan Alford, also discussed Denmark's and Norway's role in Great Britain's air defense, and said that 8,000 British troops plus aircraft are earmarked for Sjaelland. In order to emphasize the conditional nature of relieving Denmark he added: "Whatever can be considered in the interests of the alliance, it is nothing more than the total interests of the states included in the alliance--sometimes coincident and reinforcing one another, sometimes sharply different and even domestically conflicting. To believe that the alliance has a personality that is different than the personalities of the individual member countries does not agree with history or reality." Alford's words have already proved to be prophetic. London has now notified Copenhagen that the UK Mobile Force will no longer be earmarked for Denmark.

Alford and von zur Gathen show for the first time a trend which Karl Bildt recognizes in his overlapping chapter--West German influence is now growing in the north at the expense of Britain, even though Britain has had a totally dominant position since the German capitulation to Field Marshal Montgomery 42 years ago. As other writers in this book (and the other two books mentioned herein) Bildt avoids speculations about a grandiose arms control system in Scandinavia as a ready-made solution. On the contrary, he shows how the high ceilings of the Salt I agreement gave the Soviet Union a free hand for the expansion of its strategic nuclear fleet at Kola. An introductory chapter by Arne Olav Brundtland, analyst at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute and with good connections in the Norwegian Labor and Conservative Parties, is very diplomatic, but expresses misgivings that the United States and NATO are perhaps not satisfied with Norwegian security policies. If the external threat to Nordic security remains, especially in the form of conventional forces, certain Nordic countries must perhaps introduce sweeping changes in their policies, concludes Brundtland. In all, this book comes closer to the brutal truth than does the more elegant and statesmanlike Harvard volume.

But then what should one say about John Ausland's almost impertinent "Nordic Security and the Great Powers"? Ausland, who was a diplomat in the American Embassy in Oslo 1969-73 has lived since then in Norway and has had the opportunity to follow Norwegian security policy both from the American and the Norwegian side for half a generation. While the intent of the other two books is to present Scandinavian security policy for American readers, Ausland's ambition is possibly the opposite--to show the Nordic public how they look at Scandinavia from Washington and, to a certain extent, Brussels. This very modest volume, published by Westview Press, as was Cole's book, contains a bit of dynamite for researchers and diplomats who are accustomed to refined Nordic security policy etiquette.

Ausland's document consists largely of interviews with decision makers in the countries involved. This leads to an unpretentious and reasoned writing style, but also an irritating lack of footnotes, with the exception of a short literary passage at the end. Sometimes he steps out in quicksand, as with his speculation about Finnish politicians being Soviet agents of influence. But he is very aware of that, and makes the correct calculation that it is better to write incompletely about important things such as intelligence services, espionage, electronic warfare, technology transfer and propaganda, than to act as though these things did not exist.

Ausland's point is vital--if one just looks at what is happening on the surface, the Nordic countries were long a calm corner of the world where much is changing in the security policy picture. But since Ausland, like other professional analysts, also looks under the surface--that which we only glimpse in connection with the expulsion of diplomats and concealing of technology smuggling--he sees a large and growing activity within the more secret and hidden security policy spheres. The reason why more is not disclosed or noted, writes Ausland, unfortunately correctly, is the shortage of Scandinavian journalists who can or will read between the lines, or add two and two without getting the wrong answer.

At the heart of the problem Ausland sees the Nordic states' compulsion to adapt to a new situation in which the Soviet military buildup is now being met by an American response. Here in the latest decade Norway, Iceland and to a lesser extent Denmark have considerably improved their possibilities of receiving allied help in a crisis situation. Also Sweden and Finland are thinking about changing their mental and physical readiness to strengthen their defense, according to Ausland. As do other American planners, Ausland thinks of the situation in the north as a potential war situation, and herein lies the strength of his book. Considering the international audience of the book, the author's evalustion of the Nordic Armies is interesting. All the armies are too poorly equipped, and the Swedish Army furthermore lacks training and has difficulties with its command system at the brigade level and higher, according to Ausland. High NATO officers believe that the Norwegian Army needs two months of intensive training after mobilization to be ready for combat. What should one think about the Swedish? Ausland's judgment is that the Norwegian and Swedish defense forces create respect in peacetime, but are not ready for war. The Finnish forces are still too weak in peacetime, and the Danish defense has largely been taken over by West Germany.

John Ausland's tone is raw and hearty. He has made a valuable contribution to the literature by making the secret world of the diplomat and the planner better known to the interested public, and thereby made the public more aware of the facts of life. The three books mentioned here are read internationally, and thereby form the view of the outside world of what is happening in our world. They are written to a large extent by people who either have or have had responsibility for the welfare of the citizens. In this respect they differ from the flood of peace literature which never reaches outside our Nordic boundaries, but which is diligently studied in our schools, churches and study circles.

9287 CSO:3650/81

U.S.-SPANISH NEGOTIATIONS ON BASES CLOSELY WATCHED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Feb 87 p 6

[Editorial: "The Controversy Over American Bases"]

[Text] The difficulties that have been arising in the negotiations between the governments of Madrid and Washington to reduce U.S. forces stationed in Spanish territory are a subject of interest to the Atlantic Alliance as a whole and, in that context, to Portugal as well. What is at stake is the effectiveness of NATO's defense system on its southern flank and the West's ability to respond in case of conflicts endangering its security in a region that is simultaneously as unstable and as ultrasensitive as the Mediterranean. But for now, the course of the Spanish-U.S. talks has not reached a point of rupture justifying excessive concern, and it therefore seems premature to be talking already about the need to find an alternative outside the Spanish context. One need only recall that the bilateral agreement covering use of the base at Torrejon--one of the chief bones of contention between the parties directly involved--will not expire until May of next year. And in negotiations of this kind, positions of strength--or those presented as such in public statements or through the media--are not always the bottom line.

In any case, the possibility that the reduction in U.S. military manpower and equipment in Spanish territory will exceed limits considered reasonable in terms of the interests of the Atlantic Alliance is one that must be faced up to for two reasons. First of all, there is the pressure from voters to which the government of Felipe Gonzalez is subject. The fact is that the NATO issue has been a sort of Achilles' heel for the Spanish Socialists. While in the opposition, they rejected the country's continued membership in the alliance, but once in power, they redefined their position, pledging to hold a referendum and wholeheartedly supporting, even then, the idea that Spain should remain in the organization's military structure without joining its military structure [as published]. An about-face of that kind does not happen without concessions, and in the campaign preceding the referendum, Gonzalez began specifically to show the greatest firmness in his intention to bring about a drastic reduction in the presence of U.S. forces in Spanish territory. That commitment therefore has an electoral aspect, and it will be difficult not to live up to it, especially since anti-Americanism is a very pronounced phenomenon in Spanish society.

Current conditions on another level are also such that they do not facilitate bringing the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion with an acceptable compromise. This has to do with the U.S. counterparts given in exchange for use of the bases. The agreements signed in that connection by the U.S. Administration have frequently been challenged by the U.S. Congress, which has wound up substantially reducing the appropriations earmarked by the government for compensating allied countries that accept U.S. forces. Because of that, the Reagan administration--its image already weakened at home and abroad by the "Irangate" scandal--does not seem to have the necessary room for maneuver that would enable it to present sufficiently attractive counterproposals to the government in Madrid.

In that context, and considering that the negotiations are still at an early stage, it is difficult to actually foresee an agreement, although there have been no signs of intransigence such that an imminent rupture is indicated. If one occurs, however, the United States and NATO will be placed in a touchy situation. The most immediate effect will be the impact on European and U.S. public opinion of a withdrawal imposed on U.S. forces by an allied country. Such an event may stir up different reactions on the two sides of the Atlantic, but both will be harmful to the cohesiveness of the West: it may give a new boost to anti-American pacifist movements in Europe and to a strengthening of isolationist doctrine in the United States.

In addition, there will still be the problem of alternatives to the bases in Spain. Obviously, there are no substitutes of absolutely equal value as far as the specific missions assigned to those bases are concerned, and the solution will necessarily involve a redefinition of the setup for the defense of NATO's southern flank and of the Iberian Peninsula's continental component itself. It also happens that with the exception of Morocco--which is a possibility already suggested but perhaps not suitable--the countries whose geographic locations have a strategic value closest to that of the Spanish bases are already making an active and invaluable contribution to the United States and NATO. This is true of Italy, as Minister Spadolini remarked in Washington. But it is also true of Portugal, as no minister in Lisbon has yet pointed out. And that is a reality which the Portuguese Government cannot fail to take into account.

11798
CSO: 3542/67

MILITARY

PORUGAL

SPANISH ARMS SALES TO IRAN REPORTEDLY DISGUISED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 14 Feb 87 p 24

[Text] Using false "final destination certificates" supposedly issued by the Portuguese Army General Staff, the Spanish arms industry has sold about 175,000 metric tons of war materiel to Iran since September 1986, according to what EXPRESSO has learned from well-informed sources linked to that sector.

The shipments, which were supposedly being made to Lisbon, began in September of last year after the government of Felipe Gonzalez had decreed successive embargoes on arms shipments to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya and also introduced precautionary measures covering exports to Greece and Yugoslavia. Our sources say that after Madrid suspended arms sales to the Gulf countries, exports to Iran continued thanks to the use of certificates listing the destination as Syria or Libya. And when sales to those countries were also suspended, Spanish businessmen turned up with Greek and Yugoslav documents. In September 1986, under pressure from the government to prove the legitimacy of their shipments, they began submitting documentation supposedly issued by the Portuguese Ministry of Defense.

So far, it is not known exactly how much armament has left Spain with Portugal as its "destination" even though Lisbon has never bought any of it.

The orders were given to Spanish industry by two firms in that country: the Metallurgical Auxiliary Group, Inc., and Vitoria. According to documents in the hands of Portuguese authorities, those firms opened bank credits in favor of the Spanish defense firm DEFEX (which has no connection with DEFEX-Portugal), and payment for the materiel was made through those credits. The same firms took charge of loading the cargo onto ships that left the ports of Santander and Barcelona--bound supposedly for Lisbon.

Turning Mountains Into Valleys

The ships most frequently used for those shipments have been the Iceland Saga, the Louise A, the Sea Trader, and the Adonis, some of which have also been used to carry weapons to the Contras. One of the most recent shipments consisted of 160,000 rounds of ammunition for 120mm mortars, 60,000 106mm shells for recoilless guns, and an undetermined quantity of ammunition for

81mm mortars. Also shipped, in addition to that materiel, was ammunition for 203mm, 175mm, 130mm, and 122mm artillery, as well as propelling charges, cartridge clips, explosives, and fuzes. One source at the EMGFA [Armed Forces General Staff] told EXPRESSO: "If Portugal used the quantities of ammunition sold by the Spanish in its exercises, we could turn the Estrela Mountains into the Santarem Valley." And a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Defense in Lisbon said that "the only reason the Spanish did not know that the materiel was not coming here (to Portugal) was that they did not want to. An analysis of the orders showed immediately that Portugal was supposedly buying 60mm and 81mm mortars (both produced by our domestic industry), but it has never been necessary to import them, not even during the war in Africa. Moreover, Portugal does not have 175mm or 203mm artillery," which is manufactured in the United States and used by several countries in NATO and in the Middle East. Lastly, the 130mm and 122mm ammunition would not do the Portuguese Army any good because guns of those calibers, manufactured by the USSR, are used by the Warsaw Pact countries and in the war in the Gulf.

Portuguese authorities took "unofficial steps" last week to try to obtain clarification from Madrid concerning the information in their possession. According to well-informed sources, the reason Lisbon drew up an unofficial note on the subject was that the government of Felipe Gonzalez had shown reluctance to provide that clarification.

The Spanish shipments "destined" for Portugal were being made at an average rate of almost one a week and were supposedly part of a contract that has 2 more years to run, according to information obtained by EXPRESSO from circles connected with the defense industry.

Spanish authorities have refused to comment on the information revealed in the unofficial note from the Office of the Prime Minister, which denied that Portugal had bought war materiel from Spain and requested an investigation. A source in the Ministry of Defense has told us, however, that the falsification of Portuguese documents, "which could have been done in Spain as well as here," will be investigated by the Judicial Police.

11798

CSO: 3542/59

SDP, CONSERVATIVE SECURITY DEBATE HINGES ON WAR SCENARIOS

Poll On Defense Strength

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial: "We Want Defense"]

[Text] A poll by the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls (Sifo), ordered by the Industrial Press Service on the defense agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party shows interesting results. A significant majority of those polled think that Swedish defense forces today are insufficient. In all of the nonsocialist parties this opinion dominates, and even in the Social Democratic Party 46 percent think the same. Those satisfied make up only 37 percent since several are undecided.

To a significant extent this model holds even when the question is changed to apply to the defense striking force when the agreement has been carried out. The number of undecided ones increases among the nonsocialist parties, while a bare majority among the Social Democratic sympathizers think that we will then have a satisfactory defense.

On the other hand, the picture is changed somewhat with the third question on whether it was in itself bad that the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats made an agreement. A large majority among the Social Democrats think it is good, while more in the Liberal Party are positive than negative. Many are also uncertain. Among the moderates the opposition is solid, while the center sympathizers show a less decided view. But 40 percent are negative.

The figures show clearly that the defense debate in recent years has given the Swedish people a realistic picture of our defense. The citizens have seen that definite strength improvements are needed to meet the threats. A whole 48 percent of those questioned -- and 24 percent answered don't know -- think that the agreement is insufficient.

Still, 42 percent think that it was good that the two parties came to an agreement, while 26 percent think it was bad. This can appear somewhat paradoxical, but the explanation is not hard to find. There is a tendency in Swedish thinking to appreciate compromises, even if the result is imperfect.

As for the parties, the figures mean that the moderates have their sympathizers, and this was expected. Even for the government the result was positive. The agreement has support within the movement, and the poll shows that some of the criticism from the party left is numerically limited. For the Liberal Party on the other hand, the picture is divided. Many think that the agreement is insufficient, and a significant minority thinks it was bad for the party to make an agreement over the bloc boundary.

Since a solid majority in all the nonsocialist parties thinks it is important or very important for the nonsocialist parties to hold together, the Liberal Party has reason to ponder the situation. Agreements over bloc boundaries that many sympathizers consider to be less satisfactory hardly register positively in regular voter polls. Because nonsocialist voters are true to their bloc, but have shown faithlessness to individual parties. The many who streamed to them in the 1985 elections can disappear just as quickly. Experience has shown this very clearly.

Bildt Foresees Prolonged War

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Feb 87 p 12

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Social Democrats and Moderates Quarrel"]

[Text] The Defense Committee ended its work with a quarrel on how long a future great war can last. It was the Social Democrat Sture Ericsson and the Moderate leader Carl Bildt who were at loggerheads.

In the security policy thinking that forms the basis for defense planning the members assumed unanimously that a large war in Europe could last a year.

In the Defense Committee's thinking the majority, which consists of Social Democrats and Liberal Party members, talks about a prewar phase of up to a year, followed by an acute war phase between the power blocs of some months, and thereafter a recovery phase of some years.

At the press conference that ended the Defense Committee's work, Carl Bildt stressed that the security policy thinking applied to a large war in Europe.

"In my reservation I wanted to follow a more global reasoning," Bildt said. Bildt comes to the conclusion that a large conflict between the two power blocs could last a significantly longer time because of more or less extensive combat operations in various parts of the world.

Long Lasting War

Social Democrat Sture Ericsson said that this was a departure from the conclusions agreed upon in the basic security policy document.

According to Liberal Party member Hans Lindblad, the medical care sector is the weakest part of the total defense organization. Certain improvements are now

being made so that it will not fall apart in a few weeks. Lindblad thought that a complete evaluation of logistics and other defense factors would be valuable.

Center Party member Gunnar Bjork thought that a better storage of, among other things, metals, was necessary.

Shortage of Metal

The Defense Committee spokesman Per Borg pointed to a section that dealt with the Swedish defense industry. He stressed the need for a Swedish defense industry but also said that cooperation is needed with various countries in Europe to produce good weapons.

The aircraft issue has taken on excessive proportions, according to both Per Borg and Sture Ericsson. Their opinion was that we had had more money at our disposal it should have been used for the army.

Gunnar Bjork hopes that it will be possible to influence the agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party when the issue comes to the Defense Committee.

The government will now write the proposition. By 10 March at the latest the Riksdag will have the proposal in hand.

Carl Bildt Warns of a Prolonged War

A large conflict between the two military blocs would lead to a prolonged chain of crisis and war. This is what Moderate leader Carl Bildt wrote in his reservation to the reasoning of the Defense Committee. Bildt therefore demands an expert study of Swedish logistic preparedness.

The northern European and North Atlantic area will be directly affected by a large conflict. In spite of this, there is the possibility of preventing Sweden from being drawn into a war directly. We must therefore prepare ourselves for a long period of effective military capacity and for limitations in foreign trade, according to Bildt.

An expert group should therefore be established in order to present proposals during the five year period 1988-1992 for changes in logistics preparedness in, among other things, metals and food, as the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party suggest in their report.

In military defense, Bildt wants a larger increase during the five year period than the majority. The majority wants to increase buying power by 6.2 billion. The Moderates want 8.7 billion and even more for the next five year period 1992-97.

For the army Bildt recommends the acquisition of a new tank for the four tank brigades, while the navy must be able to purchase another two coastal corvettes,

a modern submarine of the Submarine 90 type, and several hydrophones.

Bildt thinks that a strengthening of the air defenses is urgent. He wants another division of Viggen, but the supreme commander should decide upon the exact number.

The Moderates propose another alternative to that presented in the final stage. It is to extend the lifetime of a division of Drakes, which would be significantly cheaper.

Bildt is not much interested in letting Swedish industry take part and manufacture a radar-guided air-to-air missile for JAS. The Moderates think that the Swedish defense industry should primarily turn its attention to the development of teleweapons, reconnaissance and operations systems.

Paper Criticizes Bildt Positions

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Bildt and Bjork Against 'Pact'"]

[Text] Before the yearly defense agreement, the agenda has become extremely awkward. On Wednesday the Defense Committee published its considerations, the contents of which in important areas confirms the ideas on the party leadership level. It is just a month now before the defense proposal must be presented to the Riksdag; the contents of the proposal have to a great extent practically already been decided.

As expected therefore the Defense Committee's majority formed its suggestions based on the agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party. Nor could anyone not have thought that both the Moderates and the Center Party would think that the will to compromise had had its time and that now instead was the time to draw up their own positions.

Nevertheless, it was hardly necessary to go as far as both Carl Bildt and Center representative Gunnar Bjork have done. Obligatory references to basic unity on the reasons for defense policy cannot hide the fact that they both chose in their reservations to direct solid broadsides against the results of the agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party, which both Bildt and Bjork like to call "the pact."

In Carl Bildt's reservation there is, as expected, room for both another Viggen division and for two coastal corvettes. But the increases are on a broad front and even include the army, which according to earlier statements from the Moderate leader should remain in the background in this agreement and instead have its turn for reinforcement in the 1992 agreement.

Now Bildt has in the meantime bound himself to a comprehensive appropriations increase in the 1992-97 period. In the coming five year period on the other hand, the increases he proposes are more modest; 8.7 billion kronor compared to

the majority's sum of just about 6.8 billion. But in the following five years the appropriations, if Bildt has his way, will increase by another 16.5 billion kronor -- compared with today's level.

In this arrangement a large amount will come at the end of the ten year period, but the increase will not be so great in the early years. This means that the Moderates can make light of the financing issue; among other things, Bildt wants to hold up on the majority's proposed reduction of the oil supply. Here he points, somewhat surprisingly, to the threat of a prolonged war in our area. This idea does not at all agree with the Defense Committee's idea of the course of a possible war.

But Carl Bildt's reasoning is not as confusing as Gunnar Bjork's. He thinks that the oil supply can be reduced, but he wants to retain a good supply of capital goods for agricultural and industrial products, which in a crisis situation would clearly be more difficult to import than oil! Here it is hard to avoid the impression of sly protectionism in the guise of defense policy.

Somewhat more credibility must be given to Bjork's criticism of the reduction of the supply of strategic metals, in which South Africa plays a significant role as supplier. But logically this should primarily be a task for special steel makers such as, for example, Sandvik, to decide themselves what the risks are and to guard themselves with an increased supply. In large upheavals, for example a war in South Africa, the whole world market would be forced after a while to make a change.

While Carl Bildt does not hide the fact that a defense policy of his type will be quite a bit more expensive, Bjork tries to penetrate significantly more into the already tight framework of the Social Democratic and Liberal Party agreement. It applies mainly to the excessive Viggen aircraft, but beyond that the increase is proposed in a way that seems tactically calculated. In addition, Bjork is quite unashamedly wooing the groups in the Social Democratic Party who may well find fault with reductions in civil defense.

- If Carl Bildt's reservation can be interpreted to mean that no basis has actually ever been found for a four party agreement that includes both the Moderates and the Social Democrats, then Gunnar Bjork's reservation says that the Center might possibly agree -- but that the will is now lacking. Therefore the agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party will not be changed in content during the Riksdag deliberations.

It is possible that the Center Party will in this way miss the chance to improve the contents of the agreement in an essential point. At a limited cost one should be able to set up a division of Drake aircraft that is now in moth balls, for example to handle incidents in the Baltic Sea. The Social Democrats and the Liberals have left the possibility open but postponed the decision until the defense agreement of 1992. For them it should not be difficult to agree upon a decision on the Drake aircraft as early as this year, if the Center in turn would give up its ill-founded attempt at mistrusting everything that looks like saving and prioritizing within the whole defense force.

9124
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MILITARY

SWITZERLAND

COMPLEX ARMORED WARFARE STRAINS MILITIA'S TRAINING RESOURCES

Frauenfeld ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT in German Feb 87
pp 65-68

[Interview with Maj Gen Friedrich Suter, Inspector General of Mechanized and Light Troops, date and place not given: "The Training of our Mechanized Troops"]

[Text] [Question] General, like all your colleagues, you have two titles: on the one hand you are the inspector general of a branch of service, on the other hand the director of a federal agency. To start with, could you give us a brief description of these two jobs?

[Answer] Gladly, and I will refer to the simplified organization chart of the Federal Agency for Mechanized and Light Troops [Bundesamt fuer Mechanisierte und Leichte Truppen (BAMLT)]:

As inspector general, I am responsible for training of the Mechanized and Light Troops (MLT), to include the basic training and officer schools, as well as the transition courses for the Leopard 87 tank. As director on the other hand I head up the BAMLT with its sections and services. This also includes the responsibility for the timely materiel readiness of the MLT, which is why the requisite proposals also form a part of my task.

[Question] Would not this duplication result in separate responsibilities-- depending on the subject matter, either the director of training or the chief of the general staff?

[Answer] Correct. All training matters (approximately the entire right-hand side of the organization chart) falls into the area of the director of training; for all questions of materiel readiness, which are principally dealt with by the offices on the left side of the chart, the channels lead to the chief of the general staff.

[Question] We will here deal primarily with the mission of the inspector general; to begin with, concerning a question which confronts the young Swiss citizen when he first comes into direct and very personal contact with the army: We frequently hear (sometimes with some envy, depending

on one's own circumstances) that upon being recruited the draftees desperately try to join the mechanized troops, fascinated with the symbol of modern technology which the tank no doubt represents. Is this still true--does that impose a torture of decision-making on you?

[Answer] Unfortunately not, because the former very tangible rush has diminished significantly. Only about 60 to 70 percent of the needed armored service soldiers are now volunteering; the balance have to be convinced to join the mechanized troops by the draft officer through more or less gentle persuasion. For this reason we cannot later on profit from undiminished enthusiasm for the armored forces and are faced in the recruit school with problems similar to those in the other branches of service.

[Question] Do we know the reasons for these changes?

[Answer] I can certainly give you a few. First of all, there is today's widespread distrust of equipment in general. One example on the recruitment side: During the 1950's we had no problems in recruiting for our motorized troops, but had a lot of trouble in finding the necessary number of volunteers for the bicycle units. Today the pendulum has swung the other way: We have too few volunteers for the tanks, but there are many more people volunteering as cyclists than we can use.

[Question] Just one more impressive example of the fact that the militia army reacts very quickly to trends prevailing in the society which carries it!

[Answer] Certainly. On the other side of the spectrum, this is true also for a second reason which makes our recruitment more difficult: The tiresome debates about our 68 tank (in 1979/80) have greatly damaged the prestige of our branch of the service, because it planted insecurity just in those young people who wanted to deal with modern technology in the military service also--to such an extent that the draft officials became aware of it. However, with the Leopard 87 combat tank a lot of things will come back to normal.

Then there are other reasons, caused by the peculiarities of the weapon systems. For instance, people wearing glasses cannot operate the optical instruments of a tank. Also, every potential tank crew member must pass an applied psychological test--it is a selection device, which however at the same time reduces the number of volunteers.

[Question] Does this psychological testing make special demands?

[Answer] Unfortunately not; it is identical with tests for military drivers. In any case, it constitutes an irreplaceable rough screening tool, which can eliminate people suffering from agoraphobia for example, or people without mechanical aptitude.

[Question] Let us leave recruitment and talk about training practices, first of all about the issue of main interest today, the Leopard. It is justly considered to be an up-to-date and high-tech weapon system. In other armies which also use it, it has been said that normal basic training (about 15 months) is too short to acquire true familiarity with such a complex system and to learn to make optimum use of it; that it would therefore be necessary for the most important functions to assign either volunteer extended servicemen or regular army personnel to it. Swiss recruit training will however obviously remain at 17 weeks, even with the "Leo." Is that really enough, and if so, what is responsible for this extraordinary performance?

[Answer] It is true of course that our training times are close to the minimum required, using adequate wartime performance of tank crews as a standard. I feel secure, however, in saying, without exaggeration, that we are able to compensate for this bare minimum with a highly efficient working organization and highly modern training facilities.

Even today the Thun weapons range is very well equipped for our training purposes, and even better and more efficient installations are presently under construction for the 87 combat tank. They will be superior to any installation in other countries, which will in time enable us to make even greater learning progress. We will be able to make the most of every training hour, regardless of hail, snow and freezing weather outside. Especially during the first few weeks, prior to the necessary acclimatization, these capabilities will be enormously helpful. Added to this will be a long day's work of 8 to 10 hours, frequently supplemented with additional night work.

As a matter of fact, I could have mentioned this training intensity as another cause for the decreasing number of volunteers in recruitment: Not everyone is used to such working hours, coming from his civilian job!

[Question] Back to the Thun training facilities, where the simulators occupy an important position: What can the recruit finally learn from them, and for which subjects can reality not be simulated--the terrain, the moving and firing "enemy?" In this connection, I am also thinking of Swissair, which largely bases its pilot basic and advanced training on simulators.

[Answer] I can contribute a small item of personal experience with regard to pilot training: I myself have made a landing at Kloten [Zurich airport] on a DC-10 simulator. There was enormous physical and psychological stress, because the simulation is incredibly realistic--there is no question of "pretending!"

We have not progressed that far in tank training; but what we can achieve is that the tank crew member knows every detail of operation and that in a critical situation he is capable of operating the system in a reasonable manner. We cannot, however, simulate live ammunition firing and its impact on the crew (detonation, powder smoke, heat, etc.), and

this remains a very important task. For this reason firing practice, starting out with reduced caliber and machinegun, is conducted in parallel with simulator training. In firing exercises, in practice with live combat ammunition, in realistic combat deployment, the two training sequences meet up with each other.

[Question] Would you summarize the advantages of simulator training?

[Answer] We can engage in intensive and realistic training any day, irrespective of outside conditions. We make large savings in ammunition and driving expenses and we protect the environment in many respects--a factor which will become increasingly important.

[Question] In such a highly structured training, the instructors no doubt play a large part. Two questions on this subject--the first with respect to another peculiarity of the militia system, significant to all branches concerned with training involving highly technical equipment: Do the militia cadres frequently reach the limits of their competence, because they are somewhat insecure in their technical, and therefore methodological, knowledge? Do such cases present the temptation to the instructor to use his knowledge directly, training the recruits personally and relegating the cadre to an "assistance" function?

[Answer] Certainly the instructors are the most highly qualified people in military applications, and their direct participation would probably improve basic training. But this would be much too high a price to pay, because then the cadre would not be properly prepared as to their independence and exercise of responsibility in weapons exercises (and in case of national emergency!). For this reason, the instructor comes to the fore only in those training facilities which are not part of a weapons exercise. The same is true when the armored battalions return to the Thun Weapons range every 3 or 4 years for a partial weapons exercise, because for practical reasons such programs are conducted by instructors. Apart from this, we insist that the cadres of all levels are as familiar with their tasks as are the tank crews.

[Question] Now to the second question concerning the instructors. A training assignment here in Thun is no doubt a very attractive one, supported with effective and up-to-date training aids, essentially unaffected by external influences--all the prerequisites, in fact, for success. Word on this no doubt gets around, leading to the fact that your branch of the service has no shortage of instructors?

[Answer] Unfortunately, we have not progressed that far to date; though lately interest has increased once again, perhaps due to the attractive training facilities.

[Question] Is that true for officers also? Has your own career choice system proven valid to date? Could you briefly discuss this new concept?

[Answer] With pleasure. Basic training in the Swiss regular service is very demanding, because the chief instructor of a unit must conduct training at five levels--he is responsible not only for the recruits, but also for corporals, higher ranking noncommissioned officers, platoon leaders and unit commanders. Occasionally a sixth level is added: the introduction of a young instructor (officer or noncom). My objective is to have available for this task a sufficient number of technically and methodologically competent chief instructors, who remain much longer in the recruit schools than in the past, who accumulate rich experience during those long years and who at the same time find satisfaction in being successful and gaining recognition as experts. Certainly I need another type of instructors also, who are not of the same caliber as to personality and intellect. They remain in the recruit training schools for only a relatively short time, from there proceed to officers' training schools and finally into the cadres of the advanced officers' courses.

Obviously, these career ladders are discussed with every candidate, and each one may state his preferences. In any case, even he will find an activity which appeals to him personally who is more interested in security, who is more interested in stability than in quick transfers--and who would perhaps prefer to avoid being pressured into a military career.

[Question] This brings up two questions: The chief instructor of the recruit training school who you have described can hope to reach the grade of Lieutenant Colonel at best and will hardly want to attend general staff courses. Isn't there an inherent danger of getting into a rut? And secondly: Are you not restricting your freedom of action by no longer being able to use your instructors along the entire training spectrum?

[Answer] In actual practice, this restriction already exists today. Very few of my instructors are good chief instructors in the regular service as well as highly qualified group leaders in advanced officers' courses.

[Question] And the "getting into a rut" thing?

[Answer] Here we might make a comparison with the civilian area: Our instructors at all levels remain in most cases in their jobs until they retire. Nobody requires them to change levels or schools every 4 or 5 years to avoid getting into a rut. Besides, the work of a chief instructor offers a lot more variety than specialized training in a school.

Certainly, there are some unfortunate examples also, but that you will find anywhere, and they do not impact the system as a whole, but rather the exceptional cases.

[Question] Does your experience with noncommissioned officer instructors provide any lessons for the military in general?

[Answer] Yes indeed. Today some master sergeants have to retire because of age, whom I would have gladly kept on duty, people who worked with great determination and enthusiasm until their last active duty day. I know

several examples from other countries. Thirty years ago in England, when the Centurion was introduced, I met some 50-year old captains, among them a widely-renowned Captain Boddy, a tank fire expert at the Lulworth arms range. Anyone who had a problem there sought him out and could be assured of being given a solution. That was why Captain Boddy was a happy man, who looked back on his career with pride.

Last year I was in Germany to get introduced to Leopard training. A 51-year old captain was a member of the team, who performed his duties with great enthusiasm. At the end he asked me: "General, you are about to introduce the LEO in Switzerland. Couldn't you take me back with you? I will unfortunately have to retire at 52." I would have gladly brought him back here; even at that age and in that rank he would have been quite a catch for our basic training.

[Question] But aren't you likely to be accused of lowering standards in order to guarantee the required numbers of personnel?

[Answer] That would be entirely unjustified, because the demands made of chief instructors in basic training are enormous, as I have indicated. I hope, however, to be able to break out of today's vicious circle as a result of using the two different career ladders for officer instructors: We have too few officer instructors, which places an excessive burden on the ones we have, which makes the assignment less than attractive--which is why potential candidates do not volunteer for it.

[Question] Before we give you a final basic question--regarding unit training under conditions prevailing at Swiss troop exercise areas--we want to go into three items on the equipment side. First: With the introduction of the LEO combat tank, there is no further use for the Centurions. What happens to them?

[Answer] We are examining the feasibility of installing their turrets and guns as immobile antitank weapons in barriers. As such, they would be able to use effective kinetic energy ammunition at ranges of up to 2000 meters. In addition, these turrets could continue to be manned by those soldiers who transfer from the armored units to the militia. Their expensive training could thus be utilized for some additional years--another important advantage.

[Question] Another question which you have no doubt heard before: Have the defects of the 68 tank been taken care of?

[Answer] Yes, the tank has been rehabilitated. It will eventually be equipped with a fire control device and will then be fully operational in the future.

[Question] Third: What is the future of the armored personnel carrier?

[Answer] Studies for selection of the next generation have been initiated.

[Question] Now for the final question. It is based on the TV broadcast "Zur Sache," concerning the large troop exercise "Dreizack" [Trident], in which three participating foreign military men and journalists were very complimentary about what had transpired, but also criticized the fact that mechanized attacks had been conducted only from roads rather than open terrain--this had been ordered in the maneuver guidelines. Isn't that a sore spot in our training of the MLT? Where should we look for solutions? Is there any way to make improvements?

[Answer] I watched that broadcast too. It was good and the foreign observers were very polite. And what they said was of course true: We are forced to conduct exercises of this sort in the middle of the civilian environment, which imposes certain mandatory restrictions. Consideration for civilian traffic requires that in case of a movement, the guns must remain in the field depot and that we must do without optronic camouflage. (How do you suppose we could traverse a gun back and forth while traveling in a mixed civilian-military column, with a supermarket truck in front of you and the Mercedes of a businessman in a hurry behind?) And in a meeting engagement the tanks cannot exercise their terrain-conquering capabilities according to the book--tear down fences, break off telephone poles, tear up meadows--to reach the commanding high ground as quickly as possible or to enter a partially covered position at the corner of a private house, in the middle of a flower bed! Restrictions of that sort generate grotesque distortions of combat technique and wrong impressions in all witnesses. I have therefore a bit of a problem in seeing the usefulness of large exercises in which battalions or even regiments confront each other. What can be practiced, however, is the activity in the assembly and readiness areas, the entire spectrum of camouflage against electronic and optronic reconnaissance, perhaps even the movement to the line of departure--but no more than that!

Everything else belongs into our federal maneuver areas. Even the mountain firing ranges provide some opportunities--and then we always have Bure in the Ajoie. There we can always practice battalion combat, though under certain conditions; for our purposes, that is the most important phase in armored unit combat.

[Question] Under those conditions, can you accept the fact that, with battalion training as the main task, you are unable to practice true regimental operations, such as counterattacks with two tank battalions?

[Answer] Certainly, but only because there is no other way. I would of course prefer a large exercise area, 50 km long and 10 km wide, with facilities for artillery and air support, which could of course be located only on foreign territory with a 99-year lease agreement. But for a variety of reasons, such desires must remain utopian, and we must certainly continue to seek a solution with optimum terrain enhancement and in a well-organized utilization of all training facilities.

[Question] Would we, therefore, be correct in assuming that your main preoccupation is the greatest possible efficiency in training?

[Answer] Certainly, in the area of responsibility of the inspector general of the branch of service. I would like, therefore, to take this opportunity to express my thanks and one wish: During the last few years, the MLT have always found good support in the improvement of their weapons ranges. More large-scale funding will be required for system-appropriate training with the Leopard tank. It is my great wish that we may continue to be able to count on generous understanding as we have in the past.

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SIMULATORS ESSENTIAL TO MILITIA CREW TRAINING ON LEOPARD 2

Frauenfeld ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT in German Feb 87
pp 70-72

[Article by Col Ernst Stettler: "Introduction of the Leopard 87 Tank"]

[Text] On 12 December 1984, the lower house of parliament unanimously eliminated its differences with the National Council and thereby activated the federal authorization for procurement of 380 Leopard 2 battle tanks. Under this authorization, 35 German tanks will be delivered to the field in 1987 and 345, made in Switzerland under license, starting in 1988. Upon delivery, initial basic training in cadre and recruit schools will be phased in, as well as transition training in field units. This paper will discuss some essential and central aspects of the imminent introduction.

1. Introduction of the Leopard 87 Tank

1.1 Officer Candidate School

With the Mechanized and Light Troops (MLT) Officer Course 1/87 the initial training with the 87 Leo tank will be initiated in our army. Prior to the start of the officers' course, there will be a 3-week special course which will familiarize the future officer candidates, who had trained with the 61 tank, with the basic features of the new tank.

The MLT 2/87 officer course will continue the training of the future platoon leaders. This will ensure that by the time recruit training starts, there will already be platoon leaders available who have been trained with the 87 tank.

1.2 Noncommissioned Officer and Recruit Courses

The first noncommissioned officers and recruit course will take place in the second semester of 1987 as part of the Armored Force Noncommissioned Officer/Recruit Course 222.

The available inventory of battle tanks will initially permit formation of an NCO course and a recruit company. Main emphasis will be on the training concept for tank basic training which has been in use to date and which has proven valid; it will be merely adapted in detail to the requirement of the 87 Leo tank.

Basic training will be extended by 2 weeks for the purpose of optimum utilization of the comprehensive training infrastructure, which has been adapted to the new requirements in a goal-directed manner. Combat and firing training will take place subsequently at the Bure and Hinterrhein exercise areas.

1.3 Transition Courses

At the end of this year the 12th Armored Battalion will undergo the first transition training course for the 87 Leo tank. Inasmuch as by that time neither trained cadres nor the Elsaleo fire simulator will be available, the preliminary cadre course will be extended by one week and the transition course by 4 weeks. Both cadre course and transition course will take place in Thun.

Transition will take place in two phases. Transition Course 1 will provide basic familiarization in the areas of system knowledge, operating procedures and maintenance. Transition Course 2, which will always be given in the subsequent year, serves for unit training and simulated combat deployment at the platoon and company levels.

Transition training for the 87 Leo tank will be provided to all armored force officers, NCOs and soldiers who have a minimum of four refresher courses before them. Troop mechanics do not undergo transition training, but are given their basic training in the recruit schools.

The end of 1989 will see the operational retirement of the 61 tank and the completion of reequipment of the 4th Mechanized Division with 87 Leo tanks. Complete reequipment of all three mechanized divisions will occur by the end of 1993.

1.4 New Organization of the Tank Battalion

In view of the introduction of the 87 Leo tank into the tank battalion of the mechanized division, an analysis was prepared of the conduct of operations of this tank unit and its mission on the battlefield--especially also the role of the armored infantryman.

The analysis of potential deployment modes, e.g., in the fight against operational airborne operations, penetration of the facilities of major units, etc, has indicated that the major demands are made upon the use of the battle tank and that the armored infantrymen's primary task consists of protecting it against special types of threat and of supporting its thrust to the enemy rear area.

This analysis resulted in a new organization of the tank battalions upon the introduction of the 87 tank, as shown in Figure 3 [not included]. Despite the reduction in the number of tanks from 13 to 10 per company, this reorganization results in an increase in the tank battalion from 26 to 30.

Reduction of the number of tanks from four to three per platoon considerably facilitates command at that level and provides the platoon leader (who at the same time serves as a tank commander) with greater freedom of action for using his own tank.

4. Impacts

4.1 Upon Command and Deployment

The introduction of the 87 Leo tank enhances the effect of operational defense. With its fire superiority, and thus its considerably improved dueling capability and its enhanced local and timely availability, the 87 Leo tank deployed with the joint weapons of the armored regiment will make an essential contribution toward maintaining or regaining operational freedom of action.

Existing command and deployment principles remain valid for tactical deployment. They will however be much easier to comply with due to the following:

- greater accuracy of fire and weapons effect;
- combat capability in darkness and poor visibility;
- good survivability;
- improved mobility.

4.2 Upon Training

Obtaining the best possible performance of the 87 Leo tank's superior capabilities at all levels and under combat conditions requires high training quality and effectiveness and competent instructors.

The necessary volume of training can be reached without basic changes in current resources (personnel, time, funds).

The present practice of specialization and decentralization of effort will be continued.

While the great technical complexity of the weapon system does not indicate a need for additional training requirements for the crew (where simplification and additional training just about balance each other), it will cause a drastic shift and greater emphasis in the areas of system familiarity and operating sequences.

It is another matter for the commanders, where there will be a greater need for training. This is caused primarily by the variety of available system options and control facilities. This additional requirement will be covered by extending basic training as well as by integrating additional training with the extended cadre training.

Training aids and simulators are considered highly important. The standard which had already been reached in this area could be maintained and even improved with the development and procurement of the new generation firing simulator (Elsaleo).

5. Conclusion

When delivered to the field from 1987 on, the 87 Leo tank will constitute a most effective resource. It has great terrain agility, has target accuracy, firepower and provides reliable protection.

The 87 Leo tank will provide the expected combat effectiveness and deterrent effect only if its personnel is fully familiar with the entire weapon system as a result of realistic, demanding and effective training.

The tank corps is enthusiastic about this mission and is prepared to accomplish it through determined and minute preparation and conduct of training, but also through great effort and high motivation.

Figure 1

| | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| (2) Kdo MLT OS 1/2 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 |
| (3) Pz Klasse LEO | | | | | | | |
| (4) Kdo Pz Trp RS 2../22.. | 1 | 1 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| (5) Pz Kp LEO | | | | | | | |
| (6) UK I LEO | 12 | 20 | | | | | |
| (7) Kdo UK Pz 87 Leo | | | 8 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 9 |
| (6) UK I LEO | | | | | | | |
| (1) Bild 1. Ausbildung/Umschulung auf Pz 87 Leo. | | | | | | | |

Key:

1. Fig 1.: Training/Transition Training for 87 Leo Tank
2. Mechanized and Light Troops Headquarters Officer Class 1/2
3. LEO Tank Course
4. Armored Forces Headquarters Recruit School 2../22..
5. LEO Tank Company
6. LEO Transition Course I
7. LEO 87 Tank Command Transition Course

Figure 2

| Nov/Dez 1987 | 9.11. | 16.11. | 23.11. | 30.11. | 7.12. 12.12. | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|  12 (2) UK 1/WK für Umzuschulende | Einführungskurs (4) Rgt/Bat Stab 17.11. <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <tr> <td>KVK Of/Uof</td> <td>1. UK-Woche</td> <td>2. UK-Woche</td> <td>3. UK-Woche</td> <td>4. UK-Woche</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(5)</td> <td>(6)</td> <td>(6)</td> <td>(6)</td> <td>(6)</td> </tr> </table> | | | | | KVK Of/Uof | 1. UK-Woche | 2. UK-Woche | 3. UK-Woche | 4. UK-Woche | (5) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) |
| KVK Of/Uof | 1. UK-Woche | 2. UK-Woche | 3. UK-Woche | 4. UK-Woche | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (5) | (6) | (6) | (6) | (6) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  12 (3) WK für Uebrige | 18.11. <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <tr> <td>Fk Fhr KVK</td> <td>1. WK-Woche</td> <td>2. WK-Woche</td> <td>3. WK-Woche</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(7)</td> <td>(8)</td> <td>(8)</td> <td>(8)</td> </tr> </table> | | | | | Fk Fhr KVK | 1. WK-Woche | 2. WK-Woche | 3. WK-Woche | (7) | (8) | (8) | (8) | | |
| Fk Fhr KVK | 1. WK-Woche | 2. WK-Woche | 3. WK-Woche | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (7) | (8) | (8) | (8) | | | | | | | | | | | | |

(1) Bild 2. UK I Leo/Wk 1987 Pz Bat 12.

Key:

1. Fig 2.: Transition Course I LEO/Weapons Exercises 1987,
12th Tank Battalion.
2. Transition Course I/Weapons Exercise for those undergoing
transition training
3. Weapons exercise for others
4. Introductory Course, Regimental and Battalion Staff
5. Cadre Introductory Course, officers and noncommissioned officers
6. Transition Course Week [1 through 4]
7. Radio Operators and Drivers Introductory Course
8. Weapons Exercise Week [1 through 3]

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ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY SEEN PROBLEM FACING ALL NORDIC STATES

Helsinki HUVUDSTADSLADET in Swedish 24 Feb 87 p 12

[Text] The increasing strain on energy production capacity and the debate over electricity production are common features in all the Nordic countries. This is apparent from the Nordic energy survey released by the Nordic Industrial Federations on Monday.

Industrial energy consumption has become considerably more efficient in all the Nordic countries since the first oil crisis. At the same time industrial fuel consumption has decreased. However increasing industrial production is still linked to increased consumption of electricity. For this reason the uncertainty about electricity supplies in several Nordic countries is obviously disturbing in the context of future industrial development.

Rapid Increase

Electricity consumption has increased rapidly in the Nordic countries. In 1979 the region consumed 241 terawatt hours in all while in 1985 the figure was 307 terawatt hours. That is an increase of 66 terawatt hours. The amount of electricity generated by nuclear power rose by 47 terawatt hours. Thus nuclear power has been of great importance in meeting the increased need for electricity.

In 1985 the Swedish and Finnish nuclear power plants generated 75 terawatt hours of electricity, representing 25 percent of the electricity produced in the Nordic countries. Water power supplied 60 percent, back-pressure power 7 percent and conventional steam turbine power 9 percent.

A lively debate is taking place in all the Nordic countries concerning the expansion of electricity production capacity. New steam turbine plants based on burning coal are criticized for environmental reasons. A further expansion of water power is not regarded as desirable in either Norway or Sweden, the countries that still have undeveloped water power potential. Power plants based on the combined production of electricity and heat are possible only as long as there is a need for heat.

Wind Power

New forms of producing electricity, such as wind power, have not had much impact yet. For example only 0.2 percent of the electricity produced in Denmark in 1985 came from wind power. Using the Norwegian gas reserves to produce electricity is still a possible alternative, but the price of gas is a consideration here. The first gas power plant that will produce 5-7 terawatt hours of electricity annually should go into operation by 1992.

Shared Network

The Nordic countries are linked together with a shared high-voltage network and within the framework of this network their power plants are operated jointly. They try to balance electricity production in the different countries through exports and imports, which has considerable economic advantages. But the potential shortage of basic power capacity is not solved by this cooperation. Electricity consumption will be stepped up among Nordic countries when an ocean cable between Forsmark and Raumo goes into operation in 1989.

Nordic cooperation has increased in the oil sector. Business purchases have been part of the picture in the form of purchases of distribution companies. With an eye on the future, natural gas is also a promising new area for Nordic energy cooperation, according to the survey.

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